HERBART, JOHANN FRIEDRICH (17 , Ger man philosopher and educationist, was born at Oldenburg on May 4, 1776. After studying under Fichte at Jena he tutored in Switzer land where he met Pestalozzi. He lectured at Gottingen in 1805, whence he removed in 1809 to occupy the chair formerly held by Kant at Konigsberg. Here he also conducted a seminary of peda gogy till 1833, when he returned as professor of philosophy to Gottingen, where he died on Aug. 14, 1841.
Philosophy, according to Herbart, means the reflection upon and elaboration of our empirical conceptions. Logic, its first division, clarifies our conceptions and the judgments and reasonings aris ing from them. But the more distinct some conceptions are, the more contradictory their elements become ; so to manipulate these as to make them thinkable is the problem of metaphysics.
Logic receives comparatively meagre notice from Herbart, though he insists on its purely formal character, and expresses himself in the main at one with Kantians such as Fries and Krug.
As a metaphysician he starts from the scepticism of Hume and Kant, and on account of the contradictions involved, questions the real validity of even the forms of experience which he admits are "given." Suppose we are given a conception A uniting among its constituent marks two contradictory ones, M and N. We can neither deny the unity nor reject one of the contradictory mem bers. To do either is forbidden by experience; to do nothing is forbidden by logic. We must assume then that the conception is contradictory because incomplete, and what we have must point the way to what we want. Experience asserts that M is the same (i.e., a mark of the same concept) as N, while logic denies it; and so—it being impossible for one and the same M to sustain these contradictory positions, we must posit several M's. But even now we cannot say one of these M's is the same as N, another is not ; for every 11 must be both thinkable and valid. We must take the M's not singly but together, and assume that N results from a combination of M's. This is Herbart's method of relations, the counterpart in his system of the Hegelian dialectic.
In the Ontology this method is employed to determine what in reality corresponds to the empirical conceptions of substance and cause, or rather of inherence and change. The conception of the real consists of the two conceptions of being and quality. That which we are compelled to "posit" is that which is, and in the recognition of this lies the simple conception of being. We know what being is because we are bound against our will to endure the persistence of a presentation. As to the quality of the real, it must exclude everything negative; for non-A sublates instead of posit ing, and is but relative to A. The real must be absolutely simple; for if it contain two determinations, then either these are reducible to one, which is the true quality, or they are not, when each is conditioned by the other and their position no longer absolute. The simplicity also excludes quantitative conceptions. But there may be a plurality of "reals," albeit the mere conception of being tells us nothing of this. This cardinal point of Herbart's system makes it a "pluralistic realism." The contradictions in the common-sense conception of ence is now obvious. For example, when A has attributes, a, b, c . . . , each presented in intuition, A, as a real, being simple, must =a; similarly it must =b; and so on. Now this would be possible if a, b, c . . . were but "contingent aspects" of A, as, e.g., are contingent aspects of 8. Such is not the case, and so we have as many contradictions as attributes ; for we must say A is a, is not a, is b, is not b, etc. There must then, according to the method of relations, be several A's. For a let us assume ... ; for b, . . . ; and so on. But what relation can there be among these several A's, which will restore to us the unity of our original A or substance? There is but one; we must assume that the first A of every series is identical, just as the centre is the same point in every radius. In place of the one absolute position, which the common understanding tutes for the absolute positions of the n attributes, we have really a series of two or more positions for each attribute, every series, however, beginning with the same central real (hence the unity of substance in a group of attributes), but each being continued by different reals (hence the plurality of attributes in unity of substance). Where there is the appearance of inherence, fore, there is always a plurality of reals and no such correlative to substance as attribute or accident. Substantiality is impossible without causality, and to this as its true correlative we now turn. The common-sense conception of change involves the same tradiction of opposing qualities in one real. The same A that was a, b, c . . . becomes a, b, d . . . ; and this on reflection proves unthinkable. The metaphysical supplementing is also fundamen tally as before. Since c depended on a series of reals . . . in connection with A, and d may be said similarly to depend on a series A,+A,-}-A, . . ., then the change from c to d means, not that the central real A or any real has changed, but that A is now in connection with A,, etc., and no longer in connection with etc.
What happens when a number of reals are in connection? The answer is the second hinge-point of Herbart's theoretical philos ophy. What actually happens as distinct from what seems to happen, when two reals A and B are together is that, assuming them to differ in quality, they tend to disturb each other to the extent of that difference, at the same time that each preserves itself intact by resisting the other's disturbance. And so by com ing into connection with different reals the "self-preservations" of A will vary accordingly.
