NATIONAL SOCIALIST GERMANY SINCE 1933 Hitler formed a cabinet two days later. It contained three Na tional Socialists—Hitler (Chancellor), Frick (Interior), Goering (Aviation)—and eight others, mostly Nationalists, taken over from the Papen and Schleicher cabinets—Papen (Vice-Chancel lor), Neurath (Foreign Affairs), Krosigk (Finance), Blomberg (Defence), Hugenberg (Economics), Eltz-Rubenach (Communi cations), Seldte (Labour), and Gartner (Justice). The Nationalist majority had expected to dominate Hitler; but the reverse took place. Papen and Hugenberg were later dropped, and new Nation al Socialists were taken in: Darre (Agriculture), Schacht (Eco nomics), Goebbels (Propaganda), Hess (Deputy without port folio), and Kerrl (Church). Hitler announced a new Reichstag election for March 5. On the evening of February 27 the central part of the Reichstag Building was destroyed by fire. Whether the fire was set by the Communists, as charged by Reichstag President Goering and the National Socialists, or by secret agents of the lat ter, as generally believed abroad and by many persons in Germany itself, or solely by a half-witted Dutch boy, Van der Lubbe, who was executed for it, was never definitely determined. But the fire was made the pretext by the Nazis, as the National Socialists were popularly called, for the wholesale arrest of Communists and the suppression of their newspapers, so that they could play no part in the Reichstag election. As a result of this and other strong-arm methods the Nazis won 44 per cent of the votes, and, with 8 per cent of their Nationalist coalition allies, had a clear majority of per cent. Though Hitler was opposed in principle to parliamentary government, which he had denounced as a lamentable failure, he was ready to use the ballot and the existing constitutional ma chinery to secure absolute control: on March 23 the Reichstag majority virtually set aside the Weimar Constitution, leaving virtually dictatorial power in Hitler's hands. The Nazi Revolu tion had begun.
In reorganizing Germany Hitler proceeded to sweep away to a large degree the old division of Germany into States—Prussia, Ba varia, Saxony, Baden, etc. He set up instead a more centralized government ruled from Berlin. Germany, like France as a result of the French Revolution, became "one and indivisible." Federal government was replaced by unitary government. This gave Ger many greatly increased strength, abolished local "states' rights" jealousies, and put an end to expensive and unnecessary duplication of administration. He also abolished or forced the "voluntary" dissolution of all political parties except the National Socialist Party. Germany became a one-party state, the state being con trolled by the party. Hitler became the supreme head of both. On the "leadership principle" he appointed his lieutenants who were responsible to him. They in turn appointed their subordinates, and so on down through the hierarchy of state and party. One of the chief duties of the party is to instil Nazi tenets into the party members and also into all German citizens, thus uniting the whole German people into a single "Totalitarian State." One of the main Nazi aims was to reduce the influence of the Jews in Germany who had secured much power and many coveted positions under the Weimar Republic. A law of April 7, for purifying the civil service decreed the dismissal of Jewish officials except those who held the office before 1914, had fought at the front, or had a son, father or brother killed in the World War. Many Jews, and also Liberals, were dismissed from the univer sities and schools. This and other harsh treatment of the Jews caused a boycott of German goods by many foreigners, hut the foreign boycott only fanned the anti-Semitic feeling in Germany. It increased until in November, 1935, a series of laws sought to settle the Jewish problem once and for all. In place of the dis tinction between "Aryan" and "non-Aryan," the people of the Reich fall into three categories : "Germans and persons of kindred blood," "Jews," and "Mixed Jews." "Jews" are persons who have at least three racially Jewish grandparents, that is, who are 75% Jewish ; also persons who are racially 5o% Jewish, if (1) they belonged to a Jewish religious community at the time of the passage of the Nurnberg laws of September 15, 1935, or (2) if at that time they were married to a Jew or married one subsequently, or (3) if they are the offspring of a marriage with a 75 per cent Jew or full Jew concluded after the passage of the Nurnberg law. "Jews" under this definition may not become full citizens, or hold office. They are condemned to a kind of ghetto existence with a cultural life of their own.
