GREEK INDEPENDENCE, WAR OF, the name given to the great rising of the Greek subjects of the sultan against the Ottoman domination, which began in 1821 and ended in with the establishment of the independent kingdom of Greece. The circumstances that led to the insurrection and the general diplomatic situation by which its fortunes were from time to time affected are described elsewhere (see GREECE : History; TURKEY : History). If we exclude the abortive invasion of the Danubian principalities by Prince Alexander Ypsilanti (March 1821), which collapsed ignominiously as soon as it was disavowed by the tsar, the theatre of the war was confined to continental Greece, the Morea and the adjacent narrow seas. Its history may, broadly speaking, be divided into three periods : the first (1821-24), dur ing which the Greeks, aided by numerous volunteers from Europe, were successfully pitted against the sultan's forces alone; the second, from 1824, when the disciplined troops of Mehemet Ali, pasha of Egypt, turned the tide against the insurgents; the third, from the intervention of the European Powers in the autumn of 1827 to the end.
When, on April 2, 1821, Archbishop Germanos, head of the Hetaeria in the Morea, raised the standard of the cross at Kalavryta as the signal for a general rising of the Christian popu lation, the circumstances were highly favourable. In the Morea itself, in spite of plentiful warning, the Turks were wholly un prepared; while the bulk of the Ottoman army, under Kurshid Pasha, was engaged in the long task of reducing the intrepid Ali, pasha of Iannina (see ALT, Pasha of Iannina). Another factor, and that the determining one, soon came to the aid of the Greeks. In warfare carried on in such a country as Greece, sea-girt and with a coast deeply indented, inland without roads and intersected with rugged mountains, victory—as Wellington was quick to ob serve—must rest with the side that has command of the sea. This was assured to the insurgents at the outset by the revolt of the maritime communities of the Greek archipelago. The Greeks of the islands had been accustomed from time immemorial to seafaring ; their ships were well armed, to guard against the Barbary pirates and rovers of their own kin; lastly, they had furnished the bulk of the sailors to the Ottoman navy which, now that this recruiting ground was closed, had to be manned hastily with impressed crews of dock-labourers and peasants. The Turkish fleet, "adrift in the Archipelago"—as the British seamen put it— though greatly superior in tonnage and weight of metal, could never be a match for the Greek brigs, manned as these were by trained, if not disciplined, crews.
Meanwhile, north of the Isthmus, the fortunes of war had been less one-sided. In the west Khurshid's lieutenant, Omar Vrioni (a Mussulman Greek of the race of the Palaeologi), had inflicted a series of defeats on the insurgents, and relieved the Acropolis; but the rout of Mohammed Pasha, who was coming to his aid in the defile of Mount Oeta, forced him to retreat and the campaign of 1821 ended with the retirement of the Turks into Thessaly. The month of April had witnessed the revolt of the principal Greek islands, Spetsae, Psara, Hydra and Samos. Their fleets were divided into squadrons, of which one, under Tombazes, was deputed to watch for the entrance of the Ottomans into the archipelago, while the other under Andreas Miaoulis sailed to blockade Patras and watch the coasts of Epirus. At sea, as on land, the Greeks opened the campaign with hideous atrocities.
pings, indeed, set the whole tone of the war, which was frankly one of mutual extermination. On both sides the combatants were barbarians, without discipline or competent organization. At sea the Greeks rapidly developed into mere pirates, and even Miaoulis, for all his high character and courage, was often unable to prevent his captains from sailing home at critical moments, when pay or booty failed. On land the presence of a few edu cated Phanariots, such as Demetrios Ypsilanti or Alexander Mavrocordato, was powerless to inspire the rude hordes with any sense of order or of humanity in warfare ; while every lull in the fighting was the signal for internecine conflicts due to the rivalry of the leaders. Their cause, indeed, was helped more by the impolitic reprisals of the Turks than by the heroism of the insurgents. All Europe stood aghast at the news of the execution of the Patriarch Gregorios of Constantinople (April 22, 1821) and the wholesale massacres that followed. The cause of Greece was now that of Christendom, of the Catholic and Protestant West, as of the Orthodox East. European Liberalism, too, gagged and fettered under Metternich's "system," recognized in the Greeks the champions of its own cause; while even conservative statesmen, schooled in the memories of ancient Hellas, saw fn the struggle a fight of civilization against barbarism. This latter belief, which was, moreover, flattering to their vanity, the Greek leaders were astute enough to foster ; the propaganda of Adamantios Coraes (q.v.) had done its work; and wily brigands, like Odysseus of Ithaka, assuming the style and trappings of antiquity, posed as the champions of classic culture against the barbarian. All Europe, then, hailed with joy the exploit of Constantine Kanaris, who on the nigl t of June 18-19 succeeding in steering a fireship among the Turkish squadron off Scio, and burned its flagship.