Having determined what really is and what actually happens, Herbart next explains synthetically the objective semblance that results from these. If this construction is to be objective, and valid for all intelligences, ontology must furnish us with a clue. This we have in the forms of Space, Time and Motion which are involved whenever we think the reals as being in, or coming into, connection and the opposite. These forms are "intelligible" be cause valid for all who comprehend the real and actual, although no such forms are predicable of the real and actual themselves. The elementary spatial relation is "the contiguity of two points," so that every "pure and independent line" is discrete. But an investigation of dependent lines which are often incommensurable forces us to adopt the contradictory fiction of partially overlap ping, i.e. divisible points, or in other words, the conception of Continuity. But this contradiction is one we cannot eliminate by the method of relations, because it does not involve anything real; and in fact as a necessary outcome of an "intelligible" form, the fiction of continuity is valid for the "objective semblance." By its help we comprehend what actually happens among reals to produce the appearance of matter. When three or more reals are together, each disturbance and self-preservation will (in general) be imper fect, i.e., of less intensity than when only two reals are together.' But "objective semblance" corresponds with reality; the spatial or external relations of the reals in this case must, therefore, tally with their inner or actual states. Had the self-preservations been perfect, the coincidence in space would have been complete, and the group of reals inextended; or had the several reals been simply cor tiguous, i.e., without connection, then, as nothing would actually have happened, nothing would appear. Motion, likewise, impli cates the contradictory conception of continuity, and cannot, therefore, be a real predicate, though necessary to the compre hension of the objective semblance. For we have to think of the reals as absolutely independent and yet as entering into connec tions. This we can only do by conceiving them as originally mov ing through intelligible space in rectilinear paths and with uniform velocities. For such motion no cause need be supposed ; motion, in fact, is no more a state of the moving real than rest is, both alike being but relations, with which, therefore, the real has no concern. The changes in this motion, however, for which we should require a cause, would be the objective semblance of the self-preservations that actually occur when reals meet. Further, by means of such motion these actual occurrences, which are in themselves timeless, fall for an observer in a definite time—a time which becomes continuous through the partial coincidence of events.
It remains to make good the assumption that we are spectators of the objective semblance and to show the possibility of know ledge. Here, again, a contradictory conception appears, viz., that of the Ego as the identity of knowing and being, and as such the stronghold of idealism. The contradiction is evident when the ego is defined to be a subject (and so a real) that is its own object. The solution the method of relations furnishes is summarily that there are several objects which modify each other, and so consti tute that ego we take for the presented real. The subject like all reals is necessarily unknown, but we can know what actually hap pens when the soul is in connection with other's reals, for its self preservations then are what we call sensations. These sensations are the sole material of our knowledge and are given to us in defi nite groups and series, whence we come to know the relations of those reals, which, though themselves unknown, our sensations compel us to posit.
Herbart regards the doctrine of mental faculties as refuted by his metaphysics, and contends that all psychical phenomena result from the action and interaction of elementary ideas or presentations. The soul being one and simple, its separate acts of self-preservation or primary presentations must be simple too, and its several presentations must become united. If they are of opposite quality, the presentations mutually suppress or ob scure each other. The act of presentation then becomes partly an effort, and its product, the idea, becomes in the same propor tion less and less intense till equilibrium is reached, and the re mainders coalesce. We have thus a mechanics and a statics of mind. In the statics two magnitudes have to be determined: (1) the amount of the suppression or inhibition and (2) the ratio in which this is shared among the opposing presentations. Equilib rium is never quite obtained for those presentations which con tinue above the threshold of consciousness, while the rest which cannot so continue are speedily driven beyond the threshold. The law according to which a presentation freed from inhibition and rising anew into consciousness tends to raise the other presenta tions with which it is combined is important. Suppose two presen tations p and 7r united by the residua r and p; then the amount of p's "help" to it is r, the portion of which appropriated by 7r is given by the ratio p :7r ; and thus the initial help is 'le.
Ir But after a time t, when a portion of p represented by w has been actually brought into consciousness, the help afforded in the next instant will be found by the equation So that if there are several 'es connected with p by smaller and smaller parts, there will be a definite "serial" order in which they will be revived by p; and on this fact Herbart rests all the phe nomena of memory and the development of spatial and temporal forms. Emotions and volitions, he holds, are not directly self preservations of the soul, as presentations are, but variable states of such presentations resulting from their interaction when above the threshold of consciousness. Thus when some presentations tend to force a presentation into consciousness, and others tend to drive it out, that presentation is the seat of painful feeling. Desires are presentations struggling into consciousness against hindrances, and when accompanied by the supposition of success become volitions. Transcendental freedom in Kant's sense is impossible. Self-consciousness is the result of an interaction essen tially the same as that which takes place when a comparatively simple presentation finds the field of consciousness occupied by a long-formed and well-consolidated "mass" of presentations. What we call Self is such a central mass.