"Mixed Jews" are those who have only 25 per cent Jewish blood, or who have So per cent but do not fall under any of the three conditions mentioned above. Such "Mixed Jews" may marry Germans under certain restrictions but not one another. They may also acquire full citizenship and enjoy its privileges.
These provisions, however, were not generously interpreted and the plight of all persons of Jewish blood grew more and more desperate. It seemed to reach a culmination during the night of Nov. 9-10, 1938. Organized bands of National Socialists all over Germany, evidently at the instigation of high Government officials, began about 2 A.M. an anti-Semitic orgy of destruction, looting, and incendiarism. Some 500 synagogues were more or less de stroyed or wrecked by bombs and fire. The police offered no interference, and the fire department confined its efforts chiefly to preventing the spread of the fire to neighbouring houses. Meanwhile other National Socialist bands of young men toured the streets, smashing the windows of every Jewish shop and hurl ing the furniture and goods into the street.
The following afternoon Dr. Goebbels issued a proclamation, saying: "The justified and understandable anger of the German people over the cowardly Jewish murder of a German diplomat in Paris found extensive expression during last night. In numerous cities and towns of the Reich retaliatory action has been under taken against Jewish buildings and businesses.... A final answer to the Jewish assassination in Paris will be given to Jewry by way of legislation and ordinance." This final answer was given a few days later by a decree which made the whole body of Jews in Germany collectively responsible for the crazed act of a young Polish Jew in Paris. It imposed an "atonement" fine of I ,000,000. 00o marks on German Jewry. It took the form of a capital levy of 20% of the property of all German Jews possessing more than 5.000 marks. Each Jew must pay at least a quarter of his quota of the fine on or before December 15, and pay the remainder in three more quarterly instalments in Feb., May, and Aug. 1939, or pay it all in a lump sum any time before the final date on Aug. 15, No Jew might leave Germany until he showed tax receipts proving that he had paid the full 20% of his property.
Another decree ordered all Jewish business men to repair at once at their own expense all the shattered windows and other damage that the National Socialist gangs had wantonly destroyed on the night of November 9-10. Insurance companies were for bidden to pay to Jews any insurance on the wrecked property. Still another decree ordered the complete elimination of Jews from all retail trade before Jan. 1, 1939, and their businesses were "Aryan ized," that is, taken over by Aryans at very low figures arranged by the Government. Jews in Berlin were forbidden to appear in any German theatres, movies, cafés, concert halls, and bathing establishments, or to set foot in certain parts of the city unless provided with a pass. Landlords in the better residential dis tricts were encouraged to evict Jews before leases expired. The Jews were thus restricted to a pitiful ghetto-like existence remi niscent of the Middle Ages. In Oct. 1939 Hitler attempted a new "solution" of the Jewish problem. Large numbers of Jews from Vienna and other cities in Eastern Germany were transported to the Lublin district of conquered Poland. This district was to be made a settlement area also for hundreds of thousands of Polish Jews.
The Papacy signed a Concordat with the Nazi State on July 8, 1933, which guaranteed to German Roman Catholics various privileges, including the continuance of religious youth organiza tions and certain societies. But disputes over the interpretation and observance of the Concordat have caused great friction be tween the Catholics and the Nazis.
The Protestants have also had serious conflicts with the Nazi government. The twenty-eight Lutheran and Calvinistic churches which were in existence when Hitler came into power hastened to unite in July, 1933, into a single German Evangelical Church. But as the control of this passed into the hands of so-called "Ger man Christians," who were regarded by more devout persons as being more nationalistically German than Christian, many pastors refused to accept its authority. They established their own Con fessional Synods, defying all efforts to unite all Lutherans and Calvinists in a single church.
