GREAT BRITAIN, the official title of the political unity of England, Wales and Scotland. The name was formally adopted in 1707 at the date of the union of the crowns of England and Scotland ; but it had been used informally by many writers for a long time previous to that date. The following article deals with those subjects which concern Great Britain as a whole, e.g., constitution, defence, finance, and economics, etc. For those sub jects which essentially concern each country separately, e.g., geography, geology, population, religious denominations, etc., the articles ENGLAND, SCOTLAND, WALES should be consulted. (See also BRITISH EMPIRE ; ENGLISH HISTORY ; IRELAND, NORTHERN; IRISH FREE STATE; LOCAL GOVERNMENT and UNITED KINGDOM.) The British is unique among existing Constitutions in antiquity of origin, length of endurance, continuity of growth, adaptability to circumstance and extent of influence. In the course of close on nine (we might say 13) centuries of practically uninterrupted evolution, it has served in turn a feudal society, an all-but-absolute monarchy, an aristocracy, and the rule of the bourgeoisie; and is even now adapting itself to the service of democracy. From the comparatively simple task of providing a form of government for a small, sparsely populated, backward and unimportant island, dangling off the north-west coast of Europe, it was called upon in time to develop and elaborate machinery for controlling the greatest empire that the world has ever seen, and more recently to modify that machinery to befit the senior partner in a common wealth of free and equal nations, each of which now possesses similar institutions of its own. Its range of influence has not been limited to the Anglo-Saxon race, nor even to countries with a background of kindred law. For even nations that have grown up on a Roman foundation have been obliged to superimpose a struc ture of Anglo-Saxon institutions. And, indeed, practically every civilized nation, and some that could hardly be called civilized, have, at one time or another, followed suit.
Much of the peculiar genius of the Constitution is attributable to the fact that it is partly "unwritten" and wholly "flexible." It is futile to search the statute book and the law reports for the details of this Constitution, since some of its most vital institutions and most of its rules of procedure are either utterly, like the cabinet, or almost, like the prime minister, unknown to the law. And, although the law gradually extends its scope, it barely keeps pace with, and never overtakes, the ever fresh developments in constitutional practice. Thus the most fundamental constitutional changes may take place without the alteration of a letter of the law ; instance the change in the status of the dominions as defined at the Imperial Conferences of 1911 and 1926 respectively.
Moreover, even such portions of the Constitution as are defined by law are in no way specially privileged, all law, whether public or private, being subject to the authority of one and the same parliament. It cannot be said, however, that this has always been the case. In the middle ages, apart from the prescriptive rights of various grades of society, e.g., clergy and baronage, certain enact ments, e.g., Magna Carta, were regarded as peculiarly sacrosanct, and the principles of the common law itself might be interpreted but not changed. In the 17th century, the doctrine of fundamental law was used by parliament against the Crown, and in the 18th when parliament was sovereign, by the people against parliament. The Acts of Union with Scotland and Ireland contained clauses which were meant to be inviolable. And the United States, on their succession, embodied the doctrine in their Constitution. The everlasting problem of reconciling sovereignty with liberty was thus solved by the simple process of docking, as it were, a piece off each. A century or so later, Great Britain reached an alterna tive solution by vesting sovereignty in the people who theoretically could now only abuse their sovereignty and their liberty at their own expense. But since the sovereignty of the people means in practice the rule of the majority, there are many who proclaim the need of safeguards against abuse of sovereignty by temporary majorities, and the argument constitutes, perhaps, the main moral sanction for the retention in some form or other of the House of Lords.
Again, as a result of the rule of an uncodified common law, the ordinary tribunals will enforce any legislation affecting the Con stitution, so that Government officials are amenable to the law which regulates the relations of private citizens. There is, in short, or is supposed to be, no loi administratif. But the technical disabilities of the subject in suing the Crown, the power of "sub ordinate legislation" conferred on Government departments, the spread of bureaucracy as a result, partly of Defence of the Realm legislation during the World War, and partly of the increased socialization of the State—all these factors contribute to that out standing constitutional problem, namely the continual encroach ment of the executive, either by using the prerogative or by the presumed exercise of statutory powers, upon the rights and liberties of the subject.
The absence of a loi administratif on the one hand, and, on the other, the possibility in spite of this, of executive encroachment in judicial and legislative spheres, are both symptomatic of yet another characteristic of the constitution. The functions of government are not segregated in watertight compartments. In other words, there is no "separation of powers." On the contrary, the several departments interlace and c,verlap. Thus the executive, as well as including the lord chancellor, the attorney-general and the solicitor-general, has seats in the legislature ; the legislature dis misses and indirectly appoints the executive, and one portion of it is a final court of error; and the judiciary, in addition to its con nection with ministry and parliament, is continually legislating by interpretation.
The feudal theory according to which the king was merely the greatest of feudal lords was gradually undermined by the idea of a national king, and the improvement of the royal status may be traced in the parallel growth of the law of treason and of the theory of the prerogative. The ruin of the baronage in the Wars of the Roses left the Crown for the time being without a rival, and, when a little later the Church became erastianized, Henry VIII. could with justice claim to be "king, emperor and pope" in his own dominions. But the national need of an autocrat passed with the century. Parliament, now fully grown, took up the chal lenge of Divine Right, and the Stuarts, in pursuit of the shadow, lost the substance of power. At the Revolution sovereignty passed to parliament. William III. was no dummy ; but, during the sub sequent reigns of a woman and two foreigners, the royal authority rapidly declined, and George III.'s tardy attempt to restore it ended in disaster. "Economical" reform at the end of the 18th century made the Commons, and parliamentary reform early in the 19th made the constituencies, independent of royal manipulation, and the logic of party government in tingeing all policies with parti zanship finally obliged the sovereign, save at moments of crisis when the exercise of his discretion became unavoidable, to under take no public acts except on the advice of ministers. But the influence of the monarch, though difficult to estimate, should not be underrated. He is kept fully informed, his advice is taken and his consent obtained to all measures ; and, of course, with the growth of the empire, and more especially since the recognition of the dominions as co-equal partners with the mother country, the Crown has achieved unique significance as at once the symbol and chief constitutional safeguard of imperial union.
Part of these duties devolved on the chancellor, who, originally the king's secretary, rose to be chief of the royal counsellors, mainly because from his office were issued the royal writs. For this reason, and because he could act on his own initiative, suitors increasingly addressed their petitions to him personally ; and an overworked council was only too glad to delegate such duties to him. Thus in the i4th century there slowly evolved a court of chancery which in the 15th achieved independence of the council. Its acts were general and registered as a matter of record whereas the procedure of the council was summary and secret. For this and other reasons Chancery jurisdiction became ultimately con fined to civil cases, while criminal matters continued to be dealt with by council. Thus there grew up, in spite of the jealousy of common lawyers, a body of equity rules alongside the corn mon law, and the two were finally fused by the Judicature Act of 1873.
