SALONIKA CAMPAIGNS , SERBIAN CAMPAIGNS.) The campaign by which the Central Powers and Bulgaria over whelmed the Serbians for the time being, and by which direct com munications were opened through Bulgaria between Austria Hungary and the Ottoman empire, profoundly influenced the situation in the Gallipoli peninsula to the disadvantage of the Allies. Not only was all idea of reinforcing the Allied army that was planted in this region abandoned, but some of Hamilton's troops had before long been transferred to Salonika. The linking up of Turkey with the Central Powers by railway, moreover, connoted that Liman von Sanders would speedily be furnished with ample munitions of all kinds, which would make the pros pect of Anglo-French forces gaining possession of the straits remoter than ever.
By the middle of September the Paris Government had come to the conclusion that there was now no hope of victory in the Dardanelles theatre; but the Brit ish cabinet, influenced by anxiety as regards prestige in the East and by disinclination to abandon an enterprise in which great sacrifices had been incurred and from which much had at one time been expected, could not make up its mind to cut losses and to withdraw. On Hamilton being asked to give his views concern ing the question of evacuation, he pronounced himself as em phatically opposed to such a step, so Sir C. Monro was sent out from England to take his place. The new commander-in-chief, impressed by the very unsatisfactory positions occupied by the Allied troops, by the impossibility of their making any progress at their existing strength, and by the risks that the army ran by clinging to such a shore without any safe harbour to depend upon for base in stormy weather, declared unhesitatingly in the closing days of October for a complete withdrawal after examining the situation on the spot and consulting with Birdwood, Byng and Davies.
The British cabinet would not accept the recommendation, and sent Lord Kitchener to investigate and report. He had viewed proposals to abandon the campaign with alarm; but after visit ing the peninsula he realized that evacuation was the only justi fiable course, and reported to that effect. All this time winter was drawing nearer and the need for a prompt decision was be coming more and more urgent, but the authorities in London lost another fortnight before, on Dec. 8, they at last sent instructions to Monro to withdraw from Suvla and Anzac, while retaining Helles.
Anticipating orders to this effect, Monro had already made certain preparations for evacuation, and, as he was also responsible for the British forces at Salonika, had placed Birdwood in command, Gen. Godley re lieving Birdwood at Anzac. It was recognized that the withdrawal of the vast accumulation of stores about the beaches, and also of the bulk of the actual troops, must be carried out gradually on successive nights, and this process was at once set on foot both at Suvla and at Anzac. The decision come to as to the final stage of the operation was that the front trenches should be held up to the last on the night of definite evacuation, and that the troops manning them should hasten straight to the beaches, everything removable having already been embarked; at a given moment the trenches (which at many points were but a few yards from those occupied by the Turks) would be vacated by detachments which by that hour would have shrunk to mere handfuls of men. The final night was provisionally fixed as that of Dec. 18-19, and, thanks to favourable weather and to the efficiency of the arrange ments, the very critical undertaking was carried out with trium phant success just as had been laid down by programme ten days before. Night after night the landing places were scenes of unceasing activity as war material, food supplies, animals and finally large bodies of troops, were got away. During the day time reliefs took place as usual, pretences were made of landing stores and animals, and the result was that the Turks remained in complete ignorance of what was passing close to their lines. On Dec. 18 only a meagre force, composed almost entirely of infantry and disposed almost entirely in the front trenches, was holding a front of I om. face to face with an enemy incomparably stronger in numbers.
At nightfall the' very few guns not yet withdrawn were hurried off to the jetties; then the troops along the front were quietly withdrawn by successive detachments ; finally the parties still in the trenches slipped away; and when dawn broke the Turks dis covered that the invaders were gone. Practically nothing worth mentioning had been left behind at Suvla, and at Anzac, where conditions were more difficult, only a very few worn-out guns had to be abandoned and some valuable war material destroyed. The relaxing by the Allies of their frail hold upon a strip of the outer coast-line of the Gallipoli peninsula had been effected more successfully than the most sanguine amongst them had permitted themselves to hope.
Yet, for a week subsequent to the good news reaching them, the British Government remained irresolute with regard to the policy to be pursued at Helles. Then, however, Monro received the expected sanction for evacuating that area likewise, and Bird wood promptly grappled with this fresh problem, a problem ren dered more difficult than the last owing to Liman von Sanders having full warning of what might be expected and, moreover, now enjoying an enormous preponderance in force. He had 21 divisions available, while there were only four left to oppose him.
The same principles as had been adopted by Byng and Godley at Suvla and Anzac were put in practice at Helles, the withdrawal of stores, war material, animals and personnel being carried out on successive nights. While the front trenches were to be held up to the last, the fight ing force ashore was to be gradually reduced, and the detachments holding the front trenches were at the given hour on the last night, fixed provisionally for that of Jan. 8-9, to vacate them and hurry straight off to the beaches. But the weather was none too favour able on several of the preliminary nights, and the enemy's guns gave a good deal of trouble on the beaches, causing many casual ties. The Turks were aware that a withdrawal was gradually be ing carried out ; but they could not tell which would be the final night, nor could they make sure how far the number of com batants within the British lines had been reduced. So, with the intention of ascertaining the strength of their opponents, on Jan. 7 they delivered a half-hearted attack upon the left of the British position. This was beaten off, and they came to the mistaken conclusion that the final evacuation was not imminent.
Shortly after dark set in on the night of Jan. 8-9 the wind rose ominously. Nevertheless the guns remaining to be embarked were got off, the infantry followed, and the last detachments quitted the front trenches at I I.4S P.M., without the Turks noting their departure. But when they reached the shore it was found, in the case of those detailed for Gully Beach, that embarkation there was impracticable; so these had to march to "W" Beach and they were not afloat till after 4 A.M., only being got off with great difficulty owing to the surf. Several worn-out guns had been intentionally left behind, besides much ordnance material and foodstuff ; but practically all of this was rendered unserviceable, for, just as the last boats were lowered off, the masses of stores were set on fire, and only then did the Turks discover that their opponents had evaded them a second time. The withdrawal from Helles had been a masterly military and naval achievement.
Most authorities on war agree that the failure of the Allies in this memorable campaign was primarily due to the abortive naval effort to force the Dardanelles. This gave the Turk such warning of what was in store that, when Hamilton's army was ready to land, the defenders were in a position to bring it at once to a standstill. The only chance of success after that lay in very sub stantial reinforcements reaching the scene promptly. But neither the British nor the French would divert the requisite military re sources from the main theatre of war at the moment, and when some additional troops were sent later, their numbers were in sufficient and it was too late.
Dardanelles Commission, Final Report (1919) ; Bibliography.-The Dardanelles Commission, Final Report (1919) ; Sir I. Hamilton, Gallipoli Diary (192o) ; Turkey, Historical Section of Staff, Campagne de Dardanelles (1924) ; Liman von Sanders, Funf Jahre Tiirkei (Eng. trans. Five Years in Turkey, 1928) ; E. Ashmead Bartlett, War Memories of the Dardanelles (1928) ; C. P. Aspinall, British Official History (1928). See also WORLD WAR: BIBLIOGRAPHY.
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