The Argentine episode is valuable in showing that some of the worst features of so-called administrative protectionism are not administrative at all, but legislative. The federal officials who administer the invisible tariff, in general, are not concerned with the economic effects of their policies. One finds occasionally men who want to help domestic producers, or who want to help the importers. But they are exceptions. As a rule, the motive which animates the customs officers, and the officials of the Department of Agriculture, in dealing with imports, is to move the goods as rapidly as is consistent with the spirit and letter of the law, keeping in mind always that their decisions are subject to review and, it may be, reversal by the courts. When Congress, however, has deliberately injected an element of economic protectionism into customs law or into sanitary legislation, the administrative officers have no choice. They must enforce the law, and bear the brunt of the criticism.
The Present Danger
The danger of abuse of administrative control of imports at present lies, not in the economic but in the political aspects of our foreign relations. The American people have been greatly disturbed by the aggressive and seemingly lawless policies of the so-called dictator states. They want to do something to show their disapproval, but, so far at least, they don't want to get involved in war. As a halfway measure, economic sanctions have been proposed, in the form of embargoes on trade with the offending nation. But since economic sanctions by congressional action would be difficult, probably impossible, to obtain, why not secure the desired result by administrative action? In the armory of the invisible tariff, many powerful trade weapons stand ready at hand, the antidumping duties, duties penalizing trade discrimination and countervailing duties to offset export bounties. It is true that none of these weapons can be used legally except under conditions specified in statutes. Furthermore, the conditions have to do with the direct effect of specified policies of foreigners, or of their governments, on American commerce and industry. They have nothing whatsoever to do with disregard of international law, nor with military aggression. Ordinarily, these distinctions do not need emphasis, but in a time of great tension in foreign affairs they may be forgotten or disregarded. Even highlyplaced officials speak of fighting fire with fire. This is dangerous talk. A democracy, if it is to remain a democracy, cannot afford to imitate totalitarian methods. We cannot afford, in order to gain a tactical advantage in foreign policy, to encourage administrators to disregard not only the letter of the law but its spirit as well.
The danger is real. Economic sanctions, many thoughtful observers believe, are only a prelude to war. If this is true, then it is of the utmost importance that whatever new controls are imposed on our foreign trade for political purposes shall be imposed by Congress, not by administrative action.