DELCASSE, THEOPHILE (1852-1923), was born at Pamiers (Ariege) on March 1, 1852, his father being an huissier or bailiff. He was educated locally, took his degree of licence es lettres, and served as tutor to the children of an official in the ministry of foreign affairs. The taste for politics was ingrained in young Delcasse. He contributed to the Republique Francaise under Gambetta, made friends, if not with the Tribune himself, at least with Camille Barrere who acted as foreign editor of the paper, besides fulfilling the function of French representative on the Danube commission, and became secretary to Massip, a wealthy man who had been elected to the chamber in the Ariege department. Eventually, he married Massip's widow and, in 1889, succeeded him in the Chamber. Freed once for all from all mate rial cares, he was able to devote himself to his new duties, and his personal integrity was never questioned by anyone. In the po litical struggles of the period, he ranked as a follower of Gambetta but, at the same time, was clever enough to keep a close connec tion with the very radical Depeche de Toulouse, the most pow erful electoral factor in the south of France, which supported him to the end on patriotic grounds. At that time, Delcasse was considered, on the whole, as a man of the Left. In Jan. 1898, he criticised the cabinet of Maine on account of its excessive tol erance towards clericalism. He climbed the ministerial ladder very rapidly: under-secretary for the colonies (Jan.–Dec. 1893), and minister of the colonies from May 1894 to Jan. 1895, after the Colonial Office had been transformed for his sake into a separate and independent ministerial department.
But the real career of Delcasse began in June 1898, after the general election of that year and the overthrow of the Maine cabinet, with his appointment as minister of foreign affairs in the Radical cabinet headed by Brisson. He retained this office under the subsequent premierships of Dupuy, Waldeck-Rousseau, Combes and Rouvier, until June 6, 1905. In 1898, French diplo macy was roughly divided into two schools. Hanotaux, his prede cessor at the Foreign Office, had been striving in an uncertain way to bring about some sort of co-operation between France, Russia and Germany, and he had rather allowed the Franco-Russian alli ance to evolve in an anti-British direction. On the other hand, the French ambassadors in Rome and Constantinople, Barrere and Paul Cambon, always. insisted that the Franco-Russian alliance should be made compatible with a Franco-British rapprochement, it being absurd for a colonial power like France deliberately to cross the purposes of the supreme maritime power. The foreign office officials were amazed when they saw that the new-comer, apparently without any previous experience of practical diplo macy, resolutely cast in his lot with Barrere and Cambon (the latter was appointed to the London Embassy in Dec. 1898) and unhesitatingly acted from the outset on the principle that the only nation France need be afraid of and guard against was Germany, and that, therefore, alliance must be sought with Britain as well as with Russia and that the way must be paved (incredibly para doxical as it seemed then) for a Russo-British understanding.
As a matter of fact Delcasse had inherited these views from the Gambetta school of thought through Camille Barrere. As early as the autumn of 1898—the grand duke Vladimir happening to be in Paris—Delcasse is reported to have expounded the above policy to his advisers, protesting to them that the grand duke, who was still thinking and speaking in the terms of the Hano taux period, had misunderstood him. In 1903, when Delcasse came back from London, where he had prepared the Franco British treaty of April 8, 1904, he told his officials the conver sation he had had with Lord Lansdowne and Joseph Chamberlain, and told them that Chamberlain had incited him to bring about a rapprochement between England and Russia. "When I heard this," he said, "I felt my brain turning. I replied to Mr. Chamberlain: `I shall refrain from making any direct approach to Russia because I should be denounced in Petersburg as having sold her in London. But I promise you I shall take every opportunity of praising the new Entente Cordiale and of inspiring our Russian ally with a desire for some sort of treaty with Great Britain.' " These details are worth stating because they may enable the historian to apply to Delcasse what Cardinal de Retz said about Richelieu : "Il eut l'intention des choses qu'il fit." At the back of Delcasse's political conceptions was a very deep feeling of France's greatness and an unshakable confidence in her destiny. Not that he ever planned war. But he was of opinion (he stated it clearly at the time of the Russo-German intrigue of 1904-1905, which aimed at compelling France, under the threat of an invasion through Belgium, to enter a coalition of Germany and Russia) that if the friendship of England was not secured by French diplomacy, Berlin and London would sooner or later get together, the Triple Alliance be rendered still more formidable, and France pay the cost of that combination on the Continent and in her oversea territories. Only second in importance in Del casse's mind, to this persistent idea of the Anglo-French-Russian Triple Entente, was the belief that his country's fate was bound up with the consolidation and extension of its North African em pire. In his judgment no great nation could exist without a mini mum of material power and territorial weight. France could only find that minimum by making use of her North African oppor tunities.
