DARDANELLES CAMPAIGN. This campaign, brought about by a desire on the part of the Allies that communications should be opened up from the Mediterranean into the Black sea with a view to assisting Russia, was begun in Feb. 1915 as a pure ly naval undertaking. (See WORLD WAR, Naval.) But it had been realized from the outset that, even should the warships succeed in attaining their object, land forces would sooner or later be required to aid in the campaign, if only to secure the communications of the fleet after it had passed into the Sea of Marmora. Before the failure of the naval attack of March 18, Allied troops had been set in motion for the Aegean. Some were already in Lemnos, and Sir Ian Hamilton, chosen as commander-in-chief of the military contingents, had arrived in time to witness the fight of the 18th. In view of its result, the Allied Governments decided that from this time onwards the gathering army must assume the principal role in the effort to secure possession of the straits. Hamilton was unable to initiate land operations at once. The Turks were making preparations to repel landings on both sides of the straits, while the troops at his disposal were partly in Egypt, partly at Lemnos, and partly on the high seas, en route from their respective bases in England and France.
The Allied force was composed of five divisions—two (the 29th and the Royal Naval) furnished by the United Kingdom, two formed of Australian and New Zealand troops, and one com posed of French colonial troops. Against this force Liman von Sanders could pit six divisions, but these were perforce dispersed; two (3rd and 11th) were watching the coast on the Asiatic side, two (5th and 7th) were near Bulair to guard against a landing at the neck of the Gallipoli peninsula, while the remainder (9th and 19th) were disposed towards its southern end.
The expeditionary force concentrated in Mudros bay, Lemnos, in the third week of April. Hamilton contemplated two distinct major operations to secure a footing on the Gallipoli peninsula. The 29th Div., supported by the Royal Naval Div., was to be put ashore at its extremity, an area which it is convenient to desig nate as Helles; the Australian and New Zealand Divs. under Sir W. Birdwood were to land just north of Gaba Tepe, where there are extensive beaches. But part of the one available French division was furthermore to effect a descent at Kum Kale, op posite Helles, as a subsidiary operation, subsequently being trans ferred to Helles. After a short delay, enforced by bad weather, the armada put to sea during the nights of April 23-24 and 24-25, so that the transports and the covering warships should arrive at their various rendezvous at or before dawn on the 25th, and the day broke calm after a placid night.
whole. Covered by the fire of f` y DERE:. ; /om: battleships and cruisers, the troops ?; started in flotillas of boats soon cam' '. ' ' l' \ c r c ! ... after dawn for all points and- . ' ?.. / ' as it turned out the actual disem- x ,.',_ barkations at "S," "X" and "Y" w 2 '- were carried out without an )_ r Ps great difficulty. But at "W" the s v Bahr I troops gained a footing only after Miles i incurring heavy loss, while at MAP SHOWING THE LANDING "V," where a large part of the BEACHES S, V, W, X, Y, AT GAL landing force was carried in the LIPOLI steamer "River Clyde" which was run ashore, the effort nearly failed altogether. After hard fighting all day the position at nightfall was that the troops landed at "W" and "X" beaches had joined hands and that a battalion was established at "S," while the situation at "V" was critical, as also at "Y"; but during the night more troops were got ashore at "V," and those at "Y" were safely withdrawn and re-embarked next morning. Losses had been severe.
Hamilton thus gained a somewhat precarious footing at two points of the peninsula. But his two forces were some i 5m.
apart, and what amounted to little more than a patch of ground had been won in either case. His intentions were now completely exposed to the enemy, and the great advantage of surprise had passed away without his force having established itself in a dominating position capable of being turned to satisfactory ac count in subsequent operations. In both areas the Turks enjoyed the tactical command, they were at least equal in force to the Allies, their guns were able to bear with effect upon the beaches used as landing places and advanced bases, and, although at this time of the year the weather was generally calm, these beaches provided but inadequate facilities for the landing of ammunition, armament or stores.
During the month a state of stalemate set in, and although ground was gained by the Allies in attacks delivered in the Helles area on June 4, 21 and 28 and during the month of July the line was gradually pushed forward near Krithia, the situation was so unpromising that the British Government, decided to send five more divisions (loth, iith, i3th, 53rd and 54th) to the Aegean. These arrived at the islands of Mytilene and Imbros during the closing days of July and the first days of August. Hamilton's artillery was at the same time strengthened, and his very inade quate ammunition supply somewhat improved. But Liman von Sanders was likewise receiving reinforcements, and, although the Ottoman maritime communications with the Gallipoli peninsula were from time to time imperilled by the submarines of the Allies, the relative strength of the two opposing armies facing each other in the theatre of war was not, as it turned out, greatly affected by the appearance of the fresh troops sent out from Eng land to these waters. The Allies, in view of the coming of rein forcements, treated July as a month of preparation, although a general attack was delivered by them in the Helles area by which a little ground was gained. A few days later the first of the rein forcing divisions, the i3th, arrived and was landed at Helles as a temporary measure.