In one respect, however, improvement by judicial decision is still going forward. A number of States, by derivation directly or indirectly from Spanish law, have the institution of "community property," in which with respect to certain property, and espe cially property acquired after marriage, husband and wife are treated legally as a sort of property-owning entity. The older view was that the husband was the administering agent of this collectivity during their joint lives, and hence could dispose of it, alter its form, and charge it with his personal debts; and that it could even be taken in execution for his wrongful acts. Recent decisions in some of these jurisdictions, recognizing the individual interest of the wife, hold that the community property is not liable for acts done by the husband outside of the reasonable scope of his authority as agent of the community (Schramm v. Steele, 97 Washington Reports, 309, 1917). Yet even there a claim for an injury to the wife, being an acquisition after mar riage and community property, she is not allowed to sue therefor if her husband refuses to join (Hynes v. Colman Dock Co., 1o8 Washington Reports, 642, Protection of Women in Industry.—Courts have hesitated to uphold legislation restricting freedom of contract on the part of women in industry with respect to hours and conditions of labour and minimum wage. When such statutes were first enacted, they were held unconstitutional, as being arbitrary and unreason able interferences with liberty of contract by a court which had no hesitation in keeping alive common law disabilities that had long ceased to secure any individual or social interest. That de
cision has been overruled (Ritchie v. Wayman, 244 Illinois Re ports, 509, 191o), and it seems to be settled that legislation may take account of the facts of women's physical make-up and secure the social interest in a healthy womanhood by regulating the hours of labour of adult females (Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. Reports, 412, 1908; Bunting v. Oregon, 243 416, 1917). But it is now held that this may not be carried to the extent of fixing a minimum wage for women employees (Adkins v. Children's Hos pital, 261 United States Reports, 525).
The political and legal emancipation of women is urged as a reason against such legislation, as if the removal of political and legal disabilities had any relation to, or effect upon, the physical handicaps upon women in industry which are the occasion of these statutes.
In 1917 California provided for the drawing of women upon juries (Laws of 1917, p. 1283). Since the adoption of the 19th amendment of the Federal Constitution providing for woman suffrage, 192o, it has been assumed generally that women are to sit upon juries and such has come to be the prevailing practice. But in some jurisdictions, out of caution, it was felt that the courts should await express legislation and there have been differences in legislative policy as to how far jury service by women should be made compulsory. (R. Po.)