In five years Hitler cut down the number of unemployed in Germany from 6,000,000 in January 1933, to 423,00o in April 1938. In reality he virtually wiped out unemployment alto gether, for among these 423,00o some were merely temporarily unemployed owing to changing work or residence, etc. This re markable reduction of unemployment greatly benefited the la bouring class as a whole, but it did not improve the standard of living of the individual worker, because wages have remained fixed while the cost of living has increased.
In foreign policy, by a combination of shrewd skill, bluff, and threats of force, Hitler achieved a series of diplomatic victories which enabled him to throw off many of the unwise and irritating restrictions of the Versailles Treaty of 1919• In 1933, since the former Allied Powers had done little or nothing to carry out their implied obligation to reduce their own armaments after Germany was disarmed, Hitler withdrew from the Disarmament Confer ence and gave notice on October 19 of withdrawal from the League of Nations. On Jan. 26, 1934, he made a ten-year treaty with Poland by which Germany and Poland sought to establish friendship, recognized each other's frontiers, and agreed not to use force against each other; this drew Poland to some extent from dependence on France to dependence on Germany. By a plebiscite in the Saar on Jan. 13, 1935• in which 90% voted for Germany, he reunited 811,000 Germans to the Fatherland.
On March 16, 1935, Hitler suddenly announced the immediate reintroduction of compulsory military service—a unilateral re pudiation of the Versailles Treaty limiting Germany's force to a long-service professional army of ioo,000. Service in this new army was at first fixed at one year, but in August was extended to two years. An Anglo-German naval agreement, signed on June 18, 1935, authorized Germany's building up to 35% of British tonnage. On March 7, 1936, he ventured successfully in marching troops into the demilitarized zone of the Rhineland, and his action was acclaimed two weeks later by 98.79% of the German voters. A five-year agreement with Japan, signed on Nov. 25, 1936, was adhered to by Italy a few months later and strengthened the so called "Rome-Berlin Axis." Greater Germany, 1938-39.—Having thus strengthened Ger many's military and diplomatic position, Hitler decided in Jan. 1938, that the time had come to revise what he regarded as some of the "criminal injustices" in the territorial clauses of the Versailles Treaty.
The clauses forbidding the union of Germany and Austria were contrary to the principle of self-determination, and were a polit ical mistake. Both countries had been united for centuries in the Holy Roman Empire. Though at war in the time of Frederick the Great and in 1866, they had become allies against Napoleon I and again in 1879. They had suffered side by side during the World War. Austria as pared down in 1919 was almost purely German in speech, tradition, and sentiment. To forbid them to unite was a psychological factor making them want to unite. Again, in 1931, the thwarting by France and her eastern satellites of the proposed economic, but not political, union was a short sighted mistake, because such a successful diplomatic achievement might perhaps have enabled Dr. Bruning to remain in office and prevent Hitler from becoming chancellor.
After 1933 the sentiment of the Austrians toward Germany rap idly changed. The majority now abhorred union with Germany when they saw beyond the border how Hitler was persecuting Catholics, Protestants, and Jews, and destroying trade unions, political parties, and personal liberty. This abhorrence was in creased by the secret incitement and public propaganda by which German National Socialists tried to stir up revolts within Austria against the Austrian Republic, so that Germany might have a pre text to intervene and annex the country. Nazi incitement did suc ceed in stirring up an abortive rising or "putsch" on July in which the Austrian Chancellor, Dollfuss, was assassinated. The ringleaders were executed and Dr. Schuschnigg succeeded Dollfuss as Chancellor.
During the next four years German Nazis kept up their policy of incitement to revolt with Hitler's approval, but publicly Hitler declared: "Germany has neither the wish nor the intention to mix in internal Austrian affairs, or to annex or unite with Austria." Nevertheless, his acts soon belied his words. During 1937 and the early weeks of 1938 he adopted toward Austria the same methods which he was also to use against Czechoslovakia and against Poland. He first encouraged Nazi sympathizers in Austria to acts of violence and disorder against Dr. Schuschnigg's re publican government. Then he turned on a violent radio propa ganda among his own people depicting the intolerable "atrocities" supposedly perpetrated by Dr. Schuschnigg against the Nazi trouble-makers in Austria. Finally, he threatened to use force, and backed up his threat by massing German troops along the frontier of the country he was determined to invade and annex.