Delcasse's scheme was carried out in the seven years extending to 1905, under difficulties which seemed well-nigh insuperable. In succession, he was confronted by the incident of Fashoda; the South African war, which rekindled anti-British feeling in France; the Dreyfus affair, bringing in its train the distinct weakening of the French army; and the Russo-Japanese war of 19°4. The Minister bravely stood his ground. The recall of Captain Mar chand from the Nile was announced on Nov. 4, 1898, and the Franco-British Convention of June 14, 1898, which Hanotaux had concluded before his resignation, for the delimitation of French and British interests in the region of the Niger, was completed by the fuller settlement of March 21, 1899. As regards the Far East, M. Delcasse unceasingly sought to support in Petersburg the peaceful policy of Count Lamsdorf as against the faction Alexeiev-Bezobrazov and, in Oct. 1904, when the Dogger Bank incident occurred, he was fortunate enough to mediate between London and Petersburg. As to the Dreyfus affair, he consistently observed an attitude of reserve and detachment. As a member of the Waldeck-Rousseau and Combes cabinets, he formally ap provea the whole anti-clerical policy, and did nothing openly to check the action of the War Minister, General Andre. He shut himself up in his study at the Quai d'Orsay, enjoying the hearty support of the president of the republic, Loubet, and turning a blind eye to home politics in his passionate attachment to his work. But the time was approaching when he would have to come forward and fight for what he had done. Things changed for him with the advent to power of Rouvier in Jan. 19°5.
On April 8, 1904, had been signed the Convention about Mo rocco and Egypt, the starting point of the Entente Cordiale, the great achievement of Delcasse, Paul Cambon and Lord Lans downe, not to speak of Edward VII. who consistently favoured it. In Berlin, the Franco-British rapprochement had to the last mo ment been deemed unthinkable. After some hesitation it was challenged by the Kaiser himself in his famous speech at Karls ruhe on April 27, 1904, and, on March 31, i9o5 William II. paid a visit to the representative of the Sultan of Morocco in Tangier, proclaiming that he would stand by the independence of the Sherifian empire. German diplomacy acted throughout on the theory that French parliamentary opinion would not stick to the Entente Cordiale as soon as it understood that it might mean instant war with Germany. To a certain point the calculation proved true enough. Rouvier, a practical financier, who was in clined to believe that the German danger could be disposed of by means of economic co-operation between France and Germany, and that the French army was not fit to withstand the onslaught of the German Army, led the battle against his own f oreign min ister with the assistance of nearly the whole cabinet. In the sit ting of the Chamber of April 18, Delcasse was criticized from nearly every side, and though formally supported by the premier, tendered his resignation, which, however, the president of the republic persuaded him to withdraw. But the position of Delcasse quickly became untenable. Germany was pressing for the sum moning of an international conference on Morocco, and Rouvier was exchanging views with von Billow behind the back of his colleague. Towards the end of May, the German Government was in that way acquainted with the British proposal for a mili tary alliance in case war should ensue from the 1904 treaty, a step that immediately led von Billow to let it be known in Paris, through Tittoni, that any advance of France towards Fez would bring about a declaration of war. Rouvier openly pressed Paul Cambon to discontinue the negotiation for the treaty of alliance with England. Vehement explanations were exchanged in the ministerial council held on June 6, 1905, which culminated in the final resignation of Delcasse.
