I. THE GERMAN OFFENSIVE On Feb. 8, 1916 it was discovered that the Germans had brought a mass of manoeuvre to the neighbourhood of Verdun. A deserter disclosed the presence of two corps. On the 11th an intelligence officer reported a concentration of troops on the east bank of the Meuse. The French Command at once took precautions. On Feb. 13 three divisions of the VII. Corps (14th, 37th and 48th) were moved to Souilly, a march south of Verdun, followed on the i6th by two divisions of the XX. Corps. On the loth the Com mander-in-Chief, who had inspected this front on the i9th, ordered the I. Army to place the i6th Div. at Gen. Herr's disposition, thus completing the XX. Corps.
Transport questions arose. Ordi narily two standard gauge railways serve Verdun. The southern line had been cut by the enemy. The western line would be, and was, cut as soon as operations started. A departmental railway, the Meusien line, and a road from Bar-le-Duc still remained. To maintain supplies for an engagement in which 15 or 20 divisions are engaged, the daily requirements are 2,00o tons of munitions, oo tons of supplies and material for each division, say 2,000 tons, and from 15,00o to 20,000 men. The Meusien Railway at best carried Boo tons daily. On the 19th Capt. Doumenc, com manding the M.T. service, undertook to carry 2,000 tons and 12,000 men daily in lorries provided that the M.T. service had sole control over the roads. Motor traffic was organized on the loth on railway lines. From the 29th, 3,000, later 3,500, lorries passed in an endless stream along this little road only seven yards wide; 6,000 vehicles passed a given point in 24 hours, an average frequency of one vehicle every 14 seconds. At times the traffic rose to one vehicle every five seconds. In the lan guage of the War this road was known as the "Sacred Way." German Dispositions.—Verdun was confronted by the Ger man V. Army—part of the command of the Crown Prince, who directed the offensive. The Germans had 26 divisions available on the Western Front. A third of these were kept as a general reserve; 17 to 18 divisions were therefore available for the Ver dun attack. The German Command allotted nine divisions to the first attack, which started from the east bank. East of the Meuse was the VII. Res. Corps (one division in line, one in support) ; then the XVIII. Corps and the III. Corps in echelon of divisions. Farther east the XV. Corps was held in the plain of the Woevre, ready on the breach of the French front to hurl itself on the French flank. The ii3th Div., completing the assault troops, was in support. This mass of manoeuvre had been embodied in the Crown Prince's Army command and to make way for it, room was made between the V. Res. Corps and the VI. Res. Corps. The duty of the latter, on the west bank of the Meuse, was to attack the French when broken on the east bank and to bar their retreat. Thus it was engaged only on March 6.
On Feb. 21, 1916, at 7.15 A.M. the Germans commenced bom bardment on a front of 25 m. from the Bois d'Avocourt to Stain.
It was of unheard of intensity. Heavy shell were used in vast quantities. The woods were full of guns which fired ceaselessly with measured regularity. Observers from the air ceased to mark batteries on the map. The woods to them were masses of clouds pierced by flashes of lightning. Soon the French squadrons were chased from the sky.
About 4.15 P.M. the first infantry attack was launched. Commandant Vouvard remarks that "It is prob able that there were strong reconnoitring parties to test the efficacy of the artillery preparations and to seize trenches which had been destroyed. Beyond doubt that first day the Germans sought to put their infantry in an advantageous position and to get into line for the battle of the next day, by making it pass even the unequal intervals separating the lines." As a fact, the Germans, to effect a surprise, had not dug parallels from which to issue and moved from their lines at distances from the French lines which varied from 600 to r,ioo metres. Gillet describes their new tactics thus : "Each troop had a specific task, with an objective of limited breadth and depth. Before taking hold of it, a wave of scouts was sent forward to test the destruction by the artillery fire. If the destruction were not thorough the scouts retired and further artillery preparation was organised. The at tack took place in waves about 8o metres apart. First came a line of pioneers and men with bombs. Then came the main body in single file. Then followed a reserve section carrying up ammu nition, tools, sandbags, and filling up gaps in the first wave. A second line followed in the same order, passing through the first line, supporting it if checked and renewing the assault on their own initiative. The attack should now proceed by encircling move ments, utilising cover and passing along ravines. Thus the centres of resistance would fall one by one. Shell fire would support the advance continually. On no account should troops attempt to overcome resistance which has not been broken by artillery fire. Units when held up must wait for fresh artillery action." Early German Successes.—The French line rested on the village of Brabant, then on the Bois de Consenvoye, Bois d'Hau mont, Bois de Caures, Bois de Ville and on Herbebois. A little in the rear the Bois de La Wavrille (southeast of the Bois de Ville) and the village of Beaumont had been strengthened with redoubts. On the extreme right the line rested on the village of Ornes. Before the German attack, what remained of the French trenches was filled with defenders. At Herbebois the Germans captured the first lines but were stopped in front of the support ing trenches. The Bois de Caures was lost but its northern part was retaken during the night. The loss of the Bois d'Haumont was a serious matter. A French counter-attack on the 22nd at 6 A.M. failed. The line had been pierced.