As far as appellate jurisdiction was provided for, errors of the Common Pleas were amended by the King's Bench; errors of the Exchequer from 1357 by the Court of Exchequer Chamber, com posed of the chancellor and treasurer with other expert associates; and another court, which also became known as the Exchequer Chamber, was created in 1585 to amend errors of the King's Bench. Writs of error from the King's Bench and from the Ex chequer Chamber, and, after 1675, appeals by way of petition for a rehearing from Chancery, could be brought to the House of Lords. As a result of the Judicature Act of 1873 and subsequent supplementary acts, all the existing superior courts were consoli dated into one Supreme Court of Judicature consisting of two primary divisions:—(a) The High Court of Justice, with the sub divisions—Chancery ; King's Bench; Probate, Divorce and Ad miralty : and (b) the Court of Appeal from the decisions of the judges of each of these divisions. The old Chancery procedure by way of petition for a rehearing was extended to the courts of Common Law, the decisions of which could till then only be questioned by alleging error apparent on some part of the pro ceedings. And the House of Lords became the final court of appeal from all the courts (other than ecclesiastical) of Great Britain; while the judicial committee of the privy council, as heir of the council's supplementary jurisdiction, remained the final court of appeal for the rest of the empire and from the ecclesiastical courts as well.
The cabinet, which in the i 7 th century evolved from a com mittee of the privy council as the effective national executive, was composed of an inner ring of confidential advisers of the Crown. The king at first presided, but, when George I. f er lack of English ceased to attend, his place was taken by a minister, usually the first lord of the treasury, who in time became known as the prime minister. The latter, normally the head of the party commanding a majority in the House of Commons, is appointed by the sover eign, with whose consent he in turn appoints the rest of the min istry and decides, though his choice is in practice narrowly re stricted, which of them shall be members of the cabinet. Just as their predecessors sat originally in the parliament chamber, so now are all ministers members of one or other house of parlia ment, according as to whether they are peers or commoners. And they are individually and collectively responsible to Crown, prime minister and parliament.
Parliament was originally a periodical public assembly of the curia regis at its fullest expansion. It was therefore competent to perform all functions of government. But the one mainly stressed was the judicial function, for law-declaring precedes law making. Any subject might present a petition, and parliament acted as a clearing-house for such petitions, referring the suitor to the appropriate court and reserving for its own consideration in full assembly only such cases as were particularly difficult, pro tracted or important. In the 13th century, however, the practice of summoning occasionally and experimentally delegates, some times from the shires, sometimes from the boroughs, and some times from both simultaneously, was instituted for certain pur poses. One of these was the granting of money. To the demand for money the Commons replied with a demand for the granting of the petitions they had brought with them ; and the more im portant of these petitions they began to present, for greater back ing, not individually, but collectively as a body. Thus evolved the idea that money is granted in return for the redress of grievances. And considerations of these common petitions came to occupy so much of parliament's time, that it was obliged more and more to leave the private petitions to be dealt with by council or chan cery after parliament had broken up. In other words, it was abandoning the righting of individual wrongs, a judicial function, in favour of the righting of the wrongs of the nation, a legislative function. And the attendance of knights and burgesses, who were at first merely an alien element briefly interrupting the ordinary routine of an occasional parliament, came to be essential to the life of the parliament.
But theory outlasted fact, and parliament, although now defi nitely legislative, was still regarded as a "high court," and as such its jurisdiction was limited. It could not interfere with the com mon law, nor with the prescriptive rights of the baronage, and, even as late as the i8th century, judges would sometimes treat its enactments as bad judgments and refuse to enforce them, if they seemed to run counter to the principles of common law. It was Henry VIII., more than anyone else, who helped parliament to climb by precedents towards a sovereignty which it finally wrested from his successors at the Revolution of 1688. For, though despotic, he liked to preserve legal forms and, still more, to shelve responsibility. Thus even to his most unconstitutional actions, e.g., the erastianization and spoliation of the Church, he made parliament his partner; and particularly did he flatter the pretensions of the Commons of whom he had no fear. He took them under his roof. And from the moment they entered St. Stephen's chapel the Commons became an integral part of parlia ment even in their private deliberations, instead of, as till then, only when they stood at the bar of the parliament chamber. The walls of the latter were no longer the boundaries of parliament, but only of the House of Lords which together with the House of Commons, from now on made up the parliament.
House of Commons.—The Commons grew so greatly in power as the result of Henry VIII.'s encouragement, of the pres ence of the privy councillors, of the increased duration of par liaments, and of the impecunious condition of the Government, that, within almost a century of achieving a house of their own, they were able to abolish the other two branches of the legislature, king and House of Lords. The latter never fully recovered from its temporary, though illegal, abolition. But much of the appar ent superiority of the lower house in the i8th century must be discounted when we reflect that so many of its members were either in receipt of Government bribes or sinecures or nominees of borough proprietors, very often peers. It was only after "economical" reform had to some extent purified the house, and parliamentary reform the constituencies, that the Commons really came to overshadow the House of Lords, which in its turn had become corrupted by wholesale creations, now that a peerage was about the only reward or bribe that Government could still offer for faithful political support. Finally, the extension of the f ran chise by stages culminating in universal suffrage has made the house representative of practically all adults in the kingdom except the individuals who compose the House of Lords.
But, in condemning the old electoral system, critics usually base their calculations on the proportion of voters to population (2% in England, 2 per thousand in Scotland, at the close of the i8th century), forgetting that representation was not meant to be of population, but of communities, and that, just as the county court stood for the county, so the corporation might stand for the borough. Later, it is true, other theories arose as to what ought to be the basis of representation, and land, property and taxation had each their champions, who had no difficulty in demonstrating the hopelessness of the system from the point of view of their respective ideals. But a sounder indictment would stress the point that the system had ceased to do what it was intended to do—had ceased, in fact, to represent communities. For many boroughs returning members to parliament had decayed and some had actually ceased to exist, while many large and flourishing towns remained unrepresented; and, in county and borough alike, the franchise, as a result of corruption, was no longer a political privilege so much as an extremely marketable property. It was the agitation of the American colonies and the disasters resulting from George III.'s attempt at personal govern ment that at last aroused public interest in the matter. But reformers were divided on the question of compensation for expropriated borough owners, and the French Revolution and Napoleonic wars afforded an excuse for shelving the subject for another generation. The Reform Act of 1832 marked the first stage in the process, continued by the Acts of 1867, 1884, 1885 and 1918, of extending the franchise to all adult males and re shaping constituencies into fairly equal electoral districts. The Act of 1918 further conceded the principle of female suffrage, and the Act of 1928 carried that concession to its logical conclusion by placing women on the same footing as men.
Religious liberty, of which the first landmark is the Toleration Act of 1689, has been gradually attained by the repeal, one after another, of the many statutes penalizing persons not of the Anglican persuasion.