Chancellor Schuschnigg was persuaded to visit Hitler at his Berchtesgaden mountain villa on Feb. 12, 1938, to talk over the situation. Hitler used such strong threats that Schuschnigg felt compelled, in order to prevent greater dangers to Austrian in dependence, to promise to take some Austrian Nazis into his cabinet, in return for Hitler's promise to respect the independence of Austria. Three weeks later Schuschnigg sought to strengthen his position by announcing that he would hold a plebiscite in Austria on March 13 to endorse his policies. On March II Hitler sent ultimatums to Vienna demanding that the plebiscite must be postponed and that Schuschnigg must resign. He empha sized his demands by massing German troops and Black Shirts along the Austrian frontier. Armed resistance by Austria would have been hopeless. To avert bloodshed Schuschnigg resigned. Before dawn next morning German troops and police had poured over the frontier at many points and made straight for Vienna. On March 13 Hitler proclaimed the annexation of Austria to Ger many and made a triumphal entry into the Austrian capital the next day. This aggrandizement of the Third Reich by 32,300 sq.mi. and by 6,760,000 subjects was his first step in the creation of a "Greater Germany." The next step was to annex the 3,500,000 Sudeten Germans who lived in Czechoslovakia in a fringe of territory just beyond the German frontier. Before the World War these Germans in Bohe mia had been Austrian subjects. They were given to Czechoslo vakia by the peace treaties because of historical and strategic con siderations. Bohemia is surrounded by high mountains which make an excellent strategic frontier. When the Czechs of Bohemia were given independence as part of the new State of Czechoslovakia, the frontier was quite properly drawn along the ridge of the mountains, even though it left the Sudeten Germans under Czech rule. The Sudeten Germans naturally disliked this. But no serious troubles occurred until their economic condition grew worse as a result of the general world economic depression and until the advent of Hitler to power in Germany in 1933. Then a Sudeten "Little Hitler," Konrad Henlein, began to agitate for the annexa tion of the Sudetenland to Germany. His hopes were greatly en couraged by Hitler's successful annexation of Austria. The Czechs were alarmed. In May 1938, fearing that Hitler might intervene during the municipal elections in the Sudetenland, the Czechs mobilized part of their army. Hitler publicly disclaimed any in tention of intervening, but realized that the Czechs might fight sooner than give up the Sudetens and the good strategic frontier. Therefore Hitler immediately gave orders for the building of a great line of fortifications in the west against France. This German "Westwall" opposite the French Maginot Line would, he hoped, protect his western frontier in case he had to fight the Czechs and the French should try to come to the assistance of their Czech allies.
During the summer of 1938, while the Westwall was being rap idly brought to completion, Konrad Henlein increased his agitation for the annexation of the Sudetenland to Germany. He made sev eral visits to Hitler. Serious disorders broke out. Finally, on Sep tember 12, Hitler announced that the Sudetens must be allowed to join the Reich. This brought on a European crisis : the Czechs would resist by force; they would probably be assisted by the French, and the French by the English and perhaps by the Rus sians, while Germany would perhaps be joined by Italy. To avert such a general European war, the British Prime Minister, Sir Neville Chamberlain, made an attempt at "appeasement" by three flights to Berchtesgaden, Godesberg, and Munich for personal con versations with Hitler. He got the strong impression that Hitler was "prepared to risk a world war" rather than abandon his de mand for immediate annexation of the Sudetenland. In this criti cal situation, the British and French Prime Ministers, Chamberlain and Daladier, and Hitler and Mussolini, met and signed on Sep tember 3o the Munich Accord. By this the German armies were allowed to occupy the Sudetenland within the next two weeks. Greater Germany was thereby further aggrandized by 29,000 sq.mi. and 3,000,00o new subjects.
