EGYPT AND SUDAN CAMPAIGNS (1882-1900) In Feb. 1879 discharged officers and soldiers mutinied at Cairo, which led to the despatch of British and French ships to Alexandria. On June 26 Ismail Pasha was removed from Egypt, and Tewfik assumed the khediviate, becoming practically the protege of the two western powers. On Feb. 1, 188i a more seri ous disturbance arose at Cairo from the attempt to try three colonels, Ahmed Arabi, Ali Fehmy and Abd-el-Al, who had been arrested as the ringleaders of the military party. The prisoners were released by force, and proceeded to dictate terms to the khedive. Again British and French warships were despatched to Alexandria, and were quickly withdrawn, their presence having produced no apparent impression. It soon became clear that the khedive was powerless, and that the military party, headed by Arabi, threatened to dominate the country. The "dual note," communicated to the khedive on Jan. 6, 1881, contained an inti mation that Great Britain and France were prepared to afford material support if necessary; but the fall of Gambetta's minis try produced a reaction, and both governments proceeded to minimize the meaning of their language. The khedive was prac tically compelled to form a government in which Arabi was minister of war and Mahmud Sami premier, and Arabi took steps to extend his influence throughout his army. The situation now became critical: for the third time ships were sent to Alexandria, and on May 25, 5882, the consuls-general of the two powers made a strong representation to Mahmud Sami which produced the resignation of the Egyptian ministry, but also a demand, to which the khedive yielded, by the military party for the reinstatement of Arabi. The attitude of the troops in Alexandria now became threatening; and on the 29th the British residents pointed out that they were "absolutely defenceless." This warning was amply justified by the massacres of June II, which took place almost under the guns of the ships in harbour. It was becoming clear that definite action would have to be taken, and by the end of June 26 warships, representing the navies of Great Britain, France, Germany, Italy, Austria, Russia, the United States, Spain, Greece and Turkey, lay off the port of Alexandria, and large numbers of refugees were embarked. The order re ceived by Admiral Sir Beauchamp Seymour on July 3 was as follows :— "Prevent any attempt to bar channel into port. If work is resumed on earthworks, or fresh guns mounted, inform military commander that you have orders to prevent it ; and if not immediately discontinued, destroy earthworks and silence bat teries if they open fire, having given sufficient notice to popula tion, shipping and foreign men-of-war." On the 9th the admiral received a report that working parties had been seen in Fort Silsileh "parbuckling two smoothbore guns —apparently 32-pounders--towards their respective carriages and slides, which were facing in the direction of the harbour." Fort Silsileh was an old work at the extreme east of the defences of Alexandria, and its guns did not bear on the harbour. On the loth an ultimatum was sent to Toulba Pasha, the military comman dant, intimating that the bombardment would commence at sun rise on the following morning unless "the batteries on the isthmus of Ras-el-Tin and the southern shore of the harbour" were previ ously surrendered "for the purpose of disarming." The fleet pre pared for action, and the bearer of the reply, which offered to dis mount three guns in the batteries named, only succeeded in find ing the flagship late at night. This proposal was rejected, and at 7 A.M. on July II the "Alexandra" opened fire and the action be came general. The attacking force was disposed in three groups: a squadron outside the reef, to engage the Ras-el-Tin and the earthworks under weigh ; another inside the harbour, to engage the Meks batteries ; and two men-of-war to take up assigned sta tions outside the reef and to co-operate with the inshore squadron. The five gunboats were to keep out of fire at first and seek oppor tunities of engaging the Meks batteries. Meks fort was silenced by about 12 :45 P.M., and a party landed and disabled the guns. As the fire delivered under weigh was not effective, the offshore squadron anchored at about Io:3o A.M., and succeeded in silencing Fort Ras-el-Tin at about 12:30 P.M., and Fort Adda, by the ex plosion of the main magazine, at 1:35 P.M. The gunboat "Con dor," followed by three others, engaged Fort Marabout soon after 8 A.M. till II A.M., when they were recalled. The bombardment ceased at 5 P.M. ; but a few rounds were fired on the morning of the 12th at the right battery in Ras-el-Tin lines.