Until the time of Henry VIII. there was no Church of Eng land, but only two provinces of the Church Universal in England. The Church had its own head, the pope, its own law, the Canon law, and each province, Canterbury and York, had its own offi cials, archbishops and bishops, its own assembly, Convocation, and its own courts of law. This diarchy of Church and State was bound to lead to friction, more especially as the border line was vague and disputed and jurisdiction in some matters over lapped. Yet ecclesiastics, more than any other section of society, influenced the shaping of the constitution. They filled the chief offices of State; they were a permanent majority in the parlia ment chamber; for a time even representatives of the lower clergy attended the parliament ; and for a century or more after the Conquest the archbishop of Canterbury had the chief say in determining the succession. After the Reformation their political influence declined. Few of them sat at the council board, and the disappearance of abbots and priors with the dissolution of the monasteries left them in a minority in the Lords. And yet the final settlement under Elizabeth left the organization of the Church to outward appearances much as it had always been. The sovereign, it is true, was now supreme governor of the Church, but the latter continued for a time to exist parallel to, and not as a department of, the State, and it was not really until the Revolution of 1688 that the royal supremacy became nominal and parliament's authority paramount over the Church as over the State. The ecclesiastical courts survived unchanged, though supervision and discipline were mainly seen to by the Court of High Commission (till its abolition in 1641) and appeals might now be carried to Chancery (after 1832 to the privy council) ; and each province retained its Convocation, though its meetings in future depended on the sovereign's will and it might legislate only with his consent. As regards the clergy itself, the total of archbishops and bishops was raised by Henry VIII. to 26 (there are now (1929) 38, but still only 26, viz., the two archbishops, the bishops of London, Durham and Winchester, and 21 others in order of seniority, have seats in the Lords; the regulars were abolished altogether with the monasteries, and the seculars were released by degrees from their vow of celibacy.
The final result of the Reformation, then, may be summed up as the abolition of the dual control of Church and State, the transference to the State of complete control over the Church, and the substitution for the canon law of the king's ecclesiastical law. Among later constitutional developments it is only necessary to mention :—(1) The substitution of parliamentary for royal control, as a result after the Revolution of the sovereignty of parliament and of the development of cabinet government, whereby the Crown's powers have become vested in a ministry responsible to parliament ; (2) the growth of religious toleration with the result that membership of the Church has ceased to be a necessary qualification for full rights in the State; and (3) the grant of a measure of legislative autonomy to the Established Church by the National Assembly of the Church of England (Powers) Act (1919). As a result of repeated quarrels between the two Houses of Convocation, the latter was silenced in 1717 and not allowed to resume its sessions until 1852. Soon after wards, annual Church Congresses began to be held in which lay men took part, and in 1885 a House of Laymen was formed in Canterbury, and another a little later in York, elected by the diocesan conferences for the purpose of conferring with the respective Convocations. From 1904 to 1919, there met annually a representative Church Council composed of the three houses in the two provinces sitting together ; and the Act of 1919 dele gated to the newly constituted assembly of the Church, subject always to the control of Parliament, powers of legislature affecting the affairs of the Church.
Wales was incorporated with England in 1536, receiving the same law and being granted representation in parliament. The crowns of England and Scotland were united in 1603 on the accession of James I. (and VI.), and their parliaments in 1707. The resulting parliament of Great Britain was to contain 16 representative Scottish peers, elected for each parliament by the whole body of Scottish peers, and 45 (now 74) representatives of shires and boroughs. Scotland, however, retained her own legal system and her own Presbyterian Church. Ireland, when united with Great Britain in 18o1, contributed to the parliament of the United Kingdom 28 representative Irish peers elected for life, one archbishop and three bishops (the ecclesiastics disap peared with Irish Disestablishment in 1869), and Ioo (later 105) members of the Commons. However, by the Irish Free State (Agreement) Act (1922), Southern Ireland was granted dominion status, leaving only Northern Ireland to be repre sented in the Commons by 13 members out of the total of 615.
See also COMMON LAW; PARLIAMENT; PARLIAMENTARY PRO CEDURE; CABINET; PRIME MINISTER; PRIVY COUNCIL; PROC LAMATIONS; LOCAL GOVERNMENT; GOVERNMENT DEPARTMENTS; MINISTRY; ELECTORAL SYSTEMS; REFORM MOVEMENT; etc.
(F. L. B.) Historical.—Prior to the Norman Conquest the armed force of England was essentially a national militia. Every freeman was bound to bear arms for the defence of the country, or for the maintenance of order. To give some organization and training to the levy, the several sheriffs had authority to call out the con tingents of their shires for exercise. The fyrd, as the levy was named, was available for home service only, and could not be moved even from its county except in the case of emergency.
Yet even in those days the necessity of some more permanent force was felt, and bodies of paid troops were maintained by the kings at their own cost. Thus Canute and his successors, and even some of the great earls kept up a household force (huscarles). The English army at Hastings consisted of the fyrd and the corps of huscarles.
The English had fought on foot ; but the mailed horseman had now become the chief factor in war, and the Conqueror intro duced into England the system of tenure by knight-service familiar in Normandy. This was based on the unit of the feudal host, the constabularia of ten knights, the Conqueror granting lands in return for finding one or more of these units (in the case of great barons) or some fraction of them (in the case of lesser tenants). The obligation was to provide knights to serve, with horse and arms, for forty days in each year at their own charges. This obligation could be handed on by sub-enfeoffment through a whole series of under-tenants. The system being based, not on the duty of personal service, but on the obligation to supply one or more knights (or it might be only the fraction of a knight), it was early found convenient to commute this for a money payment known as "scutage" (see KNIGHT SERVICE and SCUTAGE). This money enabled the king to hire mercenaries, or pay such of the feudal troops as were willing to serve beyond the usual time. The feudal system had not, however, abrogated the old Saxon levies, and from these arose two national institutions—the posse comi tatus, liable to be called out by the sheriff to maintain the king's peace, and later the militia (q.v.). The posse comi tatus, or power of the county, included all males able to bear arms, peers and spiritual men excepted; and though primarily a police force it was also bound to assist in the defence of the country. This levy was organized by the Assize of Arms under Henry II.
(1 181), and subsequently under Edward I. (1 285) by the so called "Statute of Winchester," which determined the numbers and description of weapons to be kept by each man according to his property, and also provided for their periodical inspection. The early Plantagenets made much use of mercenaries. But the weakness of the feudal system in England was preparing, through the I2th and 13th centuries, a nation in arms absolutely unique in the middle ages. The Scottish and Welsh wars were, of course, fought by the feudal levy, but this levy was far from being the mob of unwilling peasants usual abroad, and from the fyrd came the English archers, whose fame was established by Edward I.'s wars, and carried to the continent by Edward III. Edward III. realized that there was better material to be had in his own country than abroad, and the army with which he invaded France was an army of national mercenaries, or, more simply, of Eng lish soldiers. The army at Crecy was composed exclusively of English, Welsh and Irish. From the pay list of the army at the siege of Calais (1346) it appears that all ranks were paid, no attempt being made to force even the feudal nobles to serve abroad at their own expense. These armies were raised mainly by contracts entered into "with some knight or gentleman expert in war, and of great revenue and livelihood in the country, to serve the king in war with a number of men." A certain sum was usually paid in advance, and in many cases the crown jewels and plate were given in pledge for the rest. The profession of arms seems to have been profitable. The pay of the soldier was high as com pared with that of the ordinary labourer, and he had the prospect of a share of plunder in addition, so that it was not difficult to raise men where the commander had a good military reputation.