Hitler had declared to Mr. Chamberlain personally and in a pub lic speech that the Sudetenland represented "his last territorial ambitions in Europe." Nevertheless, in less than six months he resorted to the same methods of inciting internal disorders, vio lent propaganda, and threats of force against Czechoslovakia. This unhappy country, already partly dismembered at Munich and deprived of its strategic frontier and strong fortifications, felt that armed resistance would be hopeless. At Hitler's demand President Benes resigned and his successor, Dr. Hacha, was "invited" to a conference with Hitler at Berlin. He arrived on March at 1 :10 A.M., and soon after 5 A.M., according to a German communiqué, "trustfully laid the fate of the Czech people and the country in the hands of the Fuehrer of the German Reich." Already German troops had invaded Czechoslovakia, and by 9:15 A.M. their vanguard had entered Prague, the former capital of the now extinct Czechoslovakian Republic. Hitler quickly followed them and announced that henceforth the "Protectorate of Bohe mia-Moravia" belonged to the German Reich, and would be allowed to enjoy a certain amount of self-government.
In this final dismemberment of Czechoslovakia Hitler encour aged the Slovaks to revolt from Czech rule and to set up a tiny little Slovak Republic. He promised to guarantee its existence for 25 years, but at the same time secured the right to move German troops through it and to build German fortifications in it against Poland. On March 22, he also annexed Memelland, which before the World War had been part of East Prussia.
Encouraged by these successes Hitler next turned to Poland. Already on Oct. 24, 1938, less than a month after the Munich Accord, it was suggested privately to Poland that there ought to be a German-Polish "settlement." The city of Danzig, which was mainly German in population, ought to be returned to the Reich, and Germany ought to be given a strip of territory across the Polish Corridor to connect East Prussia with the rest of the Reich. This suggestion, or rather demand, was renewed the following January and discussed at Berchtesgaden where Colonel Beck, the Polish foreign minister visited Hitler. Colonel Beck ap parently neither accepted nor flatly rejected the demand. But on March 21, less than a week after Hitler's annexation of Bohemia, the demand was again renewed, the Poles rejected it on March 26. but were willing to listen to other proposals. They naturally feared that the cession to Germany of Danzig and a strip of terri tory across the Polish Corridor would simply be a first step in the dismemberment of Poland.
Meanwhile, Prime Minister Chamberlain's attitude had been completely altered by Hitler's acts since the Munich Accord. In annexing 6,000,000 Czechs in Bohemia-Moravia Hitler could no' longer pretend that he merely wanted to annex territories of Ger man population; he seemed to be aiming at the domination of Eastern Europe. Moreover, Mr. Chamberlain felt that Hitler had flagrantly broken the promise personally given to him at Munich that the Sudetenland represented his last territorial ambitions in Europe; the limit had been reached in allowing Hitler to remake the map of Europe in disregard of promises and international agreements by force and threats of force. The British Prime Min ister therefore announced on March 31 that in the event of any German action which clearly threatened Polish independence and which the Polish Government accordingly considered vital to re sist with force, Great Britain would lend the Polish Government all the support in its power.