The bombardment of the forts of Alexandria was illuminating as a gauge of the slight effect to be expected from the fire of ships—under favourable conditions—compared with that of guns on shore, even though indifferently mounted, with poorly trained gunners and antiquated ordnance. Seventy-five hits were obtained on the hulls of the ships, of which 3o were unquestionably due to the old smoothbores, which were not provided with sights. The British ships engaged fired 1,741 heavy projectiles and light. The result was comparatively small. About eight rifled guns out of 36 and 19 smoothbores out of 120 were dismounted or disabled. A considerable portion of this injury was inflicted, after the works had been silenced, by the deliberate fire of the ships. In the afternoon of the 1 2th, fires, which were the work of incendiaries, began to break out in the best quarters of Alex andria ; and the town was left to murder and pillage till the fol lowing day, when a party of bluejackets and marines was landed at about 3 P.M.
Military intervention being now imperatively demanded, a vote of credit for f 2,300,00o was passed in the British House of Com mons on July 27. Five days later the French Government failed to secure a similar vote, and Great Britain was left to deal with the Egyptian question alone. An expeditionary force was organ ized in two divisions, with a cavalry division, corps troops and a siege train, numbering in all about 2 5,00o men. An Indian con tingent numbering about 7,00o combatants was prepared for despatch to Suez. Gen. Sir Garnet Wolseley was appointed com mander-in-chief. The expeditionary force having assembled at Alexandria, the Suez Canal was seized and Ismailia occupied as the base for an advance on Cairo. Meanwhile the bulk of the ex peditionary force was taken eastwards to Port Said, a naval dem onstration being made at Abukir to deceive the enemy as to the object of the main movement in progress. The advance inland westwards towards Cairo now began. On Aug. 21 an advanced de tachment moved from Ismailia occupying Nefiche, the junction with the Suez line. Reconnaissances showed that the enemy had dammed the sweet-water canal and blocked the railway at Tell el-Mahuta, where entrenchments had been thrown up. But the advanced guard had now outrun its supplies, while a considerable force was distributed at intervals along the line Ismailia-Kassas sin. The situation on the 27th tempted attack by an enterprising enemy, and Maj.-gen. Graham's force was in danger of being over whelmed by vastly superior numbers from Tell-el-Kebir. On Aug. 28 and Sept. 9 the Egyptians attacked Kassassin, but were re pulsed. Meanwhile strenuous efforts were made to bring up sup plies and troops for an attack on Tell-el-Kebir, held by about 38,00o men with 6o guns. The Egyptian defences consisted of a long line of trench (two and a half miles) approximately at right angles to the railway and the sweet-water canal. At II P.M. on Sept. 12 the advance of about i 5,000 men commenced; the 1st division, under Lieut.-gen. Willis, was on the right, and the end division, under Lieut.-gen. Hamley, was on the left. Seven bat teries of artillery were placed in the centre. The cavalry, under Maj.-gen. Drury Lowe, was on the right flank, and the Indian contingent, under Maj.-gen. Macpherson, starting one hour later, was ordered to move south of the sweet-water canal. The night was moonless, and the distance to be covered about 64 miles. The ground was perfectly open, slightly undulating and generally firm gravel. The conditions for a night march were thus ideal; but during the movement the wings closed towards each other, caus ing great risk of an outbreak of firing. The line was, however, rectified, and after a halt the final advance began. By a fortunate accident an isolated outwork was just missed in the darkness by the left flank of the end Division; otherwise a premature alarm would have been given, which must have changed all the condi tions of the operation. At dawn the Highland Brigade of the end Division struck the enemy's trenches, and carried them after a brief struggle. The 1st Division attacked a few minutes later, and the cavalry swept round the left of the line of entrench ments, cutting down any fugitives who attempted resistance and reaching the enemy's camp in rear. The Indian contingent, on the south of the canal, co-operated, intercepting the Egyptians at the canal bridge. The opposition encountered at some points was severe, but by 6 A.M. all resistance was at an end. The British loss amounted to 58 killed, 379 wounded and 22 missing; nearly 2,000 Egyptians were killed, and more than soo wounded were treated in hospital. An immediate pursuit was ordered, and the Indian contingent reached Zagazig, while the cavalry occupied Belbeis and pushed on to Cairo, 65m. from Tell-el-Kebir, next day. On the evening of the 14th the io,000 troops occupying Abbasia barracks, and 5,000 in the citadel of Cairo, surrendered. The prompt following up of the victory at Tell-el-Kebir saved Cairo from the fate of Alexandria and brought the rebellion to an end-25 days from the landing at Ismailia to the occupation of Cairo. For the Egyptian troops elsewhere promptly surrendered.