The funds for the payment of these armies were provided partly from the royal revenues, partly from the fines paid in lieu of military service, and other fines arbitrarily imposed, and partly by grants from parliament. As the soldier's contract usually ended with the war, and the king had seldom funds to renew it even if he so wished, the armies disbanded of themselves at the close of each war. To secure the services of the soldier during his contract, acts were passed (18 Henry VI. c. 19; and 7 Henry VII. c. 1) inflicting penalties for desertion ; and in Edward VI.'s reign an act "touching the true service of captains and soldiers" was passed, somewhat of the nature of a Mutiny Act.
It is difficult to summarize the history of the army between the Hundred Years' War and 1642. The final failure of the English arms in France was soon followed by the Wars of the Roses, and in the long period of civil strife the only national force remaining to England was the Calais garrison. Henry VIII. was a soldier king, but he shared the public feeling for the old bow and bill, and English armies which served abroad did not, it seems, win the respect of the advanced professional soldiers of the continent. In 1519 the Venetian ambassador described the English forces as consisting of 150,000 men whose peculiar, though not exclusive, weapon was the long bow (Fortescue i. 117). The national levy made in 1588 to resist the Armada and the threat of invasion pro duced about 75o lancers (heavy-armed cavalry), 2,000 light horse and 56,000 foot, beside 20,000 men employed in watching the coasts. The small proportion of mounted men is very remarkable in a country in which Cromwell was before long to illustrate the full power of cavalry on the battlefield. It is indeed not unfair to regard this army as a miscellaneous levy of inferior quality.
It was in cavalry that England was weakest, and by three dif ferent acts it was sought to improve• the breed of horses. Perhaps the best organized force in England at this time was the London volunteer association which ultimately became the Honourable Artillery Company. At Flodden the spirit of the old English yeo manry triumphed over the outward form of continental bat talions which the Scots had adopted, and doubtless the great vic tory did much to retard military progress in England. The chief service of Henry VIII. to the British army was the formation of an artillery train, in which he took a special interest. Before he died the forces came to consist of a few permanent troops (the bodyguard and the fortress artillery service), the militia or general levy, and the paid armies which were collected for a foreign war and disbanded at the conclusion of peace, and were recruited on the same principle of indents which had served in the Hundred Years' War. In the reign of Mary, the old Statute of Winchester was revised (1553), and the new act provided for a readjustment of the county contingents and in some degree for the rearmament of the militia. But, from the fall of Calais up to the battle of the Dunes a century later, the intervention of British forces in for eign wars was always futile and generally disastrous. During this time, however, the numerous British regiments in the service of Holland learned, in the long war of Dutch independence, the technique of war as it had developed on the continent since 1450. Thus it was that in 1642 there were many hundreds of trained and war-experienced officers and sergeants available for the armies of the king and the parliament. By this time bows and bills had long disappeared even from the militia, and the Thirty Years' War, which, even more than the Low Countries, offered a career for the adventurous man, contributed yet more trained officers and soldiers to the English and Scottish forces. So closely indeed was war now studied by Englishmen that the respective adherents of the Dutch and the Swedish systems quarrelled on the eve of the battle of Edgehill.
The home forces of England had, as has been said, little or nothing to revive their ancient renown. Instead, they had come to be regarded as a menace to the constitution. In Queen Eliza beth's time the demands of the Irish wars had led to frequent forced levies, and the occasional billeting of the troops in England also gave rise to murmurs, but the brilliancy and energy of her reign covered a great deal, and the peaceful policy of her successor removed all immediate cause of complaint. But after the acces sion of Charles I. we find the army a constant and principal source of dispute between the king and parliament. Charles, wishing to support the Elector Palatine in the Thirty Years' War, raised an army of 10,000 men. He was already encumbered with debts, and the ,parliament refused all grants, on which he had recourse to forced loans. The army was sent to Spain, but returned with out effecting anything, and was not disbanded, as usual, but bil leted on the inhabitants. The billeting was the more deeply re sented as it appeared that the troops were purposely billeted on those who had resisted the loan. Forced loans, billeting and mar tial law—all directly connected with the maintenance of the army —formed the main substance of the grievances set forth in the Petition of Right. In accepting this petition, Charles gave up the right to maintain an army without consent of parliament ; and when in 1639 he wished to raise one to act against the rebellious Scots, parliament was called together, and its sanction obtained, on the plea that the army was necessary for the defence of Eng land. This army again became the source of dispute between the king and parliament, and finally both sides appealed to arms.
The first years of the Great Rebellion (q.v.) showed primarily the abundance of good officers produced by the wars on the con tinent, and in the second place the absolute inadequacy of the mili tary system of the country. It was clear, at the same time, that when the struggle was one of principles and not of dynastic poli tics, excellent recruits, far different from the wretched levies who had been gathered together for the Spanish war, were to be had in any reasonable number. These causes combined to produce the "New Model" which, originating in Cromwell's own cavalry and the London trained bands of foot, formed of picked men and officers, severely disciplined, and organized and administered in the right way, quickly proved its superiority over all other armies in the field, and in a few years raised its general to supreme civil power. Feb. 15, 1645, was the birthday of the British standing army, and from its first concentration at Windsor Park dates the scarlet uniform.
When Cromwell sent his veterans to take part in the wars of the continent they proved themselves a match for the best soldiers in Europe. On the restoration of the monarchy in 166o the army, now some 8o,000 strong, was disbanded. It had enforced the execution of Charles I., it had dissolved parliament, and England had been for years governed under a military regime. Thus the most popular measure of the Restoration was the dissolution of the army. Only Monk's regiment of foot (now the Coldstream Guards) survived to represent the New Model in the army of to day. At the same time the troops (now regiments) of household cavalry, and the regiment of foot which afterwards became the Grenadier Guards, were formed, chiefly from. Royalists, though the disbanded New Model contributed many experienced recruits. The permanent forces of the crown came to consist once more of the "garrison and guards," maintained by the king from the revenue allotted to him for carrying on the government of the country. The "garrisons" were commissioned to special fortresses —the Tower of London, Portsmouth, etc. The "guards" comprised the sovereign's bodyguards ("the yeomen of the guard" and "gentlemen-at-arms," who had existed since the times of Henry VII. and VIII.), and the regiments mentioned above. Even this small force, at first not exceeding 3,00o men, was looked on with jealousy by parliament, and every attempt to increase it was op posed. The acquisition of Tangier and Bombay, as part of the dower of the infanta of Portugal, led to the formation of a troop of horse (now the 1st Royal Dragoons) and a regiment of infantry (the end, now Queen's R. W. Surrey, regiment) for the protection of the former ; and a regiment of infantry (afterwards transferred to the East India Company) to hold the latter (1661). These troops, not being stationed in the kingdom, created no distrust; but whenever, as on several occasions during Charles's reign, con siderable armies were raised, they were mostly disbanded when the occasion ceased. Several regiments, however, were added to the permanent force, including Dumbarton's regiment (the Royal Scots, nicknamed Pontius Pilate's Bodyguard)—which had a long record of service in the armies of the continent, and represented the Scots brigade of Gustavus Adolphus's army—and the 3rd Buffs, representing the English regiments of the Dutch army and through them the volunteers of 1572, and on Charles's death in 1685 the total force of "guards and garrisons" had risen to 16,5oo, of whom about one-half formed w hat we should now call the standing army.