There is no doubt that technical faults could be put to the debit side of Delcasse's account. He did not take sufficient care to communicate officially to Germany in advance the bargain he was going to make with the British Foreign Office: the informa tion he had given to Prince Radolin on March 13, 1904, can perhaps hardly be regarded retrospectively as fully supplying the missing link in the chain of necessary diplomatic preparation. In April gos, he evinced some vacillation, and tried to initiate a belated conversation with the German ambassador. At times, his character was not perhaps as resolute as his policy. During his whole career he was prone to make mistakes, which it is even to-day all the more difficult to explain as he usually surrounded himself with complete secrecy, confided in no one, and took care that his steps should not be easily traced. In 1902, he had been about to sign with Spain, to the amazement of his own officials, a treaty which included Fez in the Spanish zone and did not even provide for the passage of troops between Algeria and the French zone in Morocco, an accident which accounts for the hostility shown to him by Etienne, deputy for Oran and war secretary under Rouvier. However, when he left the Quai d'Orsay, the position of France in Europe had changed beyond recognition. The Triple Entente was virtually in existence, and even the foun dation of the Anglo-Russian treaty of January 31, 1907, had been laid. The clauses of the Triple Alliance treaties specially directed against France since 1887 had been suppressed as a result of the Franco-Italian convention of 1902 on Tunis and Tripoli, secured by Barrere. Spain had rallied to the Franco-British treaty of April 19o4 in October of the same year. On the whole, the system had withstood the test of the most trying developments. As Paul Cambon remarked in a letter of May 19o5, the British alliance was perhaps in advance of what French public opinion was ready to stand at the time, and it was not well that it should be possible to denounce it as the work of one man. But what was done in 1898-19o5 might perhaps not have been done later.
Having fallen from office, Delcasse remained completely silent for nearly three years but, meanwhile, he was very active in the lobbies. On Jan. 24, 1908, taking the opportunity offered by a debate on Morocco, he suddenly launched a carefully prepared speech which amounted to a vindication of his policy. He was acclaimed by the assembly. On July 20, 1909, as chairman of the marine commission, he engaged in an oratorical duel with Clemen ceau, who was clumsy enough to allude to the events of i9o5; the Clemenceau cabinet had to resign on the same night. The vacant premiership was not, however, offered to Delcasse, lest the Cen tral Powers should interpret the move as a provocation. He was given the Ministry of Marine in the spring of 91 1, and kept it for two years under Monis, Caillaux and Poincare. He certainly thought of contesting the presidency of the republic in January 1913, but his calculation that his name would be put forward at the second ballot once the other candidates, Poincare and Pams, had spent their strength, came to nothing. He voted openly for the Radical Socialist, Pams. Notwithstanding the distant and unfriendly relations obtaining between the two men, Poincare, as president of the republic, endeavoured to induce Delcasse to ac cept either the premiership or the ministry of foreign affairs. He refused, but, a few days afterwards, was persuaded by Briand and Jonnart (respectively president of the council and foreign secretary) to take charge for several years of the St. Petersburg embassy, which had fared very badly under Georges Louis, to the detriment of the Franco-Russian Alliance.