The authority of the khedive and the maintenance of law and order now depended absolutely on the British forces left in oc cupation. Lord Dufferin, who had been sent to Cairo to draw up a project of constitutional reforms, advocated the re-establish ment of a native army, not to exceed 5,000 to 6,000 men, with a proportion of British officers for purely defence purposes within the Delta; and Sir Evelyn Wood left England to undertake the organization of this force, with the title of sirdar. A gendarmerie of 4,40o was also formed, under Baker Pasha (Gen. Valentine Baker) as inspector-general.
In a despatch of Feb. 6, 1883, Lord Dufferin dealt with the Sudan, and stated that Egypt "could hardly be expected to ac quiesce" in a policy of withdrawal from her southern territories. At the same time he pointed out that, "Unhappily, Egyptian ad ministration in the Sudan had been almost uniformly unfortunate. The success of the present mandi in raising the tribes and ex tending his influence over great tracts of country was a sufficient proof of the government's inability either to reconcile the in habitants to its rule or to maintain order." Moreover, to restore tranquillity in the Sudan, "the first step necessary was the con struction of a railway from Suakin to Berber, or what, perhaps, would be more advisable, to Shendi, on the Nile. The completion of this enterprise would at once change all the elements of the problem." The immense responsibilities involved were most imperfectly understood by the British Government. Egyptian sovereignty in the Sudan dated from 1820, and in 1877 Gordon had become governor-general of the Sudan, where he laboured to destroy the slave trade and to establish just government. In Aug. 1879 he returned to Cairo, and was succeeded by Raouf Pasha. Misrule and oppression again prevailed throughout the Sudan, while the slave traders, exasperated by Gordon's stern measures, were ready to revolt. The authority of Egypt was represented by scat tered garrisons of armed men, badly officered, undisciplined and largely demoralized. In such conditions a leader only was re quired to ensure widespread and dangerous rebellion. A leader appeared in the person of Mohammed Ahmed, who, acquiring great reputation for sanctity, had actively fomented insurrection. In Aug. 188i a small force sent by Raouf Pasha to arrest Moham med Ahmed was destroyed, and the latter, proclaiming himself the mandi, stood forth as the champion of revolt. Thus, at the time when the Egyptian army was broken up at Tell-el-Kebir, the Sudan was already in flames. These spread in face of the inef fective efforts of a rapidly changed succession of Egyptian gov ernor-generals. An Egyptian force was improvised and despatched by the khedive to Khartoum via Suakin. In March 1883 Col. William Hicks, late of the Bombay army, found himself at Khar toum in command of nine European officers and about 1o,000 troops of little military value. The reconquest of the Sudan hav ing been determined upon, although Sir E. Malet reported that the Egyptian Government could not supply the necessary funds, and that there was great risk of failure, Hicks started from Khar toum on Sept. 9 for Kordofan.