James II., an experienced soldier and sailor, was more obsti nate than his predecessor in his efforts to increase the army, and Monmouth's rebellion afforded him the opportunity. A force of about 20,000 men was maintained in England, and a large camp formed at Hounslow. James even proposed to disband the militia, and although the proposal was instantly rejected, he continued to add to the army till the Revolution deprived him of his throne. The army which he had raised was to a great extent disbanded, the Irish soldiers especially, whom he had introduced in large numbers on account of their religion, being all sent home.
The condition of the army immediately engaged the attention of parliament. The Bill of Rights had definitely established that "the raising or keeping of a standing army within the kingdom, unless it be by the consent of parliament, is against the law," and past experience made them very jealous of such a force. But civil war was imminent, foreign war certain ; and William had only a few Dutch troops, and the remains of James's army, with which to meet the storm. Parliament therefore sanctioned a standing army, trusting to the checks established by the Bill of Rights and Act of Settlement, and by placing the pay of the army under the control of the Commons. An event soon showed the altered posi tion of the army. A regiment mutinied and declared for James. It was surrounded and compelled to lay down its arms; but Wil liam found himself without legal power to deal with the mutineers. He therefore applied to parliament, and in 1689 was passed the first Mutiny Act, which, after repeating the provisions regarding the army inserted in the Bill of Rights, and declaring the illegality of martial law, gave power to the crown to deal with the offences of mutiny and desertion by courts-martial. From this event is often dated the history of the standing army as a constitutional force (but see Fortescue, British Army, i. 335).
Under William the old regiments of James's army were reor ganized, retaining, however, their original numbers, and three of cavalry and eleven of infantry (numbered to the 28th) were added. In 1690 parliament sanctioned a force of 62,00o men, but on peace being made in 1697 the Commons immediately passed resolutions to the effect that the land forces be reduced to 7,000 men in England and 12,000 in Ireland. The War of the Spanish Succession quickly obliged Great Britain again to raise a large army, at one time exceeding 200,000 men; but of these the greater number were foreign troops engaged for the continental war. Fortescue (op. cit. i. 555) estimates the British forces at home and abroad as 70,000 men at the highest figure. After the peace of Utrecht the force was again reduced to 8,000 men in Great Britain and i i,000 in the plantations (i.e. colonies) and abroad. From that time to the present the strength of the army has been de termined by the annual votes of parliament, and though fre quently the subject of warm debates in both houses, it has ceased to be a matter of dispute between the crown and parliament. The following table shows the main fluctuations from that time on ward—the peace years showing the average peace strength, the war years the maximum to which the forces were raised:— Peace War Year Number Year Number 175o . . . . 18,857 5745 • 74,187 . . . 17,013 1761 . . . . 1822 . . . . - 1857 . . . . 1812 . . • • 1866 . . . . 203,404 1856 . . . 2 75 ,079 Note.—Prior to 1856 the British forces serving in India are not included.
During William's reign the small English army bore an hon ourable part in the wars against Louis XIV., and especially dis tinguished itself under the king at Steinkirk, Neerwinden and Namur. In the great wars of Queen Anne's reign the British army under Marlborough acquired a European reputation. The cavalry, which had called forth the admiration of Prince Eugene when passed in review before him of ter its long march across Germany (1704), especially distinguished itself in the battle of Blenheim, and Ramillies, Oudenarde and Malplaquet were added to the list of English victories. But the army as usual was reduced at once, and even the cadres of old regiments were disbanded, though the alarm of Jacobite insurrections soon brought about the re-creation of many of these. During the reign of the first and second Georges an artillery corps was organized, and the army further increased by five regiments of cavalry and thirty-five of infantry. Although Fontenoy (q.v.) was a day of disaster for the English arms, it did not lower their reputation, but rather added to it. Six regiments of infantry won the chief glory of Prince Ferdinand's victory of Minden (q.v.) in 1759. About this time the first English regiments were sent to India, and the 39th shared in Clive's victory at Plassey. During the first half of George III.'s reign the army was principally occupied in America; and though the conquest of Canada may be counted with pride among its exploits, this page in its history is certainly the darkest. English armies capitulated at Saratoga and at Yorktown, and the war ended by the evacuation of the revolted states of America and the acknowledgment of their independence.
In the i8th century, regiments were still raised almost as in the days of the Edwards. The crown contracted with a dis tinguished soldier, or gentleman of high position, who undertook to raise the men, receiving a certain sum as bounty-money for each recruit. In some cases, in lieu of money, the contractor re ceived the nomination of all or some of the officers, and recouped himself by selling the commissions. This system—termed "raising men for rank"—was retained for many years, and originally helped to create the "purchase system" of promotion. For the mainte nance of the regiment the colonel received an annual sum sufficient to cover the pay of the men, and the expenses of clothing and of recruiting. Sometimes, when casualties were numerous, the allow ance was insufficient to meet the cost of recruiting, and special grants were made. In war time the ranks were also filled by released debtors, pardoned criminals, and impressed paupers and vagrants. Where the men were raised by voluntary enlistment, the period of service was a matter of contract between the colonel and the soldier, and the engagement was usually for life ; but exceptional levies were enlisted for the duration of war, or for periods of three or five years. As for the officers, the low rate of pay and the purchase system combined to exclude all but men of independent incomes. The barrack accommodation in Great Britain at the beginning of the 18th century only sufficed for five thousand men; and though it had gradually risen to twenty thou sand in 1792, a large part of the army was constantly in camps and billets—the latter causing endless complaints and difficulties.
The first efforts of the army in the long war with France did not tend to raise its reputation amongst the armies of Europe. The campaigns of allied armies under the duke of York in the Netherlands, in which British contingents figured largely, were uniformly unsuccessful (1793-94 and 1799), though in this re spect they resembled those of almost all soldiers against the "New French" army. The policy of the younger Pitt sent thousands of the best soldiers to unprofitable employment, and indeed to death, in the West Indies. At home the administration was corrupt and ineffective, and the people generally shared the contemptuous feeling towards the regular army which was then prevalent in Europe. But a better era began with the appointment of Fred erick Augustus, duke of York, as commander-in-chief of the army. He did much to improve its organization, discipline and training, and was ably seconded by commanders of distinguished ability. Under Abercromby in Egypt, and under Lake, Wellesley and others in India, the British armies again attached victory to their standards. Later, Napoleon's threat of invading England excited her martial spirit to the highest pitch to which it had ever at tained. Finally, her military glory was raised by the series of successful campaigns in the Peninsula, until it culminated in the great victory of Waterloo; and the army emerged from the war with the most solidly founded reputation of any in Europe.
The great augmentations required during the war were effected partly by raising additional regiments, but principally by increas ing the number of battalions, some regiments being given as many as four. On the conclusion of peace these battalions were reduced, but the regiments were retained, and the army was permanently increased from about twenty thousand, the usual peace establish ment before the war, to an average of eighty thousand. The duke of York, on first appointment to the command, had intro duced a uniform drill throughout the army, which was further modified according to Sir David Dundas's system in r Boo ; and, under the direction of Sir John Moore and others, a new system of training and discipline was developed, in which the mind and spirit were cultivated, not merely the muscle. In the Peninsula the army was permanently organized in divisions, usually con sisting of two brigades of three or four battalions each, and one or two batteries of artillery.
