GRAECO-TURKISH WAR, 1897. This war between Greece and Turkey (see GREECE : Modern History) involved two practically distinct campaigns, in Thessaly and in Epirus. Upon the Thessalian frontier the Turks, early in March, had concen trated six divisions (about 58,000 men), 1,50o cavalry and 156 guns, under Edhem Pasha. A seventh division was rendered available a little later. The Greeks numbered about 45,000 infantry, Boo cavalry and 96 guns, under the crown prince. On both sides there was a considerable dispersion of forces along the frontier. The Turkish navy, an important factor in the war of 1877-78, had became paralytic ten years later, and the Greek squadron held complete command of the sea. Expeditionary forces directed against the Turkish line of communications might have influenced the course of the campaign; but for such work the Greeks were quite unprepared, and beyond bombarding one or two insignificant ports on the coast-line, and aiding the trans port of troops from Athens to Volo, the navy accomplished nothing. On April 9 and i o Greek irregulars crossed the frontier, either with a view to provoke hostilities or in the hope of foment ing a rising in Macedonia. On the i 6th and 17th some fighting occurred, in which Greek regulars took part ; and on the i8th Edhem Pasha, whose headquarters had for some time been estab lished at Elassona, ordered a general advance. The Turkish plan was to turn the Greek left and to bring on a decisive action, but this was not carried out. In the centre the Turks occupied the Meluna pass on the 19th, and the way was practically open to Larissa. The Turkish right wing, however, moving on Damani and the Reveni pass, encountered resistance, and the left wing was temporarily checked by the Greeks among the mountains near Nezeros. At Mati, covering the road to Tyrnavo, the Greeks entrenched themselves. Here sharp fighting occurred on the 21st and 22nd, during which the Greeks sought to turn the right flank of the superior Turkish central column. By the 23rd the Turkish forces had drawn together, and the Greeks were threatened on both flanks. In the evening a general retreat was ordered, and the loose discipline of the Greek army was at once manifested. Rumours of disaster spread among the ranks, and wild panic supervened. There was nothing to prevent an orderly retirement upon Larissa, which had been fortified and provisioned, and which offered a good defensive position. The general debacle could not, however, be arrested, and the mass of the Greek army fled south wards to Pharsala. There was no pursuit, and the Turkish com mander-in-chief did not reach Larissa till the 27th. Thus ended the first phase of the war, in which the Greeks showed tenacity in defence, which proved fruitless by reason of initially bad strategic dispositions entailing far too great dispersion, and also because there was no plan of action beyond a general desire to avoid risking a defeat which might prevent the expected risings in Macedonia and elsewhere. The handling of the Turkish army showed little skill or enterprise.
Larissa being abandoned, Velestino, the junction of the Thessa lian railways, where there was a strong position covering Volo, seemed to be the natural rallying point for the Greek army. Here the support of the fleet would have been secured, and a Turkish advance across the Othrys range upon Athens could not have taken place until the flanking position had been captured. Whether by direction or by natural impulse, however, the mass of the Greek troops made for Pharsala, where some order was re established. The importance of Velestino was recognized by send ing a brigade thither by railway from Pharsala, and the inferior Greek army was thus split into two portions, separated by nearly 4om. A Turkish reconnaissance on Velestino was repulsed, but on May 5 the Greeks were driven from their positions in front of Pharsala by three divisions. Further fighting followed on the 6th, and in the evening the Greek army retired in fair order upon Domokos. It was intended to turn the Greek left with the first division under Hairi Pasha, but the flanking force did not arrive in time to bring about a decisive result. The abandonment of Pharsala involved that of Velestino. Again delaying, Edhem Pasha did not attack Domokos till the 17th, giving the Greeks time to entrench their positions. The attack was delivered in three columns, of which the right was checked and the centre failed to take the Greek trenches and suffered much loss. The left column, however, menaced the line of retreat, and the Greek army abandoned the whole position during the night. No effective stand was made at the Furka pass, which was evacuated on the following night. Col. Smolenski, who arrived on the 18th from Velestino, was directed to hold the pass of Thermopylae. The Greek forces being much demoralized, the intervention of the tsar was invoked by telegraph ; and the latter sent a personal appeal to the sultan, who directed a suspension of hostilities. On the loth an armistice was arranged.
In Epirus at the outbreak of war about 15,00o Greeks under Col. Manos occupied a line of defence from Arta to Peta. The Turks, about 28,000 strong, under Achmet Hifsi Pasha, were dis tributed mainly at Iannina, Pentepagadia, and in front of Arta. On April 18 the Turks commenced a three days' bombardment of Arta ; but successive attempts to take the bridge were repulsed, and during the night of the 21 st they retired on Philippiada, 26m. distant, which was attacked and occupied by Col. Manos on the 23rd. The Greeks then advanced to Pentepagadia, but the posi tion held by their advanced force near Homopulos was attacked on the 28th and 29th, and no Greek reinforcements were forth coming when needed. The Evzones made a good defence, but were driven back by superior force, and a retreat was ordered, which quickly degenerated into panic-stricken flight to and across the Arta. Reinforcements were sent to Arta from Athens, and on May 12 another incursion into Turkish territory began, the appar ent object being to occupy a portion of the country in view of the breakdown in Thessaly and the probability that hostilities would shortly end. The advance was made in three columns, while 2,50o Epirote volunteers were landed near the mouth of the Luro river with the idea of cutting off the Turkish garrison of Prevesa. The centre column attacked the Turks near Strevina on the i3th, but although the Greeks fought well, they ultimately had to retreat. The volunteers landed at the mouth of the Luro, were attacked and routed with heavy loss.
The campaign in Epirus thus failed as completely as that in Thessaly. Under the terms of the treaty of peace, signed on Sept. 20, and arranged by the European Powers, Turkey obtained an indemnity of ŁT4,000,000 and a rectification of the Thessalian frontier, carrying with it some strategic advantage. History records few more unjustifiable wars than that which Greece gratuitously provoked. The Greek troops on several occasions showed tenacity and endurance, but discipline and cohesion were manifestly wanting. Many of the officers were incapable; the campaign was gravely mismanaged ; and politics, which led to the war, impeded its operations. On the other hand, the fruits of the German tuition, which began in 188o, and received a power ful stimulus by the appointment of Gen. von der Goltz in 1883, were shown in the Turkish army. The mobilization and concentra tion was on the whole smoothly carried out, the young school of German-trained officers displayed ability, and the artillery at Pharsala and Domokos was well handled. The superior leading was, however, not conspicuously successful ; and while the rank and file again showed excellent military qualities, political condi tions and the Oriental predilection for half-measures and for denying full responsibility and full powers to commanders in the field enfeebled the conduct of the campaign. (G. S. C.)