HOLSTEIN, FRIEDRICH VON from 1878 1906 counsellor (Vortragender Rat) in the political department of the German Foreign Office, was the most important personality, after Bismarck, and equally with William II., in the political history of the German Empire. The following account will give first the chief events in his official career, then a picture of his personality, as reconstructed from documents, recollections and oral tradition, and finally an appreciation of the most important of his political decisions.
Life.—Friedrich August von Holstein was born on April 21, 1837, of an old and noble, but untitled, Mecklenburg family. He attended the gymnasium and the university in Berlin, and after passing his examinations in law entered the foreign office in 186o as attaché. His first post was in Petersburg, under Bismarck, who was at that time Prussian Ambassador. His most important secretarial post was in Paris after the war of 187o-1871, first under Generals von Fabrice and von Waldersee, and later, after the re-establishment of the embassy, under the ambassador Count Arnim. He became secretary of legation in 1872, and in 1876, after Arnim's fall, was recalled to the foreign office, where the rest of his career was passed. At the Congress of Berlin in 1878 he accomplished excellent work, which was recognised by Bis marck, and was promoted Vortragender Rat. This was the end of his actual promotions, but his unseen rise to the highest posi tion of real power was only now to begin. The steps by which he rose cannot be measured by exact events.
After Bismarck's fall he appears at once as the "wirepuller in chief," whose extraordinary influence is known to all the initiated. Henceforward no secretary of state or chancellor might draw up any important document unapproved by him. Neither the changes in the Chancellor's Office (Caprivi, Hohenlohe, Billow), nor at the head of the Foreign Office (Marschall, Billow, Richt hofen) in any way changed the fact that Holstein was the only man in the foreign office who mastered the complicated principles of German foreign policy, and was able to lay down its course with an assurance which may have been real and in any case was apparent. This situation continued, contrary to expectation, even during Billow's long years of office. The first time that Billow acted independently was during the Moroccan crisis of 1905-06. Holstein thereupon tendered his resignation, as the most effective way of gaining his point ; it happened, however, that both chancellor and the secretary of state succumbed to strokes in quick succession and the secretary of state's deputy, von Tschirschky, submitted Holstein's proffered resignation to the emperor, who accepted it. There is good reason to suppose that Billow knew what was happening, although he was able after wards to persuade Holstein to the contrary, and it is certain that the Secretary of State, Freiherr von Richthofen whose illness proved fatal, had declared for Holstein's dismissal. Holstein himself believed the real author of his fall to be the Emperor's friend, Prince Philip Eulenburg, with whom he had quarrelled after an intimacy lasting many years. Even after Holstein's dis missal, Billow did not despise his advice in later difficulties. A long memorandum by Holstein exerted a decisive influence on the attitude of the German Government in the Bosnian crisis of 1908-09. The promotion of his friend Kiderlen-Wachter to the position of Secretary of State came too late to benefit him. He died in Berlin in the same year, May 8, 1909.
Relations with Bismarck.—Bismarck, on whose staff Hol stein had served as attaché in Petersburg, used his attaches principally to write from his dictation, requiring them not only to take down his ideas but to aid expression. It is quite possible that Bismarck was struck here, not only by Holstein's notable eccentricity, but also by his literary and intellectual powers, which were presently to show themselves in the "Notes" with which Holstein afterwards ruled German policy. In any case, Bismarck kept in personal touch with his former attache, whom he took with him ten years later to headquarters at Versailles, afterwards appointing him to the embassy under Frieherr von Arnim. It was here that the first great scandal arose, which is characteristic of Holstein's mentality. Soon after Arnim's ap pointment to the embassy, Bismarck quarrelled with him, and employed Holstein to spy on his chief. In the trial in which Bismarck broke the Ambassador, Holstein was obliged to come forward as a witness and to admit that he had written letters to the chancellor about his chief, Count Arnim. Bismarck had unmasked the secretary of legation before all the world as an intriguant; and this earned Holstein's undying hatred. He believed that Bismarck had shamed him as a traitor in order to make him a degraded and unresisting tool. The passion of injured pride and vanity with which* he reacted against this, the force of hatred which was to endure nearly twenty years, are no less characteristic of Holstein than his secret collaboration with Bismarck against Arnim. Various remarks on Holstein are at tributed to Prince Bismarck and his son Herbert : "only useful for underground work""; "the blind spot" and "the man with the hyena eyes, of whom one must beware." (This the chancellor is alleged to have said to Prince William when giving him an account of affairs and personalities in the Foreign Office.) There is no reason to doubt the authenticity of these remarks.
