THE WORLD WAR June 28–August 4.—On June 28, 1914, Francis Ferdinand, heir to the throne of Austria, was assassinated at Serajevo. The assassins came from Belgrade and had received money, passports and arms from Serbian officials. Vienna was therefore convinced that the assassination had been planned in Serbia with the know ledge or at the least the connivance of the Serbian Government. It was therefore decided to send an ultimatum to Serbia demand ing the repression of Greater Serbian propaganda, the dismissal of all officials associated with such propaganda, and the collabor ation of Austrian authorities in the investigation of the origins of the murder of the Crown Prince. Germany was not consulted in the framing of these demands, and was only informed of them just before they were communicated to Belgrade. Serbia sent a reply within the period of 48 hours which had been fixed ; the reply was in general conciliatory, and accepted some of the de mands, while others were refused or made subject to conditions. The Austrian ambassador declared that this implied the rejection of Austria's demands, and left Belgrade on the evening of July 25, 1914. Serbia mobilized, and Austria also mobilized its eight southern army corps. Attempts at mediation were made in several quarters; Great Britain in particular proposed arbitration by the four Great Powers not directly involved. The Emperor William was absent on a Northern tour from which he returned only on July 28; but the German Government did not feel it possible to bring the dispute between Austria and Serbia bef ore a tribunal of the European Powers, and took up the attitude that the con flict must be localized which meant in practice that Russia must be prevented from intervening in favour of Serbia. At first public opinion on the whole was not unfavourable to Austria. When however the Serbian reply became known, opinion veered round against Austria. It was thought that Austria could obtain suffi cient satisfaction if it moderated its demands in certain respects. Vienna however persisted in the view that nothing less than full compliance on the part of Serbia would be satisfactory; and Russia thereupon began to prepare for war.
Anxiety now began to be felt in Berlin, and Austria was advised to accept the British proposals for mediation or to enter into direct negotiations with Russia on the demands made to Serbia. It was only when Bethmann informed Vienna that Germany would not let itself be involved in a world war lightly, or if its counsels were disregarded, that Vienna made up its mind to adopt the latter course. Now, however, it was too late. In the meantime the tsar, who had received assurances of full support from France, had decided on July 31 to order the mobilization of the entire Russian army. It was believed in Berlin that war was now inevitable, but it was desired not to lose the advantage of more rapid mobiliza tion. An attempt to obtain a declaration of neutrality from Eng land having failed, a demand was sent to the tsar that the mobil ization order should be revoked. Consent was not given within the stipulated period of 12 hours, and Germany thereupon declared war on Russia. It was thought certain that France would come to the help of its allies, and it was considered that the French should not be allowed to choose the moment for the attack. The French minister, when asked whether France would undertake to remain neutral, gave an evasive reply, and Germany the reupon declared war on France on Aug. 3.
Germany, by declaring war both on Russia and on France, assumed before the world the odium of being the aggressor. This however is no proof that Germany intended to cause the war. The most serious error of the German Government must be ad mitted to be that it did not from the outset declare that it would only support Austria if agreement on every step were reached in advance. The peremptory terms of the ultimatum and Austria's declaration of war on Serbia came as a surprise to Germany, and forced its hand. The counsels of moderation which were subse quently given to Austria came too late. They might perhaps still have achieved something if Russia had not mobilized in the meantime. It was this which really made war inevitable. The fact that Germany did not wait for a formal declaration of war from the other side was due to the obvious military considerations, and to Germany's belief that war could not now be averted.
