ALEXANDER II. (1818-1881), emperor of Russia, eldest son of Nicholas I., was born on April 29, 1818. Up to the moment of his accession in 1855 no one ever imagined that he would be known to posterity as a great reformer. In so far as he had any decided political convictions he seemed to be animated with the reactionary spirit of his time. The moral atmosphere of St. Peters burg (Leningrad) was very unfavourable to the development of any originality of thought or character. It was a time of govern ment on martinet principles, under which all freedom of thought and all private initiative were suppressed vigorously by the admin istration. Alexander Nicolaevich received the education commonly given to young Russians of good family at that time—a smatter ing of a great many subjects and a good practical acquaintance with the chief modern European languages. His ordinary life was that of an officer of the Guards, modified by the ceremonial duties incumbent on him as heir to the throne. His natural kindliness and indisposition for a military life had been fostered by his tutor Zhukovski, the amiable humanitarian poet, and they remained with him all through life. In 1841 he married the daughter of the grand duke Louis II. of Hesse, Maximilienne Wilhelmine Marie, thenceforward known as Maria Alexandrovna, who bore him six sons and two daughters. He did not travel much abroad, for his father, in his desire to exclude from Holy Russia the subversive ideas current in Western Europe, disapproved of foreign tours and could not consistently encourage in his own family what he tried to prevent among the rest of his subjects. He visited England, how ever, in 1839, and in the years immediately preceding his accession he was entrusted with several missions to the courts of Berlin and Vienna. On March 2, 1855, during the Crimean War, he succeeded to the throne on the death of his father.
The first year of the new reign was devoted to the prosecution of the war and, after the fall of Sevastopol, to negotiations for peace. Then began a period of radical reforms, recommended by public opinion and carried out by the autocratic power. The rule of Nicholas, which had sacrificed all other interests to that of making Russia an irresistibly strong military power, had been tried by the Crimean War and found wanting. A new system had, therefore, to be adopted. All who had any pretentions to enlightenment declared loudly that the only way of restoring Russia to its proper position in Europe was to develop its natural resources and to reform thor oughly all branches of the administration. Fortunately for Russia the autocratic power was in the hands of a man who was impression able enough to be deeply influenced by the spirit of the time, and who had sufficient prudence and practical common sense to prevent his being carried away by the prevailing excitement into the dangerous region of Utopian dreaming. At first he moved so slowly that many of the impatient, would-be reformers began to murmur. But important changes were made in the legislation concerning industry and commerce, and the new freedom thus accorded pro duced a large number of limited liability companies. At the same time plans were formed for constructing a great network of rail ways, partly for economic and partly for military purposes. Further progress was blocked by a great obstacle—the existence of serfage, and Alexander II. grappled boldly with the difficult and dangerous problem. Taking advantage of a petition presented by the Polish landed proprietors of the Lithuanian provinces, praying that their relations with the serfs might be regulated in a more satisfactory way, he authorized the formation of committees "for ameliorating the condition of the peasants" and laid down the principles on which the amelioration was to be effected. Without consulting his ordi nary advisers, the tsar then ordered a copy of these instructions to be forwarded to the provincial governors of European Russia and suggested that perhaps the landed proprietors of other provinces might express a similar desire. In all provinces where serfage existed emancipation committees were formed. Emancipation in volved very complicated problems affecting deeply the economic, social and political future of the nation. The main point at issue was whether the serfs should become agricultural labourers de pendent economically and administratively on the.landlords or be transformed into a class of independent communal proprietors. The emperor gave his support to the latter project, and the Russian peasantry accordingly acquired rights and privileges such as were enjoyed at that time by no other peasantry in Europe. In the nu merous other questions submitted to him he began by consulting carefully the conflicting authorities, and while leaning as a rule rather to the side of those who were known as "Liberals" he never went so far as they desired and always sought some middle course by which conflicting interests might be reconciled. On March 3, 1861, the sixth anniversary of his accession, the emancipation law was signed and published. Other reforms followed in quick succes sion during the next five or six years : army and navy organization, a new judicial administration on the French model, a new penal code and a greatly simplified system of civil and criminal procedure, an elaborate scheme of local self-government for the rural districts and the large towns, with elective assemblies possessing a restricted right of taxation, and a new rural and municipal police under the direction of the minister of the interior. These new institutions were incomparably better than the old ones which they replaced, but they did not work such miracles as inexperienced enthusiasts expected. Comparisons were made, not with the past, but with an ideal state of things which never existed in Russia or elsewhere. Hence arose a general feeling of disappointment which acted on different natures in different ways. Thus appeared in the educated classes two extreme groups : on the one hand, the discontented Conservatives, who recommended a return to a more severe disciplinarian regime; and on the other, the discontented Radicals, who would have been satisfied with nothing less than the adoption of a thoroughgoing socialistic programme. Between the two ex tremes stood the discontented Moderates, who indulged freely in grumbling without knowing how the unsatisfactory state of things was to be remedied. For some years the emperor, with his sound common sense and dislike of exaggeration, held the balance fairly between the two extremes ; but when radicalism assumed more and more the form of secret societies and revolutionary agitation, he felt constrained to adopt severe repressive measures.
