Disposal Board

DISPOSAL BOARD. The conclusion of the World War found the British Government engaged in gigantic preparations for a decisive campaign in 1919. The consequent problems of liquidation of war commitments and disposal of surpluses which faced Great Britain on the conclusion of the war were far more complicated and difficult of solution than those facing any other nation, allied or enemy. These problems divided themselves into two main heads, viz., the liquidation of war contracts, and the disposal of property and stores surplus to peace requirements.

In January 1919 His Majesty's Government decided to entrust the liquidation of Ministry of Munitions contracts, and the sale of war surpluses belonging to all Government departments, to the Minister of Munitions, Lord Inverforth, who, as Surveyor General of Supply at the War Office, had controlled many of the purchases. The organization set up by Lord Inverforth was con trolled in the main by eminent business men who gave their services to the State in a voluntary capacity. On the Ministry of Munitions ceasing to exist in March 1921, this policy was con tinued by the Disposal and Liquidation Commission of which Sir Howard Frank was chairman, the Commission in turn being suc ceeded by a Treasury Advisory Committee under the chairman ship of Sir Charles Barrie.

At the Armistice, the Ministry of Munitions had contracts out standing to the number of 34,862 and their value was approxi mately £355,0o0,0o0, including contracts for aircraft engines and materials amounting to and for guns, arms, tanks and ammunition amounting to over £99,000,000. Of the outstand ing contracts, 3,722 of a value of approximately f 17,000,00o were in respect of supplies still definitely required, leaving nearly contracts valued at about £338,0o0,o0o for immediate liquidation.

The settlement of these contracts necessitated the scrutiny of 750,00o separate claims. This not only involved the examina tion of the bills of each contractor for work, but also for the re covery by the Ministry of any sums due from him for raw material supplied on debit, the accounting for material issued to him with out charge, the adjustment of subsidies, the recovery of loans in respect of capital expenditure, the agreement of inventories of Government plant remaining on hand, the settlement of disputes in regard to defective material and the fixing of prices regarding supplies to and by the contractor by means of cost investigation.

In spite of these complications, the great majority of these contracts were disposed of by the end of 1920 at comparatively small expense to the State.

Disposal of Surpluses.

The problem of selling to the best advantage public assets becoming surplus owing to the termina tion of the War was, it will be realized, one of extraordinary magni tude and complexity. The property to be disposed of was lying all over the world, much of it in regions that had been recently wasted by war, where its handling was extremely difficult and its disposal in situ almost impossible. The surplus property not only comprised vast quantities of raw materials, such as wool, flax and hides, enormous quantities of unwrought metals—platinum, copper, brass, zinc, steel and iron—railway lines in France, Egypt, Palestine and Macedonia, tugs, barges and other seagoing craft at home and abroad, harbour installations such as those at Rich borough, Calais, Dunkirk, Dieppe and Taranto, whole towns such as Gretna, factories and housing estates, but also over 3 50,000 different types of stores, which had been used for war purposes.

Initially the Ministry was confronted with the difficult task of locating and listing the huge quantities of stocks, particularly those in war areas. For disposal purposes it was essential that the stocks should be properly sorted and classified.

Nor was the disposal of these stocks a mere matter of selling at the highest prices. Many other considerations were involved, for example, the necessities of British trade and manufacture, the avoidance as far as possible of labour dislocation at home, the obtaining of transport facilities at reasonable cost, the release of army personnel guarding property and stores in war areas, etc. Subject to these considerations, the policy adopted throughout was to dispose of the property and stores by public tender, auction or private treaty as rapidly as the market could absorb them, and at highest prices obtainable.

So energetically were sales pushed forward that before the severe slump in prices took place in the late summer of 1920, over three-quarters of the surpluses had been sold. There is little doubt that the sales of articles of general utility early in 1919 proved a death blow to the worst forms of post-war profiteering.

Many of the surpluses were by their nature quite unsuitable for disposal in their existing forms, e.g., shells and ammunition, of which approximately 5,000,000 tons were broken down at home and abroad and their residuals—steel, brass, copper, resin, etc.,— sold for commercial purposes. A considerable quantity of ammuni tion proved unsafe to break down and was at suitable points dumped in the sea. The same course had to be followed with enormous quantities of poison gas, the cylinders containing it being dumped many miles out at sea. In this work and the dump ing of ammunition a fleet of sea-going barges and tugs were em ployed for nearly two years after the Armistice.

As regards other warlike stores, while it would not be true lit erally to say that swords were turned into ploughshares, all possi ble steps were taken to secure the utilization for commercial purposes of such stores, and with a great measure of success.

The total sales of surplus stores and properties (excluding raw materials on trading accounts—wool, flax, leather, etc.) amounted to £35o,000,000. The principal groups of sales at home were, in round figures, as follows :— Lands, buildings and factories . . . . . Li5,000,000 Timber, huts and building materials, etc. . . i6,000,000 Plant and machinery, railway material and dock equipment . 25,000,o00Textile, leather and equipment . 34,000,000 Ferrous metals . . 21,000,000 Non-ferrous metals . . . . . . 51,000,000 Chemicals and explosives . . . . . . 29,000,000 Mechanical and horse transport . . . .. 20,000,000 Food 8,000,000 River and canal craft . . . . . . 3,000,000 In addition to the sales at home there were large sales of sur pluses abroad, including:— France and Belgium . . . . . . . £4o,000,000 Army of the Rhine . . 3,o00,o00 Italy 3,000,000 Egypt . . . . . . . . . . 9,000,000 Army of the Black Sea . . . . . . 3,5oo,000 `Iraq . Io,000,000 India . . . . . . . . . . 1 o,000,000 United States and Canada . . . . 4,000,000 The sales on the Continent of Europe were made where possi ble in sterling, but the depreciation of Continental exchanges fol lowing the war had an adverse effect on Continental sales.

The sales of raw materials (wool, flax, leather, etc.) amounted to over 1330,000,000, on which a net profit of L78,000,000 was made, of which approximately 144,000,00o accrued to the British Ex chequer, £34,000,000 going to various Dominions under profit sharing schemes.

The total sales, including raw materials, amounted, therefore, to over 1680,000,000. (D. N.)