The very bitterness of them betrays how clearly Bismarck must have realised the hatred burning in Holstein's heart against him. They mean, too, that the Bismarcks, father and son, besides respecting Holstein's ability, had also formed a clear idea of the limits of his capacities. The "blind spot" had a symbolical mean ing for Bismarck. He-felt that Holstein was myoptic in dealing with matters that lay under his eyes. Prince Philip Eulenburg is the chief authority for the statement that Holstein was mainly instrumental in bringing about Bismarck's fall. But, he says, Holstein's tread was so soft and so hidden his ways, that he himself failed to detect the secret method of this enemy. It is impossible to say how far Holstein was influenced by his old hatred, how far by boundless ambition, which could not bear even a Bismarck in its path, and how far by political conviction that Bismarck's policy had ceased to be sound. But any of these three motives may have been present, and they show the com position of a character which was now to develop fully for the first time.
It is hardly possible to overestimate the power of this sys tematic thinking, and as this equation of forces, balanced in Holstein's super-refined brain, was upset by the personal factor : as foreign statesmen, Germany's own ministers, and not last the Emperor himself, failed to act according to the system, this resistance ended by engendering in the central brain that irrita bility which seemed to all observers unnatural and unhealthy. Holstein's proverbial mistrustfulness was the destiny and the curse of his over-systematic spirit. But this curse went so far as to create the illusion that it was unnecessary to treat the personal factor with any consideration. If interests ruled the progress of the world, semi-automatically, then it was possible to pay out Golushowski, when he was minister, for insolence of which he had been guilty when Secretary of Legation in Paris, or to let Salis bury feel the personal dislike conceived against him, even when his Government was making Germany favourable offers. Hol stein shunned every official or social contact in which he was not able to balance and dispose as he wished. The emperor saw him only once ; but even the simple social duties which would have been required of him as secretary of state, under Billow's chancellorship seemed impossible for him. Yet he is said to have been capable of exerting great personal charm when he wished, and it was his habit to elaborate his policy with his intimate friends in a wine cellar of western Berlin as discreet as it was luxurious. The best proof of this ability to charm his enemies, and incidentally, to overcome his own nature, was given by his reconciliation with Maximilian Harden, his most embittered ad versary in the journalistic world, after his dismissal.
He also saw many journalists while still in office. His name, however, was never mentioned. Only once was this rule broken. The humorous paper "Kladderadatsch" denounced him, Kiderlen and Philip Eulenburg under transparent pseudonyms as the secret tyrants of the foreign office and wirepuller of the Emperor. Holstein challenged the editor of "Kladderadatsch" to a duel with pistols and wounded his man. But this was not the only quarrel which he tried to settle by the pistol, and although in other cases he was at least dissuaded from a duel, yet his fondness for this means is characteristic of the hermit-like, sensitive but violent man, devoured by his own passion.
In the foreign office, he clung to his commanding position with ruthless jealousy. When an ambassador or minister came to Berlin, the first person to whom he had to report was not the secretary of state or the chancellor, it had to be Councillor von Holstein, who insisted on being called "Baron." Telegrams and reports went through his hands first, and it sometimes happened that urgently necessary papers were not available to the secretary of state because Herr von Holstein had gone on leave and locked them away. A large part of the official correspondence was marked "private for Baron Holstein." On the other hand, he sent private telegrams, letters and notes to the ministers, laying down their attitude, and often the way in which he desired them to report. The most surprising detail recorded of Holstein is his habit, continued almost daily for years, of speculating on the exchange. The correspondence between him and his intermediary, published by the Berliner Tageblatt is undoubtedly genuine. It is doubtful what the real aim of Holstein's speculation was. Money for money's sake, money in order to secure himself certain en joyments, money for political purposes? Or was it the irresistible need to be in touch, to gamble, not merely with the State, but also with the other mighty force—Capital? The laconic notes to the banker give no answer to this question. It is also impossible to say with certainty whether Holstein let himself be led by financial considerations, into political actions contrary to the interests of the Empire. The correspondence as published gives no ground for the supposition that Holstein the speculator ruled Holstein the Statesman.