Col. Hicks was fully aware of the unfitness of his rabble forces for the contemplated task, and on Aug. 5 he telegraphed : "I am convinced it would be best to keep the two rivers and province of Sennar, and wait for Kordofan to settle itself." Early in Novem ber the force from Khartoum was caught by the mandists short of water at Kashgil, near El Obeid, and was almost totally de stroyed, Col. Hicks, with all his European officers, perishing. Sinister rumours having reached Cairo, Sir E. Baring (Lord Cromer), who had succeeded Sir E. Malet, telegraphed to London that "if Col. Hicks's army is destroyed, the Egyptian Government will lose the whole of the Sudan, unless some assistance from the outside is given," and advised the withdrawal to some post on the Nile. On the following day Lord Granville replied : "We cannot lend English or Indian troops; if consulted, recommend abandon ment of the Sudan within certain limits"; and on the 25th he added that "Her Majesty's Government can do nothing in the matter which would throw upon them the responsibilities for operations in the Sudan." In a despatch of Dec. 3 Baring forcibly argued against British intervention in the affairs of the Sudan; on Jan. 4, 1884 he was directed to insist upon the policy of evacua tion, and on the 18th Gen. Gordon left London to assist in its execution.
The year 1883 brought a great accession of power to the mandi, who had captured about 20,000 rifles, 19 guns and large stores of ammunition. On the Red Sea littoral Osman Digna, a slave dealer of Suakin, appointed amir of the Eastern Sudan, raised the local tribes, invested Sinkat and Tokar, and destroyed Egyptian rein forcements sent thither. On Dec. 23 Baker, followed by about 2,500 men, gendarmerie, blacks, Sudanese and Turks, with ten British officers, arrived at Suakin to prepare for the relief of Sinkat and Tokar. The tragedy of Kashgil was repeated on Feb. 4 when Gen. Baker's heterogeneous force, on the march to Tokar, was routed at El Teb by an inferior body of tribesmen. Of 3,715 men, 2,375 with 11 European officers were killed. Suakin was now in danger, and on Feb. 6 British bluejackets and marines were landed for the defence of the town.
Two expeditions in the Sudan led by British officers having thus ended in disaster, and Gordon with Lieut.-col. J. D. Stewart hav ing reached Khartoum, the policy of British non-intervention could no longer be maintained. Public opinion in England was strongly impressed by the fact that the Egyptian garrisons of Tokar and Sinkat were perishing within striking distance of the Red Sea littoral. A British force about 4,400 strong, with 22 guns was rapidly concentrated at Suakin and placed under the orders of Maj.-gen. Sir G. Graham. News of the fall of Sinkat, where the starving garrison, under Tewfik Bey, made a gallant sortie and was cut to pieces, reached Suakin on Feb. 12. On the 24th Gen. Graham's force disembarked at Trinkitat and received informa tion of the surrender of Tokar. At 8 A.M. on the 29th the force advanced towards Tokar in square, and came under fire at i i : 20 A.M. from the enemy entrenched at El Teb. The tribesmen made desperate efforts to rush the square, but were repulsed, and the position was taken by 2 P.M. The cavalry, loth and 19th Hussars, under Brig.-gen. Sir H. Stewart, became involved in a charge against an unbroken enemy, and suffered somewhat severely. The total British loss was 34 killed and 155 wounded; that of the tribesmen was estimated at 1,5oo killed. On the following day Tokar was reached, and on March 2 the force began its return to Suakin, bringing away about 700 rescued people. On March 9 the whole force was back at Suakin, and on the evening of the II th an advance to Tamai began, and the force bivouacked and formed a zariba in the evening. Information was brought by a native that the enemy had assembled in the Khor Ghob, a deep ravine not far from the zeriba. At about 8:3o A.M. on the 13th the advance began in echelon of brigade squares from the left. The left and leading square (2nd Brigade) moved towards the khor, approach ing at a point where a little ravine joined it. The enemy showing in front, the leading face of the square was ordered to charge up to the edge of the khor. This opened the square, and a mass of tribesmen rushed in from the small ravine. The brigade was forced back in disorder, and the naval guns, which had been left behind, were temporarily captured. After a severe hand-to-hand struggle, in which the troops behaved with great gallantry, order was restored and the enemy repulsed, with the aid of the fire from the 1st Brigade square and from dismounted cavalry. The ist Brigade square, having a sufficient field of fire, easily repelled all attempts to attack, and advancing as soon as the situation had been restored, occupied the village of Tamai. The British loss was 109 killed and 104 wounded; of the enemy nearly 2,00o were killed. On the following day the force returned to Suakin.