The British Government was resolved from the outset to stand by France and Russia if war could not be prevented. The only question was whether parliament and public opinion would en dorse its views. On this point the Belgian question was decisive. The essence of the German plan of campaign was a swift and de cisive blow at France ; and as the north-east frontier of France was strongly fortified, this only seemed possible if the German army marched through Belgium. The neutrality of Belgium was how ever guaranteed by the Powers, and it was therefore thought in London that steps must be taken to prevent such a possibility. France and Germany were therefore asked whether both Powers would undertake to respect Belgian neutrality so long as it was respected by the other side. France agreed, but Germany refused to give any definite undertaking, and informed Belgium on Aug. 2 that it found itself compelled to send its troops into that coun try because it had reliable information that French troops were on the point of invading Belgium from the south. Although Ger many declared itself ready to promise to respect the integrity of Belgium and to evacuate its territory immediately on the con clusion of peace, its action was regarded by Belgium as tanta mount to a declaration of war, and the Belgian Government ap pealed to Great Britain and France for help. Grey, having ob tained a majority in Parliament for his policy on Aug. 3, once more sent a demand to Berlin that Germany should undertake to respect Belgian neutrality. Germany could not give such an undertaking, since its troops had already crossed the Belgian frontier. Great Britain declared war on Germany on the night of Aug. 4. (See also EUROPE; DIMITRIEVZC; WAR GUILT.) The War.—The course of events in the World War will be found described under that heading. The decisive factor was the failure of the attempt at a rapid and decisive defeat of France. The German advance was checked at the Battle of the Marne in Sept. 1914; and the fact that the German army succeeded in occupying nearly the whole of Belgium and warding off the Russian invasion at the battle of Tannenberg could not really make up for this. When Italy came into the war against Germany on May 23, 1915, and Rumania in the summer of 1916, the prospect of obtaining a decisive victory became more remote. Germany's only allies besides Austria were Turkey and Bulgaria, and the military power of these was not very great. The attempt to attack the British position in Egypt and on the Persian gulf through Asia Minor and Mesopotamia was unsuccessful, but the endeavours of the other side to capture Salonika and to break the enemy front in the south-east were for a long time equally fruitless. Germany was completely cut off from the world market by the blockade of its coasts, and had to rely entirely on its own resources for its food supply and for the replenishment of its war material. The shortage of food and munitions became more and more serious every year. As a final attempt to turn the f or tunes of war in favour of Germany, it was decided to try ruthless submarine warfare, with the idea of creating a de facto blockade of England and cutting off its food supplies. There were however not enough submarines available to make this scheme successful. Its final result was to determine the United States of America to come into the war on the other side in the spring of 1917.
The position of the Central Powers was further weakened by the death of Emperor Francis Joseph on Nov. .II, 1916. His suc cessor, the Emperor Charles, soon attempted to open peace negotiations with England and France, and though these were not successful, they showed the other side that the unity of the Central Powers was shaken. On the other hand, the outbreak of the Russian Revolution in March 1917 seemed likely to ease the position of the Central Powers. The new Russian Government which came into power as a result began peace negotiations in November, but it was not until March 8, 1918 that the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk (q.v.) was finally signed. This however was only a temporary success. The attempts which were made to set up independent States in the Ukraine and Poland which would sup port Germany had no lasting result, and their consequence was that much of Germany's military strength was frittered away in minor operations in South Russia. After the great German offen sive in Northern France in March and April 1918 had failed to break the Allied front, the French, British and Americans at tacked on the Western front. In September the British and French attacked the Bulgars from Salonika and completely de stroyed their army.
In the meantime the position in Germany had greatly changed. At the beginning of the war the greatest enthusiasm prevailed, and the nation was ready for any sacrifice, because it was firmly convinced that war had been forced on it and that it was fighting for existence. This applied to the workers as well as the rest, and the Social Democrat deputies voted for the war credits in the Reichstag. But as the war dragged on, and every department of economic life suffered from the blockade, while the loss of life became greater and greater, that section of the Social Democrats who desired the end of the war at any price increased in strength. In 1918 they formed a separate party, the Independent Social Democrats. Their spokesmen said that it was not in the interest of the working classes that Germany should be victorious in the war, for such a victory would only consolidate the rule of mili tarism and capitalism. The huge fortunes made by war profiteers helped to embitter public feeling. More and more people began to believe that only the military leaders and those capitalists who were making money by the continuance of the war stood in the way of the conclusion of peace. However mistaken such a view might be, it was impossible to eradicate it from the public mind.
Bethmann-Hollweg felt it necessary to make some concession in view of the increasing popular discontent, and at his suggestion the emperor, in the Easter proclamation of April 7, 1917, prom ised the reform of the Prussian electoral system so soon as peace should have been concluded. This promise did not however pro duce much effect, as it was extremely doubtful whether it could be legally carried out against the will of the majority of the Prussian Landtag. An increasingly critical attitude began to pre vail in the Reichstag. It was demanded that parliament should enjoy a greater measure of influence, and a proclamation was drafted declaring that Germany was ready to make peace on the basis of the pre-war territorial position if all the belligerents would renounce any claim to war damages. Bethmann-Hollweg tried in vain to allay the unrest by the issue of an imperial proclamation promising the introduction of equal suffrage in Prussia. His vacillation and indecision had cost him the confi dence of all parties. The Emperor therefore made up his mind to dismiss him on June 14, 1917. But Germany could not at the moment produce a personality capable of taking over the real control of affairs at this difficult time. The new chancellor, Michaelis, who had been head of the Imperial Grain Office, soon proved himself quite unfitted for his position, and was replaced on Nov. 2 by the Bavarian premier Count Hertling, who was a man of 75 years of age, but who enjoyed the confidence of the Centre Party.
The peace resolution of the Reichstag was adopted on June 19 by a majority composed of the Centre, the Progressive People's Party and the Social Democrats. It could not fail to strengthen the view in the outside world that Germany's power of resistance was breaking down. Whether the various attempts which the German Government made both before and of ter the autumn of 1917 to bring about the conclusion of peace ever had any prospect of success, and why they failed, cannot yet be determined with any certainty, since the relevant documents have not yet been made public.