This was the system on which Holstein based his policy. It began with the non-renewal in March 1890 of the German Russian Treaty of 1887. It would have been consistent with Holstein's policy to keep the treaty, but the system also allowed him to ignore it. For Holstein did not believe that Russia could form an alliance with France which would stand the test of Mediterranean policy. The suggestion that a treaty with Russia, added to one with Austria, was an act of dishonesty towards the latter power, was incorrect. Both treaties were defensive in their terms, and the aim of the double arrangement was not to let either of the two rivals in the Balkans act against the other and thereby against the peace of Europe. It is true, as Caprivi and others maintained, that this policy was more difficult to conduct than one which dealt with Austria alone. But Holstein shunned simplicity rather than sought it; the only explanation of his decision is therefore his hostility to Bismarck. Bismarck's fall was to be final, his return made impossible. Up to Bismarck's death, Holstein was always tortured by the nightmare of the possible return of the "Bismarcks." The danger of return would, however, have been greater on the renewal of the Russian treaty than at any other time. The following year saw Russia's political understanding with France, and 1892 the drafting of that military convention which was still in force in 1914. If it is remembered that at least up to 1908 Russia did not come into any sort of conflict, even with Austria, much less with Germany, it is clear that the one circumstance which drove the Tsar into the arms of France was the non-renewal of the Treaty, which was accom panied by ostentatious advances by the Emperor William to England, causing the Tsar to fear an attack. Thus two days after Bismarck's dismissal, the superiority of the Triple Alliance, which had hitherto been indubitable, vanished, France emerged from her isolation, and a danger of war between the two European systems of alliance arose. The chief responsibility for this must rest on two men : the Emperor and Holstein.
In the succeeding period Holstein's political path always led him nearer to Russia than to England. This attitude was largely due to his dislike of Lord Salisbury. The rebuffs experienced by Bismarck in 1887 and 5889 from the British foreign minister seem to have had a strong after-effect on Holstein. Between 1893 and 1895 came England's refusal to agree to the Italian plan of redrafting the Mediterranean agreement of 1887 more closely and more favourably for Italy. Holstein had supported Italy's wishes, and felt the refusal as a personal rebuff. Again, after the Chinese-Japanese war, Germany joined the Russo-French Note, while England refused at the last moment, making Germany's attitude conspicuous. Holstein believed that England had manoeuvred him into a false position. Then, in 1895, the British prime minister sounded the Powers regarding the partition of Turkey. Here Holstein conceived a fixed idea that British policy was aiming at bringing Germany into opposition with Russia and getting her to pull the chestnuts out of the fire for Great Britain. For Holstein assumed that Salisbury had conceived the whole plan in order to keep Russia quiet in the Far East. Later, after the emperor had met Salisbury's suggestions with a sharp refusal, Holstein saw that the plan had accorded with Russia's interests, and altered the foreign office's recommendation, but too late.
There is, so far, no documentary proof that Holstein had a share in the congratulatory telegram to President Kruger. But the statement made by Prince Billow, the Chancellor, in 1904 that Holstein's advice had hitherto been followed in all important decisions, with the express reference to "the anti-English trend in 1896," can hardly mean anything except that Holstein was partly responsible for the Kruger telegram. The author of this telegram, Privy Councillor Kayser, was one of Holstein's intimates.
Holstein is quite certainly the spiritual father of Germany's attitude towards the advances made by Chamberlain and Lans downe in 1899-19o1. In England itself, Salisbury consented only with reluctance to negotiations for a general understanding be tween England and Germany; and the idea immediately en countered the strongest opposition from Holstein. He feared that Germany was to be driven into a war with Russia and France and dropped at the decisive moment. He rightly saw that England would be unable to allow a fresh victory by Germany over France. But he failed to see that if England were bound to Germany by a general understanding, and America and Japan also joined this combination, as seemed possible, then Russia and France would never have dared risk a war with Germany, Austria and Italy. On the other hand, Holstein committed the error of considering England's differences with France and Russia to be insuperable, although Chamberlain made it absolutely clear that England, if rebuffed by Germany, would seek and find a settlement of her differences with Russia and France, which must then necessarily bring her into opposition to Germany. The negotiations were dragged out so long at Holstein's orders, and made so difficult that at last the British Government broke them off in December 1901 after concluding the Treaty with Japan.