The revolutionary agitation was of a very peculiar kind. It was confined to a section of the educated classes and emanated from the universities and higher technical schools. At the beginning of the reform period there had been much enthusiasm for scientific as opposed to classical education. Russia required, it was said, not classical scholars, but practical scientific men capable of develop ing her natural resources. The government, in accordance with that view, had encouraged scientific studies until it discovered to its astonishment that there was some mysterious connection be tween natural science and revolutionary tendencies. Thus arose a struggle between the youthful, hot-headed partisans of revolution ary physical science and the zealous official guardians of political order—a struggle which has made the strange term Nihilism (q.v.) a familiar word not only in Russia but also in western Europe. The movement gradually assumed the form of terrorism and aimed at the assassination of prominent officials and even of the emperor himself, and the natural result was that the reaction ary tendencies of the government were strengthened.
In foreign policy Alexander II. showed the same qualities of character as in internal affairs, ever trying prudently to steer a middle course. When he came to the throne the Crimean War was still going on, but he concluded peace with the allies as soon as he thought the national honour had been satisfied. Prince Gorchakov for fifteen years avoided foreign complications so that the internal strength of the country might be developed, while the national pride and ambition received a certain satisfaction by the expansion of Russian influence and domination in Asia. Twice, indeed, during that period the chancellor ran the risk of provoking war. The first occasion was in 1863, when the Western powers seemed inclined to interfere in the Polish question, and the Russian chancery declared categorically that no interference would be tolerated. The second occasion was during the Franco-German War of 187o-71, when the cabinet of St. Petersburg boldly de clared that it considered itself no longer bound by the Black Sea clause of the Treaty of Paris. On both occasions hostilities were averted. Not so on the next occasion, when Russia abandoned her attitude of recueillement. When the Eastern question was raised in 1875 by the insurrection of Hercegovina, Alexander II. had no intention or wish to provoke a great European war. No doubt he was waiting for an opportunity of recovering the portion of Bessarabia which had been ceded by the treaty of Paris, and he perceived in the disturbed state of eastern Europe a possibility of obtaining the desired rectification of frontier, but he hoped to effect his purpose by diplomatic means in conjunction with Austria. At the same time he was anxious to obtain for the Christians of Turkey some amelioration of their condition, and to give thereby some satisfaction to his own subjects. As autocratic ruler of the nation which had long considered itself the defender of the Eastern Ortho dox faith and the protector of the Slav nationalities, he could not remain inactive at such a crisis, and he gradually allowed himself to drift into a position from which he could not retreat without ob taining some tangible result. Supposing that the Porte would yield to diplomatic pressure and menace so far as to make some reason able concessions, he delivered his famous Moscow speech, in which he declared that if Europe would not secure a better position for the oppressed Slays he would act alone.
The diplomatic pressure failed and war became inevitable. Dur ing the campaign he displayed the same perseverance and the same moderation that he had shown in the emancipation of the serfs. To those who began to despair of success, and advised him to conclude peace on almost any terms so as to avoid greater disasters, he turned a deaf ear ; but when his more headstrong advisers urged him to insist on terms which would probably have produced a conflict with Great Britain and Austria, he resolved, after some hesitation, to make the requisite concessions. In this resolution he was in fluenced by the discovery that he could not rely on the expected support of Germany, and the discovery made him waver in his devotion to the German alliance, which had been the main pivot of his foreign policy; but his personal attachment to the emperor William prevented his adopting a hostile attitude towards the empire he had helped to create.
The patriotic excitement produced by the war did not weaken the revolutionary agitation. The struggle between the Terrorists and the police authorities became more and more intense, and attempts at assassination became more and more frequent. Alexan der II. succumbed by degrees to the mental depression produced originally by the disappointments which he experienced in his home and foreign policy; and in 188o, when he had reigned twenty-five years, he entrusted to Count Loris-Melikov a large share of the executive power. In that year the empress died, and a few weeks afterwards he married secretly a Princess Dolgoruki, with whom he had entertained intimate relations for some years. Early in 1881, on the advice of Count Loris-Melikov, he determined to try the effect of some moderate liberal reforms on the revolutionary agi tation, and for this purpose he caused a ukase to be prepared creat ing special commission, composed of high officials and private per sonages who should prepare reforms in various branches of the administration. On the very day on which this ukase was signed— March 13,188i—he fell a victim to a Nihilist plot. When driving in one of the central streets of St. Petersburg, near the Winter Palace, he was mortally wounded by the explosion of some small bombs and died a few hours afterwards. (D. M. W.) BIBLIOGRAPHY.-N. P. Ogarev, Essai sur la Situation russe; lettres a Bibliography.-N. P. Ogarev, Essai sur la Situation russe; lettres a un anglais (London 1862) ; A. P. Vretos, Les douze Armies du refine d'Alexandre 11., empereur de Russie (1867) ; I. Golovin, Russland unter Alexander II. (Leipzig, 1871) ; B. Bazilevskii, Les journaux revolution naires publiees en Russie entre 187o et 188o (1905). See also the rele vant chapters in the following: Lavisse et Rambaud, Histoire generale, vol. xi. (1899) ; Cambridge Modern History, vols. xi. and xii. (1 909) ; F. H. Skrine, Expansion of Russia 1815-1goo (1915) ; A. A. Kornilov, Modern History of Russia (1916) ; B. Pares, A History of Russia (1926).