Germany was quickly increasing her armaments, and the whole machinery of the Franco-Russian alliance sadly needed mending and overhauling; it was felt that Delcasse alone would enjoy the moral authority requisite to perform the task. The hope reposed in him was fully fulfilled. With the emperor Nicolas and with Sazonov his credit was unbounded. Yet, he did not make the least attempt to live as an ambassador. His way of living was parsi monious. He stuck to the habits of a little French bourgeois, tak ing a stroll on the quay at 8 o'clock in the morning. As far as cur rent affairs were concerned, he always favoured a concert of Europe, and urged moderation on Russia in the controversies over Silistria and Scutari. In December 1913, he expressed himself very pessimistically about the consequences of the Liman von Sanders mission in Constantinople. Two months before, he had asked for his recall. No satisfactory explanation of that sudden decision is available. He had not seen eye to eye with the Paris Government over the French claims to Syria and the pourparlers with Germany for the building of French railways in Armenia, as he was steadily opposed to the extension of French commitments in the Near East, which he believed dangerous and likely to resus citate former Franco-British dissensions. But, in 19r3, such mat ters did not loom very large on the horizon.
The word "failure" must unfortunately be written across Del casse's last tenure of office. In June 1914, after the general elec tion had resulted in the constitution of a radical majority, the premiership was again pressed upon him in vain by Poincare. He only agreed to take the War Office in the short-lived Ribot cabinet. The temper of the country was very far removed then from the impending European developments. In the midst of the invasion of France by the German army, when Viviani had to transform his ministry into a ministry of national defence, Delcasse, who was hailed by the country as the embodiment of the Russian and British alliances came back, on Aug. 27, to the Quai d'Orsay and remained there until Oct. 13, 1915, when he resigned in order to protest against the Salonika expedition. As far as the winning of Italy to the side of the Allies was concerned, he did all that could be expected of him, and, in April 1915, approved the Treaty of London with the Government of Rome. But, in the Balkans, from beginning to end, he persistently followed the wrong track, and his closest advisers are at loss to understand his conduct, which bore such a striking contrast with his former clearness of judg ment and power of vision. He allowed himself to be deceived by Bulgaria, held in check the Serbian army which, left to itself, would have interfered with the mobilization of King Ferdinand's army, allowed Venizelos to be dismissed by King Constantine and, having approved of the Gallipoli campaign some nine months before, set his face against any assistance being lent to Serbia. Moreover, for unknown reasons, he delayed for fully six months the assent of the French Government to the annexation of Constantinople by Russia as a feature of the eventual peace treaties. On Sept. 16, 1916, in the secret sitting of the Chamber, he harped, for his defence, on the theme that he only wished 500,00o Germans were already encamped in Salonika, since the strength of the Kaiser's army on the western front, where the issue would be settled, could not fail to be all the more impaired. A passionate reply from Briand, then president of the council, crushed him, and he retired into private life and complete solitude. He entirely disapproved of the policy followed by the French and British cabinets in 1918 and 1919. The British Alliance and the building up of the Rhineland as a bulwark against Germany remained his motto to the end. Hardly any one ever saw him till his sudden death from arterio-sclerosis, on Feb. 21, 1923. He had been very much affected by the death of his son, Jacques, who had been seriously wounded and transferred to Switzerland. His daughter, Suzanne, married General Nogues.
He is reported to have destroyed most of his personal papers. In spite of his limitations, he remains, by general consent, the outstanding figure of the Third republic in the field of foreign affairs. (A. GE.) Mevil, De la paix de Francfort a la confer ence d'Algesiras (19o9) (the inspiration of the book came from Del casse himself) ; Revnald, La diplomatie f rancaise. L'oeuvre de M. Delcasse (1915) ; "M. Delcasse," Nuova Antologia (Sept. i, 1916) ; Durand-Viel, "Delcasse et la Marine," Revue Maritime (May 1923) ; Vladimir d'Ormesson, "Vergennes et Delcasse: Fachoda," Revue Heb domadaire (Aug. 25, 1923) ; Andre Mevil, "Delcasse, son Oeuvre," Revue politique et parlementaire (June so, 1924). The only collections of official documents dealing with Delcasse are to be found in Die Grosse Politik der Deutschen Kabinetts, vol. xx. ch. cxlvii., and British Documents of the Origin of the War, vol. i. ch. 4., vol. ii. ch. 7., besides the various Livres Jaunes of the period.