Grouchy's victory was barren. In the far higher duty of co operation he had failed miserably. His tactical achievement could avail the emperor nothing, and it exposed his own force to con siderable danger. Whilst pondering on the course he should fol low, the marshal received the news of the awful disaster that had overtaken the emperor at Waterloo. In a flash he realized his danger and made prompt arrangements to begin his retreat on Namur, the only line to France that was then available. This retreat he carried out resolutely, skilfully and rapidly, slipping past Blucher and finally bringing his force to Paris. But the rapid advance of the allies gave France no time to rally. Napoleon was forced to abdicate, and finding escape was impossible, he sur rendered (on July 14) to the British—"the most powerful, the most unwavering and the most generous of his foes." The causes of Napoleon's failure in the Waterloo campaign were as follows:—The French army was numerically too weak for the gigantic task it undertook. Napoleon himself was no longer the Napoleon of Marengo or Austerlitz, and though he was not broken down, his physical strength was certainly impaired. Ney failed to grasp and hold Wellington on the critical 17th of June; and on the 17th and i8th Grouchy's feeble manoeuvres enabled Bliicher to march and join Wellington at Waterloo. Napoleon's chance of success was dangerously diminished, if not utterly destroyed, by the incompetence of the two marshals whom in an evil hour he selected for high commands.
Another dominant influence in shaping the course of events was the loyalty of Blucher to his ally, and the consequent appear ance of the Prussian army at Waterloo. Nor must we overlook Wellington's unswerving determination to co-operate with Bliicher at all costs, and his firmness on June 18; or the invincible steadi ness shown by the British troops and those of the King's German Legion.
Reviewing this campaign at St. Helena, Napoleon laid the re
sponsibility for the disaster of Waterloo on the inaction of Mar shal Grouchy who, after he had lost touch with the Prussian army (which had crossed the Dyle at Wavre in order to work round to the north in the direction of Soignes), ignored the urgent representations of his officers, and in particular of General Gerard, and refused to unite his forces with the bulk of Na poleon's army, although he could hear the sound of the guns. However grave may have been Grouchy's error, it would be un just to characterize his failure as treason. In any case, Mar shal Grouchy, in spite of the miscarriage of his first mission, fear ing to depart from the orders of the emperor, showed himself deficient not only in military insight but also in character.
In this article the writer has been greatly assisted by the advice and suggestions of Lt.Col. H. W. L. Hime, R.A. (A. F. BE.) BIBLIOGRAPHY.-Some of the principal books on the subject are:— K. v. Clausewitz, Campagne de 1815 (1835, Fr. trans., 1899) ; H. de Mauduit, Les derniers jours de la Grande Armee (1847) W. Siborne, Campaign of 1815 (1848) ; J. S. Kennedy, Battle of Waterloo (1865) ; C. C. Chesney, Waterloo Lectures (1874) ; H. T. Siborne, Waterloo Letters (1891) ; L. Navez, Quatre Bras, Ligny, Waterloo et Wavre (1903) ; A. A. Grouard, Strategique Napoleonique, 1815 (1904), and Critique de 1815 (1907) ; H. Houssaye, Waterloo (1907) ; F. de Bas and T'serclaes de Wommerson, Campagne de 1815 (Dutch-Belgian official account) (1908) ; A. Pollio, Waterloo (Rome, 1906) ; A. F. Becke, Napoleon and Waterloo (1914) ; E. Lenient, La Solution des enigmes de Waterloo (1915). See also Napoleon Ier, Correspondance and Commentaires; Wellington, Dispatches and Memorandum on Waterloo; Henri Houssaye, 1815; the works of Thiers, Charms and Quinet; the battle in Victor Hugo's Les Miserables (untrustworthy as history) ; the beginning of Stendhal, Chartreuses de Parme.