When war threatened to break out between Russia and Japan in 1904, Holstein remained so conspicuously deaf to all warnings, particularly from Freiherr von Eckardstein, the well-informed councillor of embassy in London, that at this point the suspicion arises that financial motives influenced his attitude. During the war he adhered to his former policy of contact with Russia and strained relations dangerously with England by allowing Russian ships of war to take in German coal in the Baltic. If England had now joined Japan in her fight with Russia, and if France had sup ported her ally Russia against England and Japan, the Continental Alliance between Russia, France and Germany would have been formed. Without wishing for a war with England, which would have entailed the sacrifice of Germany's mercantile marine, Holstein envisaged the possibility, of this alliance; and there is proof that one of the motives behind the German naval pro gramme was the wish to enhance Germany's value to Russia as a potential ally. The Emperor, indeed, when he afterwards con cluded the desired alliance with the downcast Tsar at Bjorkoe on July 24, 1905, privately altered the Foreign Office draft and limited the obligation of active mutual assistance to Europe, evoking thereby Billow's offer of resignation, which was as un expected as it was unwelcome to him. Billow could have nullified the effect of the treaty of Bjorkoe, which the Russian Foreign Minister, Count Lamsdorff saw to be impracticable, without re signing; his threat of resignation must be therefore looked on as a successful attempt to curb the Emperor's power—a typical Holstein manoeuvre. Holstein himself attempted to have the Emperor placed under control as insane only a few years after his accession.
The last time that Holstein determined German policy was over the first Morocco bargain with France. The Anglo-French Entente had just been concluded and England had promised to support France in her action, which was irreconcilable with the 188o Morocco Convention of Madrid. Holstein had always de clared the Anglo-French entente to be a dream, and wished to seize the opportunity to shatter it. If this artificial web were only held to the light of the sun, he thought, the natural opposition of the two Powers in Morocco must pulverize it. The Emperor wanted Germany to remain disinterested in Morocco; but Billow and Holstein sent him to Tangier against his will. There by a speech, not that drawn up for him by the foreign office, but one of his own—which gave Holstein a nervous shock—he drew on himself public disapproval of his personal interference. The French and British Governments would have been glad to find a diplomatic settlement for the matter, but Holstein insisted on a conference and was not even satisfied by Delcasse's leaving the French Cabinet. He wanted to put forward and enforce such unmistak able and decisive demands as to compromise the Anglo-French entente. As Russia was absolutely out of action at the moment, and the French Government was consequently unable to risk an armed conflict; and as Germany also had international law on her side, which must place the British Government in an em barrassing light, Holstein's campaign, which he planned with great energy, had every prospect of success. But here for the first time Billow failed to follow his tyrannical advisor. Fear of possible war with Great Britain, which would annihilate Ger many's trade, seems to have been his decisive motive. Holstein in consternation tendered his resignation for the fourteenth time, and this time, as said above, it was, contrary to expectation, ac cepted. Thus he relinquished the reins of policy, after holding them since Bismarck's resignation. Only once again, during the Bosnian crisis, had he an opportunity of affecting a great decision by his advice. Holstein believed that the issue of the crisis had been a victory for Germany, which repaired the defeat of 1906. This was a grave error. Far from loosening the Entente, Russia's defeat over the Bosnian question in 1908-1909 was the occasion for a re-construction of the Entente on lines of closer diplomatic co-operation, and of a definite determination to arm.
This brings us to the final appreciation of Holstein's policy. It was Holstein who by his share in the non-renewal of the German Treaty with Russia, took the decisive step in making Germany dependent on Austria-Hungary. In trying to repair this fault by a rapprochement with Russia, he missed the hour in which Great Britain could have been won for the Triple Alliance, without being able to overcome the hostility of Russia, which dated from 1878 and had its roots in her rivalry with Austria in the Balkans. Finally, when England had composed her difficulties with France and Russia, consequent on which Italy also joined this group, Germany was left alone with Austria-Hungary. Possibly Hol stein's Morocco policy would have been a more effective way of breaking the increasing menace of encirclement than Austria's war with Serbia in 1914. But it was due to Holstein's policy that the two central Powers were ever isolated at all.