The period which elapsed between Waterloo and the Crimean War is marked by a number of Indian and colonial wars, but by no organic changes in the army, with perhaps the single exception of the Limited Service Act of 1847, by which enlistment for ten or twelve years, with power to re-engage to complete twenty-one, was substituted for the life enlistments hitherto in force. The army went to sleep on the laurels and recollections of the Penin sula. The duke of Wellington, for many years commander-in-chief, was too anxious to hide it away in the colonies in order to save it from further reductions or utter extinction, to attempt any great administrative reforms. The force which was sent to the Crimea in 1 854 was an agglomeration of battalions, individually of fine quality, but unused to working together, without trained staff, ad ministrative departments or army organization of any kind. The lesson of the winter before Sevastopol was dearly bought, but was not thrown away. From that time several war ministers and one commander-in-chief have laboured perseveringly at the thankless and difficult task of reforming army organization. Foremost in the work was Sidney Herbert (Lord Herbert of Lea), the soldier's friend, who fell a sacrifice to his labours (1861), but not before he had done much for the army. The whole system of adminis tration was revised. In 1854 it was inconceivably complicated and cumbersome. The "secretary of state for war and colonies," sitting at the Colonial Office, had a general but vague control, practically limited to times of war. The "secretary at war" was the parliamentary representative of the army. The commander-in chief was responsible to the sovereign alone in all matters con nected with the discipline, command or patronage of the army, but to the secretary at war in financial matters. The master-general and board of ordnance were responsible for the supply of ma terial on requisition, but were otherwise independent. and had the artillery and engineers under them. The commissariat department had its headquarters at the treasury, and until 1852 the militia were under the home secretary. In 1854 the business of the colonies was separated from that of war, and the then secretary of state assumed control over all the other administrative officers. In the following year the secretary of state was appointed secre tary at war also, and the duties of the two offices amalgamated; the commissariat office was transferred to the war department; and the Board of Ordnance abolished, its functions being divided between the commander-in-chief and the secretary of state. The minor departments were gradually absorbed, and the whole admin istration divided under two great chiefs, sitting at the war office and Horse Guards respectively. In 187o these two were welded into one, and the war office now existing was constituted.
Corresponding improvements were effected in every branch. The system of clothing the soldiers was altered, the contracts being taken from the colonels of regiments, who received a money allowance instead, and the clothing supplied from government manufactories. The pay, food and general condition of the soldier were improved ; his ordinary education and the military educa tion of the officer were taken in hand.
The Indian Mutiny of 1857, followed by the transference of the government of India, led to important changes. The East India Company's white troops were amalgamated with the Queen's army, and the whole reorganized.
But it is not a British habit to profit by military experience. The mere fact that the difficulties of 1854 and 1857 had been sur mounted ultimately led the nation and its representatives to forget their cost and waste. And the nation-wide rejoinder to the French threats of 1859—the creation of the Volunteer Force— contributed to a false sense of security. Thus the two obvious lessons of the German successes of 1866 and 187o—the power of a national army for offensive invasion, and the rapidity with which such an army when thoroughly organized could be moved—created the greatest sensation in England. The year 18 7o is, therefore, of prime importance in the history of the regular forces and the ensuing period of reform is connected indissolubly with the name of Edward, Lord Cardwell, secretary of state for war 1869-1874. In the matter of organization the result of his labours was seen in the perfectly arranged expedition to Ashanti (1874) ; as for recruiting, the introduction of short service and reserve enlistment together with many rearrangements of pay, etc., helped to treble the number annually enlisted as well as to build up a reserve which in the Boer War yielded 8o,000 men to maintain the strength of the army in the field. The localization of the army, subsequently completed by the territorial system of 1882, was commenced under Cardwell's regime, and a measure which en countered much powerful opposition at the time, the abolition of the purchase of commissions, was also effected by him (1871). The machinery of administration was improved, and autumn manoeuvres were practised on a scale hitherto unknown in Eng land. In 1871 certain powers over the militia, formerly held by lords-lieutenant, were transferred to the crown, and the auxiliary forces were placed directly under the generals commanding dis tricts. In 1881 came an important change in the infantry of the line, which was entirely remodelled in two-battalion regiments bearing territorial titles. This measure (the "linked battalion" system) aroused great opposition; it was dictated chiefly by the necessity of maintaining the Indian and colonial garrisons at full strength, and was begun during Lord Cardwell's tenure of office, the principle being that each regiment should have one battalion at home and one abroad, the latter being fed by the former, which in its turn drew upon the reserve to complete it for war. On these general lines the army progressed up to 1899, when the severe trials of the Boer War hastened fresh schemes of reform, leading up to Mr. Haldane's "territorial" scheme (1908), which put the organization of the forces in the United Kingdom on a new basis.
Cardwell had left office before one of his most important re forms had been completed, organizing the forces in the United Kingdom in larger formations so that they could be employed as a field army, of which the strength was based solely upon the number of troops serving abroad, not upon any estimate of war requirements. The question of the uses to which such an army would be put was one that had never, been properly determined. There were two conflicting schools of thought on the subject, the Army school, which visualized the invasion of England and the primary need for a large field army to deal with such emergency, and the Navy or "Blue-water" school, which maintained that de fence of the sea-communications of the United Kingdom was a need of such vital economic importance to the nation in war, that the Navy must be maintained at sufficient strength to render those communications secure. That invasion by foreign armies, given such naval strength, could be prevented by action at sea, and that the army in the United Kingdom, therefore, would not be required to deal with anything more formidable than hostile raids. The Army view was reflected in the organization of the higher forma tions. These consisted of Army Corps, composed not only of regular forces but also of auxiliary elements under no obligation to proceed abroad. One of the first steps taken by Haldane was to advocate "clear thinking" in connection with army problems, and he developed the general staff, initiated by his predecessor, Arnold Forster, to undertake this important but hitherto neglected branch of military preparation. Within a few months, three principles had been laid down and officially accepted to govern the military defence of the Empire. The first of these was the essential need for a navy strong enough to ensure the safety of troops crossing the seas. This was a natural outcome from Cardwell's system of cutting down oversea garrisons to a bare minimum on the assump tion that the troops in the United Kingdom could be sent as reinforcements to any part of the world in times of emergency. The second principle was that of local provision for military de fence in all parts of the Empire, to the utmost extent to which such provision could be furnished. The third was that of mutual military support in times of emergency.