Two heavy blows had now been inflicted on the followers of Osman Digna, and the road to Berber could have been opened, as Graham suggested and Gordon urged. It was at first opposed by Sir E. Baring who, however, realized soon afterwards the gravity of the situation and telegraphed on March 16:—"It has now become of the utmost importance not only to open the road between Suakin and Berber, but to come to terms with the tribes between Berber and Khartoum." The Government refused to take this action'and Graham's force was broken up, leaving one battalion to garrison Suakin.
The abrupt disappearance of the British troops encouraged the tribesmen led by Osman Digna. The first attempt at intervention in the affairs of the Sudan had been made too late to save Sinkat and Tokar. It resulted only in heavy slaughter of the tribesmen, which afforded no direct or indirect aid to Gordon or to the policy of evacuation. The public announcement of this policy increased Gordon's difficulties, and the situation at Khartoum grew steadily worse. On March 24 Sir E. Baring telegraphed:—"The ques tion now is, how to get Gen. Gordon and Col. Stewart away from Khartoum. . . . Under present circumstances, I think an effort should be made to help Gen. Gordon from Suakin, if it is at all a possible military operation. . . . We all consider that, however difficult the operations from Suakin may be, they are more prac ticable than any operations from Korosko and along the Nile." A telegram from Gordon, received at Cairo on April 19, stated that "We have provisions for five months and are hemmed in. . . . Our position will be much strengthened when the Nile rises. • • • Sennar, Kassala and Dongola are quite safe for the present." At the same time he suggested "an appeal to the millionaires of America and England" to subscribe money for the cost of "2,000 or 3,00o nizams" (Turkish regulars) to be sent to Berber. A cloud now settled down upon Khartoum, and subsequent communica tions were few and irregular. The Foreign Office and Gordon ap peared to be somewhat at cross purposes. The former hoped that the garrisons of the Sudan could be extricated without fighting. The latter, judging from some of his telegrams, believed that to accomplish this entailed the suppression of the mandi's revolt, the strength of which he at first greatly under-estimated. On March 9 Gordon proposed, "if the immediate evacuation of Khartoum is determined upon irrespective of out-lying towns," to send down the "Cairo employes" and the garrison to Berber, to resign his commission, and to proceed with the stores and the steamers to the equatorial provinces, which he would consider as placed under the king of the Belgians. On March 13 Lord Granville gave full power to Gordon to "evacuate Khartoum and save that garrison by conducting it himself to Berber without delay," and expressed a hope that he would not resign his commission.