Mr. Chamberlain's promise of support encouraged the Poles to con tinue to refuse Hitler's demands for Danzig and a pathway across the Polish Corridor, which Hitler repeated in a public speech on April 28. In this speech Hitler also denounced the German-Polish treaty of friendship and also the Anglo-German naval agreement of 1935. This caused a new European diplomatic crisis which grew in intensity during the summer. The German press complained of the "frightful conditions" and "intolerable provocations" in Poland. German Nazis began to enter Danzig as "tourists," and Danzig Nazis began to smug gle large quantities of arms and war material into the city, as if in preparation for an armed uprising to bring Danzig "home to the Reich." The Poles increased the number of Polish customs inspectors in order to check the smuggling. A sharp dispute arose over the rights and duties of these customs officers. Poland warned that if they were interfered with, Poland would consider it an aggressive action. The Danzig Nazis took the dispute to Hitler on August 9. He appears to have been greatly angered by what he regarded as another Polish "provocation." The British, fearing Hitler's designs on Poland, had instructed their ambassador at Berlin, Sir Nevile Henderson, to warn the German Government that Britain was determined to uphold the pledge of support given to Poland on March 31. But the German Government did not at first take the warning very seriously. Hitler had success fully bluffed the western democracies and seized Austria, the Sudeten land, and Bohemia without causing a European war. He believed he could do the same thing another time and seize Danzig and the Polish Corridor by a threat of force which still would not lead to war. His minister of foreign affairs, Herr von Ribbentrop, who had been Ger man ambassador in England, assured him that the British would never make up their minds to fight, in spite of their pledge to Poland. How ever, as a trump card in the diplomatic game of bluff, which would frighten Poland into yielding and would frighten Britain and France from backing up Poland, it was announced that Ribbentrop was flying to Moscow on August 22 to sign a German-Russian Pact. This news for a moment caused consternation in Britain and France, for these two powers had been carrying on negotiations for weeks in Moscow with the aim of bringing Russia into a "stop Hitler" front. Now it was declared in Berlin that Russia and Germany would stand together in bringing about order in Poland and Central Europe.
Britain, however, was not intimidated by Hitler's diplomatic move toward Russia. Mr. Neville Chamberlain immediately summoned Parliament, ordered military precautionary measures, and sent a firm letter to Hitler. This letter declared in the clearest terms that "what ever may prove to be the nature of the German-Soviet Agreement, it cannot alter Great Britain's obligation to Poland, which she is de termined to fulfill." Mr. Chamberlain then went on to say that "war between our two peoples would be the greatest calamity that could occur," and urged that Germany and Poland should cease their press polemics and enter into direct negotiations on the questions at issue. But efforts to bring about such direct conversations failed, chiefly because Hitler insisted on great haste and because he expected the Poles to send a negotiator to Berlin with full powers to sign a docu ment drawn up by Germany which Poland had had no opportunity to study. Therefore at dawn on September I German troops began to pour into Poland. In his Reichstag speech Hitler gave as his rea sons: the failure of the Poles to send a negotiator, the mobilization of the Polish Army, and more Polish atrocities. Britain, after vainly trying to secure a promise that the German invasion of Poland would be countermanded, announced at II A.M. on Sunday, September 3 that Britain and Germany were at war. France took a similar step at 5 P.M.
General History. See the Bibliothek deutscher Geschichte (ed. H. von Zwiedineck-Sudenhorst, 1889, etc.) ; Handbuch der deutschen Geschichte (ed. B. Gebhardt, Stuttgart, 7th ed., 1931) ; E. F. Hender son, A Short History of Germany (2nd ed., 1920) ; J. Haller, Epochs of German History (193o) ; G. P. Gooch, Germany (1925) ; E. Diesel, Germany and the Germans (1931) ; and the Cambridge Modern His tory (ed. A. W. Ward, 13 vols., 1902-11) .
Early Period. F. Dahn, Urgeschichte der germanischen and roman ischen Volker (188o-89) , and Die Konige der Germanen (1861-1909) ; W. von Giesebrecht, Geschichte der deutschen Kaiserzeit (1855-88) ; J. W. Thompson, Feudal Germany (1928).
Later Middle Ages. T. Lindner, Deutsche Geschichte unter den Habsburgern and Luxemburgern (Stuttgart, 1888-93) ; O. Lorenz, Deutsche Geschichte im 13. and 14. Jahrhundert (Vienna, 1863-67) ; F. von Kraus, Deutsche Geschichte im Ausgang des Mittelalters (Stutt gart, 1888-1905) .
Reformation and Counter-Reformation Period. L. von Ranke, Deutsche Geschichte im Zeitalter der Reformation (Leipzig, 1882; Eng. trans.) ; J. Janssen, Geschichte des deutschen Volkes seit dem Ausgang des Mittelalters (1897-1903 ; Eng. trans.) ; G. Egelhaaf, Deutsche Geschichte im Zeitalter der Reformation (1893) . See also