Instead of paper army corps, available only for home defence, the Haldane reforms provided for the organization of the troops in the United Kingdom in six infantry divisions, one cavalry division, and line of communication troops, as an "expeditionary force" (composed entirely of regulars) available for oversea serv ice either as reinforcements for the small garrisons of different parts of the empire in the event of internal or external menace; or, if need be, as a field army capable of fulfilling treaty obliga tions. Furthermore, the need for strong drafts of men to keep units in the field in a protracted campaign was realized. In the Manchurian War of 1904-5 the Russians had made the mistake of reinforcing their field army with fresh formations, while leaving the veteran units already in the field to melt away for want of drafts to replace wastage in personnel. In order to avoid this mistake in British military policy, the militia was called upon to provide drafts of trained men in time of war for the expedition ary force, and its name was changed to the "special reserve" of the regular army.
A further point that was realized was that, whether the British Isles were, or were not, subject to the menace of invasion, they could not be left denuded of troops. Material in man-power lay readily to hand in the force of yeomanry and volunteers who, from patriotic motives, had volunteered to take part in the military defence of the United Kingdom in grave emergencies and to spend such time as they could spare from their civil vocations in under going training for the purpose. Lacking neither in zeal nor in numbers, they lacked all else required by a field army in the way of organization and training in higher units and most of the trans port, material and equipment, of which the provision comes under the term understood by the expression "mobilization." Units of the different arms and departments had sprung up haphazard, according to the preference expressed by those who had been instrumental in raising them. No attention had been paid to the proportion of each arm and department needed for a grouping in such higher formations as divisions. In face of opposition and criticism similar to that faced by Cardwell, Haldane, with the loyal co-operation of the units concerned, used this material to establish the territorial force, of which the first units appeared under arms in the financial year beginning in April 1908. The act which established this force providea that either the units or the individuals serving therein might volunteer for oversea serv ice in grave emergencies. The extent to which this appeal met with response during the years 1914-18 belongs to the story of the World War (q.v.). By December 1914, 2,413 officers and 66,805 other ranks in the territorials were serving abroad. By April 1917 these numbers had risen respectively to 17,859 and 487,237. Up to the close of 1915, the voluntary direct enlistments in war time into the territorial force numbered 725,842. Apart from indi viduals who volunteered for the regular army, the yeomanry pro vided one complete division for oversea service, the territorial force of all arms 24 divisions.
Thirty "New Army" divisions were also raised on a plan instituted by Lord Kitchener to supplement the I I "regular" divisions employed overseas. In December 1918 the British field army comprised 4 mounted and 67 infantry divisions, of which all excepting one mounted (cyclist) and 4 infantry divisions were serving outside the United Kingdom. With a total establishment of 256,798, the British regular army began the World War with an actual peace strength of 247,432, an army reserve of and "special reserve" of The territorial force, with an establishment of 316,094, numbered 268,777, including 766 mem bers of the officers training corps, also established by Haldane, with an establishment fixed at Between the outbreak of war and conclusion of the armistice, England provided 4,006,158, Scotland 557,618, Wales and Monmouthshire 272,924 and Ireland 134,202 men for the British army, a total of nearly 5,000,00o for the United Kingdom. The total permanent wastage in British (Isles) military personnel up to January 1919 amounted to 1,892,10o, including half a million killed or died of wounds or other causes overseas, and about 37,000 in the United Kingdom.
Roughly speaking the number of British troops serving in va rious expeditionary forces at the time of the armistice in Novem ber 1918 may be put at about 2,100,000, with 1,380,00o in the United Kingdom (excluding about 250,00o volunteers), 94,000 in India, and 11,200 as garrisons of defended ports. Total about 3,600,000. Some idea of the strain brought upon the British army in the days of unrest in the world after the armistice can be gathered from a return showing that the numbers demobilized up to May 26, 1920 amounted to the vast total of 163,563 officers and 3,595,717 other ranks, altogether nearly 3,660,000; while dur ing the same period grave military responsibilities were under taken in North Russia (up to October 1919), in East Russia (Vladivostok), in Germany (Cologne area of occupation), in Arabia, in Trans-Caucasia (up to April 1919), in the Caucasus (up to August 1919), in Mesopotamia, Syria (up to January 1920), Palestine and East Africa, involving fighting in most of those areas, as well as in India and in Ireland ; that we were still technically at war with Turkey, and actively at war with Afghani stan (May to August 1919). The tale is told elsewhere of these operations, and of the strain brought subsequently upon the army by operations in India ; in attempting to hold neutral zones covering the Dardanelles and Bosporus when the Turkish Army had been allowed years to recuperate after the conclusion of an armistice in October 1918; in attempting to maintain order in Ireland; and in military activities elsewhere. It was not until the training season of 1925, when 4 regular divisions and an extem porized cavalry division took part in army manoeuvres for the first time for twelve years, that normal conditions of peace or ganization and training again began to prevail. A shortage of reserves would, however, have still rendered impossible the mobili zation of even four divisions (as compared with six in 1914). Behind this small expeditionary force stood a reconstituted (1920) territorial army of 14 divisions, liable to oversea service in grave emergencies, to whom a definite promise had been made that, in such circumstances, they would go as units, and not be called upon to provide drafts for the regular army, although that force had lost the "special reserve" which formed so valuable a feature of the Haldane reforms.
Such, in broad outline, is the story of the British Army from the earliest times till the crisis of 1914-18 called upon that Army for the greatest effort in its history, and through the decade that intervened until we find it in the present day, with its num bers reduced, its responsibilities increased by the Locarno Treaties (q.v.) and by the need to maintain order in, and to defend in creased areas of territory in Asia and in Africa ; with Southern Ireland, from whence came some of its finest soldiers, no longer available as a recruiting ground ; and, the militia having been abolished except in name, with no other military force to share in the unpopular task of rendering aid to the civil power in time of peace. The territorial army cannot be used for this purpose unless embodied by special Act of Parliament.
The regular army in the United Kingdom is organised in 2 cavalry brigades and 4 infantry divisions, with additional units unallotted. Some of the troops in the 3rd division, serving on Salisbury plain, also form part of an experimental "armoured force" of tanks, mechanized artillery, engineers and mechanically transported infantry which was formed in the summer of 1927 for training and trials with other units. In addition to the above there are certain army troops consisting of artillery (including anti-aircraft), tanks, technical units, etc. A point of which to take note is that the annual reliefs in units or drafts sent out from these troops in the United Kingdom in the year ending on September 3o, 1927 numbered approximately equalling the number of recruits that were raised in the same year. (Serv ice on the Rhine is counted as "home" service.) In the Channel Islands there is a small force of militia, with an establishment of 2,703 and a strength (1928) of about 2,200.
The territorial army is organised in 14 Divisions, one Cavalry Division, and Army Troops. Excluding permanent staff, provided by the regular army, its establishment in 1928 stood at officers and 173,754 other ranks. ''he actual strength on January I, 1928 was 6,824 officers and 132,323 other ranks, an increase of 64 officers and a decrease of 7,439 other ranks compared with the figures for January 1, 1927.
The cadet force, of boys of school age, on October 1027 con tained 953 companies with a total strength of 2,45o officers and other ranks, of whom 1,134 officers and 19,126 cadets had attended an annual camp.
The Officers' Training Corps, consisting of contingents from universities and schools whose offer has been accepted by the army council, contains a senior (university) division, numbering about 4,600 and a junior (schools) division numbering about 34,00o. The object of this formation is to make provision for expansion in grave emergencies. The potential strength of the British army in future, as in past conflicts, is difficult to estimate without know ing the cause of the war or the extent to which it appeals to the nation. By the close of 1928 it is estimated that the regular army (trained) reserve will stand at about 105,000; that of the supple mentary reserve at about 18,000.