By the end of March the growing danger to Gordon, with the grave national responsibility involved, began to be realized in Great Britain. Sir Henry Gordon, however, who was in personal communication with Mr. Gladstone, considered that his brother was in no peril, and for some time disbelieved in the need for a relief expedition. Meanwhile it was at least necessary to evolve some .plan of action, and on April 8 Lord Wolseley, the adjutant general, drew up a memorandum detailing the measures required for placing 6,500 British troops "in the neighbourhood of Shendi." The controversial "battle" of the routes began much earlier, and was continued for some months. Practically the choice lay be tween the Nile and the Suakin-Berber road. The first involved a distance of 1,65om. from Cairo along a river strewn with cataracts, which obstructed navigation to all but small boats, except during the period of high water. So great was this obstruc tion that the Nile had never been a regular trade route to the Sudan. The second entailed a desert march of about 2 5om., of which one section, Obak-Bir Mahoba (52m.), was waterless, and the rest had an indifferent water supply (except at Ariab, about half-way to Berber), but capable of development. From Berber the Nile is followed (nom.) om.) to Khartoum. This was an ancient trade route with the Sudan, and had been used without difficulty by the reinforcements sent to Hicks Pasha in 1883. The author ities in Egypt were unanimous in favour of it. From the first Maj. gen. Sir A. Clarke, then inspector-general of fortifications, strongly urged this plan, and proposed to begin at once a metre gauge rail way from Suakin. Preliminary arrangements were made, and on June 14 the Government sanctioned certain measures of prepara tion at Suakin. On the other side were the adjutant-general and a small number of officers who had taken part in the Red River expedition of 187o in Canada (q.v.). Wolseley's memorandum had been based on the hypothesis that Khartoum could not hold out beyond Nov. 15, and that the expedition should reach Berber by Oct. 20. Steamers were to be employed in such reaches as proved practicable, but the force was to be conveyed in special whale-boats, by which "the difficulty of transport is reduced to very narrow limits." The question of routes continued to be argued and on July 29 a committee of three officers who had served in the Red River expedition reported :—"We believe that a brigade can easily be conveyed in small boats from Cairo to Dongola in the time stated by Lord Wolseley; and, further, that should it be necessary to send a still larger force by water to Khartoum, that operation will present no insuperable difficulties." This inconclusive report, and the baseless idea that the adoption of the Nile route would involve no chance of bloodshed, which the Government was anxious to avoid, seem to have decided the question. Wolseley was appointed to take over the command in Egypt for the purposes of the expedition, and on Sept. 9 he arrived at Cairo, where the plan of operations was somewhat modified. A camel corps of r,ioo men selected from 28 regiments at home was added, and the "fighting force to be placed in line somewhere in the neighbourhood of Shendi" was fixed at 5,400. The construction of whale-boats began at once, the first batch arrived at Wadi Halfa on Oct. 14, and on the 25th the first boat was hauled through the second cataract. The mounted forces proceeded up the banks, and the first half-battalion embarked at Gemai, 87om. from Khartoum, on Nov. 5, ten days before the date to which it had been assumed Gen. Gordon could hold out. In a straggling procession the boats worked their way up to Korti, piloted by Canadian voyageurs. By Christmas day 2,220 men had reached Korti, of whom about Boo only had been conveyed by the whale-boats, the last of which did not arrive till Jan. 27. Beyond Korti Iay the very difficult section of the river to Abu Hamed, which was quite unknown. A letter from Gordon, dated Nov. 4 and received on Nov. 17, stated that his steamers would await the expedition at Metemma, and added, "We can hold out 4o days with ease; after that it will be difficult." It was clear at Korti that something must be done at once; and on Dec. 13 a camel force under Gen. Sir H. Stewart was despatched to occupy Jakdul wells, 96m. on the desert route to Metemma. Stewart returned on Jan. 5, i885, and started again on the 8th, with orders to establish a fort at Abu Klea and to occupy Me temma. The desert column, i,800 men, with 2,88o camels in poor condition and 153 horses, found the enemy in possession of Abu Klea wells on the i6th, and was desperately attacked on the 17th. The want of homogeneity of the force, and the unaccustomed tactics imposed upon the cavalry, somewhat hampered the de fence, and the square was broken at the left rear corner. Driven back upon the camels in the centre, the troops fought hand to hand with the greatest gallantry. Order was quickly restored, and the attack was repulsed, with a loss of 74 killed and 94 wounded. At least ',zoo of the enemy were killed. After occupying the wells the column started again next evening. The wrong road was taken, and great confusion occurred during the night, but at dawn this was rectified; and after forming a rough fort under fire, by which Stewart was fatally wounded, the advance was resumed. Repuls ing a fresh attack, the desert column, now greatly exhausted, on the 21st reached Metemma, which was found too strong to assault. On this day Gordon's four steamers arrived; and on the morning of the 24th Sir C. Wilson, on whom the command had devolved, with 20 British soldiers and about 28o Sudanese, started in the "Bordein" and "Telehawiyeh" for Khartoum. The "Bordein" grounded twice, by which 24 hours were lost. On the 28th Khar toum was sighted, and it soon became clear that the town was in the hands of the enemy. After reconnoitring farther, the steamers turned and proceeded down stream under a heavy fire, the Sudan ese crews showing signs of disaffection. Both steamers were wrecked on the way back, but Wilson's party was rescued. Khar toum had been taken and Gordon killed on the morning of Jan. 26, having thus held out 34 days beyond the date when he had expected the end. The desert column, now in a precarious situa tion, increased by the breakdown of its transport, extricated itself by a return to Korti, while the river column was still 35om. below Khartoum when on Feb. 24 it received orders to retire. On Feb. II, Wolseley, who had previously refused the offer of an active demonstration from Suakin, accepted the proposal of the Government to make a railway from there to Berber, as a means of supply.
