He settled the affair in his usual downright manner, telling the commissioners bluntly that they must take back their legitimate king, and refusing—perhaps with more questionable wisdom—to allow.the retention of the tricolour flag, which to him was a "symbol of rebellion." Further, it was mainly owing to the influence of Wellington, in conjunction with Castlereagh, that France escaped the dis memberment for which the German powers clamoured, and which was advocated for a while by the majority of the British cabinet. Wellington realized the necessity, in the interests not only of France but of Europe, of maintaining the prestige of the restored monarchy, which such a dismemberment would have irretrievably damaged. In the same spirit he carried out the trust imposed upon him by the allies when they placed him in command of the international army by which France was to be occupied, under the terms of the second peace of Paris, for five years. By the terms of his commission he was empowered to act, in case of emergency, without waiting for orders ; he was, moreover, to be kept informed by the French cabinet of the whole course of business. If he had no sympathy with revolutionary disturbers of the peace, he had even less with the fatuous extravagances of the comte d'Artois and his reactionary entourage, and his im mense powerful influence was thrown into the scale of the moderate constitutional policy of which Richelieu and Decazes were the most conspicuous exponents. Besides the complex ad ministrative duties connected with the army of occupation his work included the reconstruction of the military frontier of the Netherlands, and the conduct of the financial negotiations with Messrs. Baring, by which the French Government was able to pay off the indemnities due from it, and thus render it possible for the powers to reduce the occupation from five years to three.
The events of the next few months considerably modified his opinions in this matter. The new chambers proved their trust worthy quality by passing the budget, and the army of occupa tion was reduced by 30,00o men. Wellington now pressed for the total evacuation of France, pointing out that popular irritation had grown to such a pitch that, if the occupation were to be prolonged, he must concentrate the army between the Scheldt and the Meuse, as the forces, stretched in a thin line across France, were no longer safe in the event of a popular rising. At the congress at Aix-la-Chapelle in the autumn of 1818, which settled the question, it was owing to his common-sense criticism that the proposal of Prussia, supported by the emperor Alexander and Metternich, to establish an "army of observation" at Brussels, was nipped in the bud. The definitive financial settlement be tween France and the allies was left entirely to him.
On Wellington's first entry into Paris he had been received with popular enthusiasm, but he had soon become intensely unpopular. He was held responsible not only for the occupation itself, but for every untoward incident to which it gave rise; even Bliicher's attempt to blow up the Pont de Jena, which he had prevented, was laid to his charge. His characteristically British temperament was wholly unsympathetic to the French, whose sensibility was irritated by his cold and slightly contemptuous justice. Two attempts were made to assassinate him. His work in Paris, however, was now finished, and on Oct. 3o he took leave of the international troops under his command. On Oct. 23, while still at Aix, he had received an offer from Lord Liverpool of the office of master-general of the ordnance, with a seat in the cabinet. He accepted, though with some reluctance.
He organized the military forces held in case of a Radical rising.
It was his influence with George IV. that led to the readmittance of Canning to the cabinet after the affair of the royal divorce had been settled. It was only in 1822, however, that the tragic death of his friend Londonderry (Castlereagh) brought him once more into international prominence. Londonderry had been on the eve of starting for the conference at Vienna—later adjourned to Verona—and the instructions which he had drawn up for his own guidance were handed over by Canning, the new foreign secretary, to Wellington, whose official part at the congress is outlined else where. (See VERONA, CONGRESS OF.) Unofficially, he pointed out to the French plenipotentiaries, arguing from Napoleon's ex perience, the extreme danger of an invasion of Spain, but at the same time explained, for the benefit of the duke of Angouleme, the best way to conduct a campaign in the Peninsula.
Wellington. disliked Canning's aggressive attitude towards the autocratic powers, and viewed with some apprehension his deter mination to break with the European concert. He realized, how ever, that in the matter of Spain and the Spanish colonies the British Government had no choice, and in this question he was in complete harmony with Canning. This was also at first the case in respect to the policy to be pursued in the Eastern Question raised by the war of Greek independence. Both Canning and Wellington were anxious to preserve the integrity of Turkey, and therefore to prevent any isolated intervention of Russia ; and Wellington seemed to Canning the most suitable instrument for the purpose of securing an arrangement between Great Britain and Russia on the Greek question, through which it was hoped to assure peace in the East. In Feb. 1826, accordingly, the duke was sent to St. Petersburg (Leningrad), ostensibly to congratulate the emperor Nicholas I. on his accession, but more especially— to use Wellington's own words—"to induce the emperor of Russia to put himself in our hands." In this object he signally failed. a diplomatist the "Iron Duke"—whom Nicholas, writing to his brother Constantine, described as "old and broken (casse)" was no match for the "Iron Tsar." As for the Greeks, the emperor said bluntly that he took no interest in ces messieurs, whom he regarded as "rebels"; his own particular quarrel with Turkey was the concern of Russia alone. Under stress of the imminence of the peril, which Nicholas was at no pains to conceal, the duke was driven from concession to concession, until at last the tsar, having gained all he wanted, condescended to come to an arrange ment with Great Britain on the Greek question. On April 4 was signed the Protocol of St. Petersburg, an instrument which—as events were to prove—fettered the free initiative not of Russia, but of Great Britain. (See TURKEY : History; GREECE : History.) After the death of the duke of York on December 5, 1826, the post of commander-in-chief was conferred upon Wellington. His relations with Canning had, however, become increasingly strained, and when, in consequence of Lord Liverpool's illness, Canning in April 1827 was called to the head of the administration, the duke refused to serve under him. The effect of his withdrawal was momentous in its bearing upon Eastern affairs. Canning, freed from Wellington's restraint, carried his intervention on behalf of Greece a step further, and concluded the Treaty of London, whereby France, England and Russia bound themselves to put an end to the conflict in the East and to enforce the conditions of the St. Petersburg protocol upon the belligerents. Against this treaty Wellington protested, on the ground that it involved war. The battle of Navarino followed.