Aesthetics elaborates the "ideas" involved in the expression of taste called forth by those relations of object which acquire for them the attribution of beauty or the reverse. The beautiful is predicated absolutely and involuntarily by all who have attained the right standpoint. Ethics, the chief branch of aesthetics, deals with such relations among volitions as thus unconditionally please or displease. These relations Herbart reduces to five : Internal Freedom, the underlying relation being that of the individual's will to his judgment of it ; Perfection, the relation being that of his several volitions to each other in respect of intensity, vari ety and concentration; (3) Benevolence, the relation being that between his own will and the thought of another's; (4) Right, in case of actual conflict with another; and (5) Retribution or Equity, for intended good or evil done. The ideas of a final soci ety, a system of rewards and punishments, a system of administra tion, a system of culture and an "unanimated society," correspond ing to the ideas of law, equity, benevolence, perfection and internal freedom respectively, result when we take account of a number of individuals. Virtue is the perfect conformity of the will with the moral ideas. The conception of duty arises from the existence of hindrances to the attainment of virtue. The application of ethics to things as they are with a view to the realization of the moral ideas is moral technology, which includes Politics and Paedagogy. The aim of education should be the cultivation of the good will and the formation of character. Since ideas build up the Ego, an intelligent interest involving the process of obser vation, expectation, demand and action, should be extended to a variety of subjects.
In Theology Herbart held the argument from design to be valid for divine activity and to justify belief in a supersensible real, concerning which, however, exact knowledge is neither at tainable nor on practical grounds desirable.
Among the post-Kantians Herbart doubtless ranks next to Hegel in importance. His criticisms are worth more than his construc tions; indeed for exactness and penetration of thought he is on a level with Hume and Kant. (J. WAR. ; X.) BIBLIOGRAPHY.-Herbart's works were collected and published by his disciple G. Hartenstein (Leipzig, 1850-52 ; reprinted Hamburg, , another edition by K. Kehrbach (Langensalza, 1887) . The most important are: Allgemeine Pddagogik (18o6) ; Hauptpunkte der Metaphysik (18o8) ; Allgemeine praktische Philosophie (1808) ; Ein leitung in die Philosophie (1813) ; Lehrbuch der Psychologie (1816, Eng. trs. 1891) ; Psychologie als W issenschaf t (1824) ; Allgemeine Metaphysik (1828) ; Encyklopddie der Philosophie (2nd ed., 1841) ; Umriss padagogischer V orlesungen (2nd ed., 1841) ; Psychologische Untersuchungen (1839) . Eng. translations of his educational works in clude: The Science of Education (1892), Letters and Lectures on Education (1898) ; A B C of Sense Perception and minor pedagogical works (1896) ; Application of Psychology to the Science of Education (1898) ; Outlines of Educational Doctrine (19o1) .
There is a life of Herbart in Hartenstein's introduction to his Kleinere philosophische Schriften and Abhandlungen (1842) and by F. H. T. Allihn in Zeitschrift fur exacte Philosophie (Leipzig, 1860. See also: H. A. Fechner, Zur Kritik der Grundlagen von Herbart's Metaphysik (Leipzig, 1853) ; M. W. Drobisch, Ober die Fortbildung der Philosophie durch Herbart (Leipzig, 1876) ; K. S. Just, Die Fortbildung der Kant'schen Ethik durch Herbart (Eisenach, 1876) ; C. Ufer, V orschule der Pddagogik Herbarts (1883 ; Eng. tr., 1895) L. Strumpell, Das System der Padagogik Herbarts (Leipzig, 1894) ; J. Christinger, Herbarts Erziehungslehre and ihre Fortbildner (Zurich, 1895) ; H. M. and E. Felkin, Introduction. to Herbart's Science and Practice of Education (1895) ; C. de Garmo, Herbart and the Herbartians (New York, 1895) ; E. Wagner, Vollstandige Darstel lung der Lehre Herbarts (1899) ; J. Adams, The Herbartian Psychology applied to Education (1897) ; F. H. Hayward, The Meaning of Education as interpreted by Herbart (1907) ; W. Kinkel, J. F. Herbart (1903) ; A. Darroch, Herbart and the Herbartian Theory of Education (19o3) ; C. J. Dodd, Introduction to the Herbartian Prin ciples of Teaching (19o4) ; J. Davidson, A new Interpretation of Herbart's Psychology, etc. (1906) ; R. D. Chalke, A Synthesis of Froebel and Herbart (1912) . See also Uberweg, Grundriss der Gesch. der Phil. Pt. 4 (1923) containing a full bibliography.