Every effort was now concentrated upon sending an expedi tionary force to Suakin, and before the end of March about 13,000 men, including a brigade from India and a field battery from New South Wales, with nearly 7,000 camels and i,000 mules, were there assembled. Gen. Graham was placed in com mand of this force, with orders to break down the power of Osman Digna and to press the construction of the railway towards Berber. On March 19, Graham reconnoitred as far as Hashin and there next day inflicted a sharp reverse on the enemy, despite the natural difficulties of fighting in the dense mimosa scrub. On the 22nd a detachment with a large camel convoy started from Suakin for Tamai, but at a halt six miles out was attacked. Although caught partly unprepared, they repulsed the enemy, after a severe fight, before Graham's prompt aid arrived. After the repulse of a few lesser attacks, the railway was pushed on without interruption, reaching Otao on the 3oth. On the night of May 6 a combined movement was made from Suakin and Otao, which resulted in the surprise and break-up of a force of the enemy and the seizure of a large number of sheep and goats. The moral effect of this operation was marked.
Meanwhile many communications had passed between the War Office and Wolseley, who at first believed that Berber could be taken before the summer. But by March 6 he had come to the opinion that it would be "impossible . . . to undertake any offensive operations until about the end of the summer, and only then with large reinforcements." A cloud having arisen on the frontiers of Afghanistan, the withdrawal of the troops from the Sudan was ordered in May. On June 22, before the British rearguard had left Dongola, the mandi died. The withdrawal of the Suakin force began on May 17, and the friendly tribes, deprived of support, were compelled to make terms with Osman Digna.
The operations against mandism during the II years from the end of the Nile expedition and the withdrawal from the Sudan to the commencement of the Dongola campaign will be more easily understood if, instead of narrating them in one chronological sequence, the operations in each province are considered sepa rately. On the death of the mandi he was succeeded by the prin cipal khalifa, Abdullah el Ta'aisha, a Baggara Arab, who for the next 13 years ruled the Sudan with despotic power. He was cruel, vicious, unscrupulous and strong, and the country groaned beneath his oppression. He removed all possible rivals, concentrated at Omdurman a strong military force composed of men of his own tribe, and maintained the ascendancy of that tribe over all others. As the British troops retired to Upper Egypt, his followers seized the evacuated country, and the khalif a cherished- the idea, already formulated by the mandi, of the conquest of Egypt, but for some years he was too much occupied in quelling risings, massacring the Egyptians in the Sudan, and fighting Abyssinia, to move seriously in the matter.
It was not until May 1889 that an invasion of the frontier on a large scale was again attempted. At this time the power and prestige of the khalifa were at their height; the rebellions in Dar fur and Kordofan had been stamped out, the anti-mandi was dead, and even the dervish defeat by the Abyssinians had been converted by the death of King John and the capture of his body into a success. It was therefore an opportune time to try to sweep the Turks and the British into the sea. On June 2 2 the amir Wad en Nejumi was at Sarras with over 6,000 fighting men and 8,000 followers. On July 2 Col. Wodehouse headed off and routed a part of this force at Argin. The sirdar, Gen. Grenfell, who had arrived to take the command in person, concentrated the Egyptian troops, with a squadron of the loth Hussars, at Toski, and thence, on Aug. 3 gained a decisive victory with slight loss. The dervish army was practically destroyed and no further seri ous attempts were made to disturb the frontier, of which the most southerly outpost was at once advanced to Sarras.