Colonial Forces.—Mention has been made above of certain "Colonial Forces" included in returns of the strength of the British Army. These included the Royal Malta Artillery, the West African Regiment, the Hong Kong and Singapore Royal Artil lery, and certain details, the total of all these units numbering just under 2,000 of all ranks. Reference to forces for colonial defence again brings into prominence the Cardwell system, under which a mere handful of British troops is kept abroad on the assumption that reinforcement by sea in times of emergency will always be a practicable proposition; and also the accepted prin ciple (19o9) that local forces should be maintained in sufficient strength to provide for defence under normal conditions. A gen eral idea of the working of the Cardwell system may be gathered from notes given below. The military forces maintained by the greater self-governing nations grouped in the British Common wealth—Canada, Australia, New Zealand, South Africa and the Irish Free State—will be found under those countries. There remain the colonies and protectorates which, for the sake of con venience, will be taken in the order in which they are arrayed in the League of Nations "Armaments Year Book," from which the latest information can always be obtained. Where no military forces are mentioned, none exist.
Group I. (The West Indies, the Americas and the islands in the Atlantic.) Includes the Bahamas, Barbados, with about 26o volunteers and their reserve, a cadet corps and rifle association; Bermuda, with a militia of about 240, about 32o volunteers and a cadet corps; British Guiana, with a militia of about 1,200, now all volunteers but with a ballot in force if required, and a semi military police of about Boo; British Honduras, with about 43o volunteers and a territorial force compulsory service act in force if needed, also a police force of about 14o liable for military service ; the Falkland Islands, with liability for all British male subjects from 18 to 41 years to serve in the defence force; Ja maica, with about 10o militia artillery, about ioo infantry volun teers, a few mounted scouts and a police force with military organization; the Leeward Islands (Antigua, St. Kitts-Nevis, Dominica and Montserrat), with volunteer defence forces num bering in all about 210, with rifle clubs as reserves and an armed police force of West Indian natives ; Trinidad and Tobago, with about 240 volunteers; and the Windward Islands (St. Lucia, Grenada and St. Vincent), with volunteer corps totalling about 16o in St. Lucia and St. Vincent and a rifle club in Grenada, with police forces liable to military service and numbering about 210 in the three islands.
Group II. (Europe.) Includes Cyprus; and Malta, where a garrison of British troops is supplemented by the Royal Malta Artillery, mentioned above, by Royal Engineer Malta militia about 95 strong, and by the Royal Malta Regiment of which the strength is being reduced to about Ioo.
Group III. (Africa.) Includes (a) East Africa (q.v.) corn prising Kenya Colony, Nyasaland, Uganda, Tanganyika Territory, Zanzibar Protectorate, and Somaliland; (b) West Africa, includ ing Gambia, Gold Coast, Nigeria and Sierra Leone; and (c) South Africa, excluding the Union 'territory, and comprising Basuto land, Bechuanaland Protectorate, Northern and Southern Rho desia and Swaziland.
(a) In East Africa, apart from the King's African Rifles (see BRITISH EAST AFRICA) and the Somaliland Camel Corps, about 50o strong, recently embodied therein, Kenya Colony is organ izing a territorial force, based on compulsory and voluntary serv ice for Europeans and a reserve of about 500 for the K.A.R. Nyasaland has a volunteer reserve of about 27o and a reserve of about 600 for the K.A.R. Uganda has a volunteer reserve of about ioo for each district and a reserve of about 75o for the K.A.R. ; Tanganyika has a reserve of about Soo for the K.A.R.; Somaliland a reserve of about I So . f or the Camel Corps. All these territories and Zanzibar have armed native police forces available for military service. With the exception of the King's African Rifles the services of all the above local forces are limited to their own territories.
(b) In West Africa local defence is provided primarily by the West African Frontier Force, regular troops similar to the King's African Rifles. (See also NIGERIA.) A reserve for this force is being established in each colony. The active units in the W.A.F.F. include, with approximate strengths, Gambia Company (15o), Gold Coast Regiment (1,10O), Nigeria Regiment (3,600), and Sierra Leone Battalion (400). Taken in detail, a reserve of about Ioo for the W.A.F.F. is kept in Gambia; one of about 38o in the Gold Coast, besides a volunteer force composed chiefly of government officials; another of about 700 in Nigeria (q.v.) ; and one of about Ioo in Sierra Leone. All these territories have armed native police forces, which, with the Gold Coast Police, are restricted to the Gold Coast and Ashanti.
(c) In South Africa, outside the Union, for which (see SOUTH AFRICA) there is a native police force of about 30o in Basutoland, liable to military service, and one of about 27o in In Northern Rhodesia a volunteer force about 76o strong, and about 700 native police liable for military service. In Southern Rhodesia a volunteer force of about 3,000, a cadet corps of about 1,200 and about 500 police. In Swaziland a British rifle club of about 400, and a native police force of about 16o, liable for military service anywhere in South Africa.
Group IV. (Asia, and Islands in the Indian Ocean.) This group includes British North Borneo, Ceylon, Hong Kong, the Malay Peninsula (Straits Settlements, Federated States and Unfederated States), Mauritius and the Seychelles. In North Borneo there is a police force of various races, liable for military service and numbering about 780. In Ceylon a volunteer defence force of about 3,60o with a reserve of about 600, about 94o cadets, and a volunteer rifle association of about 15o members; in Hong Kong a volunteer defence force of about 33o, and a European rifle association; in the Straits Settlements, volunteer corps numbering about 2,900, distributed between Singapore, Penang and Malacca, and armed police forces numbering about 3,400. For the military forces in the Malay States, numbering in all about 4,200, see under Malay States. In Mauritius there is a volunteer force numbering about 66o.
Group V. (Pacific Ocean.) Includes Fiji, where there is a defence force of about Boo and semi-military police of about 200 natives; Gilbert and Ellice Islands, with small defence forces being organized in Fanning and Ocean Islands, and about 50 armed police; and the Solomon Islands, with about 15o armed police.
We find, then, that British Colonies and Protectorates, exclud ing those in Africa, with a total population of about 12,900,000 (2,200,000 in Group I., 600,000 in Group II., 9,800,000 in Group IV. and 300,00o in Group V.) maintain no regular troops for local protection, but only small handfuls of volunteers or rifle-clubs. In Africa (Group III.) we find in the East the King's African Rifles (about 5,70o) and in the West the West African Frontier Force (about 5,40o) and a few local volunteers in most of the African Colonies and Protectorates, while the total native popula tion in this group numbers about 37,000,00o.
Due note will be taken of the point that in this article dealing with British Colonial Forces, no reference has been made to Egypt and the Sudan, to the mandated territories in Iraq, in Palestine, or to Aden and the Arabian hinterland. These are dealt with elsewhere. See also, for defence responsibilities that fall upon the British army, the information under INDIA, and, in connection with the principle of mutual defence, that given under