Karaiskakis.—The fall of Missolonghi, followed as this was by the submission of many of the more notable chiefs, left Reshid free to turn his attention to east Hellas, where Gouras had been ruling as a practically independent chief and in the spirit of a brigand. The peasants of the open country welcomed the Turks as deliverers and Reshid's conciliatory policy facili tated his march to Athens, which fell at the first assault on Aug. 25, siege being at once laid to the Acropolis, where Gouras and his troops had taken refuge. Round this the war now centered; for all recognized that its fall would involve that of the cause of Greece. In these straits the Greek Government entrusted the supreme command of the troops to Karaiskakis, an old retainer of Ali of Iannina, a master of the art of guerilla war, and, above all, a man of dauntless courage and devoted patriotism. A first at tempt to relieve the Acropolis, with the assistance of some dis ciplined troops under the French Col. Fabvier, was defeated at Chaidari by the Turks. The garrison of the Acropolis was hard pressed and the death of Gouras (October 13) would have ended all, had not his heroic wife taken over the command and inspired the defenders with new courage. For months the siege dragged on, while Karaiskakis fought with varying success in the moun tains, a final victory at Distomo (February 1827) over Omar Vrioni securing the restoration to the Greek cause of all conti nental Greece, except the towns which were actually held by the Turks.
Cochrane and Church.—It was at this juncture that the Greek Government, reinforced by a fresh loan from Europe, handed over the chief command at sea to Lord Cochrane (earl of Dundonald) and that of the land forces to General Church, both Miaoulis and Karaiskakis consenting to serve under them. Cochrane and Church at once concentrated their energies on the task of relieving the Acropolis. Already, on February 5, Gen. Gordon had landed and entrenched himself on the hill of Mu nychia, near the ancient Piraeus. When Church and Cochrane ar rived, a general assault on the Ottoman camp was decided on. This was preceded, on April 25, by an attack, headed by Cochrane, on the Turkish troops established near the monastery of St. Spiridion, the result of which was to establish communication between the Greeks at Munychia and Phalerum. The monastery held out for two days longer, when the Albanian garrison sur rendered on terms, but were massacred by the Greeks as they were marching away under escort. For this miserable crime Church has, by some historians, been held responsible by default ; it is clear, however, from his own account that no blame rests upon him (see his MS. Narrative, vol. i. chap. H. P. 34)• The as sault on the Turkish main camp was fixed for May 4; but, un fortunately, a chance skirmish brought on an engagement the day before, in the course of which Karaiskakis was killed, an ir reparable loss in view of his prestige with the wild armatoli. The assault on the following day was a disastrous failure. The Greeks, advancing prematurely over broken ground and in no sort of or der, were fallen upon in flank by Reshid's horsemen and fled in panic. Church held Munychia till the 27th, when he sent instruc tions for the garrison of the Acropolis to surrender. On June 5 the remnant of the defenders marched out with the honours of war, and continental Greece was once more in the power of the Turks. Had Reshid at once advanced over the Isthmus, the Morea also must have been subdued; but he was jealous of Ibra him and preferred to return to Iannina to consolidate his con quests.
Renewed Anarchy.—The fate of Greece was now in the hands of the Powers, who after years of diplomatic wrangling had at last realized that intervention was necessary if Greece was to be saved for European civilization. The worst enemy of the Greeks was their own incurable spirit of faction, and a third civil war had only been prevented by the arrival of Cochrane and Church. Under their influence a new National Assembly met at Troezene in March 1827 and elected as president Count Capo d' Istria (q.v.), formerly Russian minister for foreign affairs; at the same time a new constitution was promulgated which, when the very life of the insurrection seemed on the point of flickering out, set forth the full ideal of Pan-Hellenic dreams. Anarchy fol ol lowed; lowed; war of Rumeliotes against Moreotes, of chief against chief ; rival factions bombarded each other from the two forts at Naup lia over the stricken town, and in derision of the impotent govern ment. Finally, after months of inaction, Ibrahim began once more his systematic devastation of the country. To put a stop to this the Powers decided to intervene by means of a joint demon stration of their fleets, in order to enforce an armistice and corn pel Ibrahim to evacuate the Morea (Treaty of London, July 6, 1827). The refusal of Ibrahim to obey, without special instruc tion from the sultan, led to the entrance of the allied British, French and Russian fleet into the harbour of Navarino and the battle of October 20, 1827 (see NAVARINO). This, and the two campaigns of the Russo-Turkish War of 1828-29, decided the issue.