The military events of the late autumn of 1918 were not long in producing their effect on the internal situation in Germany.
When, on Sept. 29, the Supreme Command urged that negotiations for an armistice should be opened at once because it was impossi ble to hold the front any longer, Count Hertling handed in his resignation ; for it was generally felt that a Government must be brought in which would possess the confidence of parliament. The various parties united in proposing to the emperor that Prince Max von Baden should be appointed imperial chancellor ; this was done on Oct. 3. He had the reputation of being an adherent of the idea of international reconciliation, which was an important feature in President Wilson's programme, and he was therefore thought a specially suitable person to take over the conduct of affairs at the present juncture. The new chancellor at once in formed President Wilson that Germany was ready to conclude an armistice and peace on the basis of the Fourteen Points (q.v.) which Wilson had laid down as the basis of a new settlement of affairs on Jan. 8, 1918. Wilson, however, said that before he could approach his allies, the occupied districts of France and Belgium must be evacuated, and the German political system must be changed by "the destruction of every arbitrary power anywhere that can separately, secretly, and of its own single choice, disturb the peace of the world." This was taken to mean that the em peror's power must be greatly restricted, and real control placed in the hands of a Government responsible to the Reichstag. As this entirely corresponded to the desires of the majority parties, the Reichstag resolved on Oct. 26 that the consent of the Reichstag was necessary for the declaration of war or the conclusion of peace, and that the imperial chancellor must, in the exercise of his functions, possess the confidence of the Reichstag and conse quently of the nation. The emperor gave his consent to this decision a few days later.
In the meantime President Wilson had declared in the name of the Allied and Associated Powers that they were ready to take the Fourteen Points as a basis for a treaty of peace on con dition that Germany should pay compensation for all damage suffered by the civilian population of the occupied territories dur ing the war. When however the commission which was sent to negotiate an armistice met the Allied commanders, conditions were proposed which amounted to a complete capitulation. The occupied territories in the West and the whole left bank of the Rhine were to be evacuated, all war material surrendered, and all prisoners released without corresponding obligation on the other side. German troops in the East were to withdraw behind the 1914 frontiers. In view of the circumstances prevailing in Ger many at the time it was impossible to contemplate continuing the struggle, and the terms were therefore accepted on Nov. I1, 1918. An armistice of 3o days was granted. The German army, under the leadership of Hindenburg, executed the difficult operation of withdrawal in perfect order, but was at once disbanded on arrival in Germany, as the Socialist Party, which was now in power, re garded it as a menace to the new order.
The Socialists, who found themselves so suddenly in possession of power, were not able to set up a social and political order cor responding to their ideals. Sharp divergences of opinion soon made themselves felt in their own ranks. The Council of People's Representatives, which at first took over the direction of affairs, removed all restrictions on freedom of assembly and on the free dom of the press, granted a general amnesty and announced the in troduction of an eight hour day for workers; but it did not ven ture to abolish private ownership of property, as the strict Socialist programme would have required, because it was not felt practic able to take over the entire control of economic affairs. A confer ence of representatives of the newly formed Governments of the individual States, which met in Berlin on Nov. 25, decided that a National Constituent Assembly should be elected at once to draw up a new Constitution for the whole of Germany; until the Assem bly met, the workers' and soldiers' councils which had been formed during the revolution in the various States should continue to control affairs. The left wing of the Social Democrats, who were known as the Spartacists, were dissatisfied with this solution and tried to prevent the elections to the National Assembly by raising fresh revolts. There was street fighting in Berlin, but the disturb ances were suppressed by Noske. The elections took place on Jan. 19, 1919; all Germans over the age of 20, irrespective of sex, were entitled to vote. Even during the electoral campaign it be came clear that the revolution had not radically altered the rela tive position of the various parties. They continued to exist under new names, and in most cases their leaders remained un changed. Those who had been Conservatives were now called the German National People's Party (Deutsclinationale Volkspartei), the National Liberals became the German People's Party (Deut sche Volkspartei), and the former Progressive Party was known as the Democratic Party. A section of the National Liberals went over to the Democrats, but broke away in the years which fol lowed. The Centre was to some extent weakened by the secession of the Bavarian People's Party, while the Social Democrats split into two groups, the Majority Socialists and the Independents. A separate Communist Party was also formed. If the Social Democrats had hoped to obtain a majority in the National Assem bly, they were doomed to disappointment. The elections resulted in the return of 163 Majority Socialists and 22 Independents, while the bourgeois parties obtained 236 seats. The composition of the Assembly nevertheless showed a marked shifting to the Left as compared with previous Parliaments.