In the neighbourhood of Suakin there were many tribes dis affected to the khalifa's cause, and in the autumn of i886 Col. H. Kitchener, who was at the time governor of the Red Sea littoral, judiciously arranged a combination of them to overthrow Osman Digna, with the result that his stronghold at Tamai was captured on Oct. 7. But at the end of 1887 Osman Digna again advanced towards Suakin, and although routed by the "Friend lies," he collected a large force again in 1888 and besieged Suakin. In December the sirdar arrived with reinforcements from Cairo, on the loth sallied out and dislodged the dervishes from their trenches at Gemaiza, and the country was again fairly quiet for a time. In Jan. 1891 Osman Digna showed signs of increased activity, and Col. Holled Smith, then governor of the Red Sea lit toral, advanced and on Feb. 19 fought the decisive action of Afafit, occupied Tokar, and drove Osman Digna back to Temrin with a loss of 700 men, including all his chief amirs. This action proved the final blow to the dervish power in the neighbourhood of Suakin, for although raiding continued on a small scale, the tribes were growing tired of the khalifa's rule and refused to support Osman Digna.
In the spring of the same year an agreement was made between England and Italy by which the Italian forces in Eritrea were at liberty, if they were able, to capture and occupy Kassala, which lay close to the western boundary of their new colony, on condi tion that they should ultimately restore it to Egypt. Three years passed before they availed themselves of this agreement. In 1893 the dervishes, 12,000 strong, under Ahmed Ali, invaded Eritrea, and were met on Dec. 29 at Agordat by Col. Arimondi with 2,000 men of a native force. Ahmed Ali's force was completely routed and himself killed, and in the following July Col. Baratieri, with 2,500 men, made a fine forced march from Agordat, surprised and captured Kassala and continued to hold it for three years and a half.
The Bahr-el-Ghazal.—The first outbreak in favour of mah dism in the Bahr-el-Ghazal took place in Aug. 1882, and although crushed by Lupton Bey, a fresh outbreak a year later forced him to retire to Dem Suliman, where he was completely cut off from Khartoum. After gallantly fighting for 18 months he was com pelled by the defection of his troops to surrender. to Karamalla, the dervish amir of the province, and he died at Omdurman in 1888. In 1890 the Shilluks in the neighbourhood of Fashoda rose against the khalifa, and the dervish amir of Gallabat, Zeki Tumal, was engaged for two years in suppressing the rebellion. In 1892 he was recalled by the khalifa to invade Eritrea (Italian), and on reporting it to be impossible he was summoned to Omdurman and put to death. The country then relapsed into its original barbarous condition, and dervish influence was nominal only. Equatoria.—In the Equatorial Province, which extended from the Albert Nyanza to Lado, Emin Bey, who had a force of 1,300 Egyptian troops and 3,00o irregulars, distributed among many stations, held out, hoping for reinforcements. In April 1885, however, Karamalla arrived near Lado, the capital, and sent to in form Emin of the fall of Khartoum. Emin and Capt. Casati, an Italian, moved south to Wadelai, and opened friendly relations with the king of Unyoro. Emin determined to remain rather than leave the country and to "hold together, as long as possible, the remnant of the last ten years." His troops were in a mutinous state, wishing to go north rather than so ath, and unsuccessfully endeavoured to carry him with them by force.
His communications to Europe through Zanzibar led to the relief expedition under Stanley, which went to his rescue by way of the Congo in 1887, and eventually met with Emin and Casati at Nsabe, on the Albert Nyanza, on April 29, 1888. Stanley went back in May to pick up his belated rearguard, leaving Mounteney Jephson and a small escort to accompany Emin round his prov ince. But a revolt broke out, headed by Fadl-el-Maula, governor of Fabbo, and Emin and Jephson were made prisoners by the Egyptian mutineers. In the meantime, the arrival of Stanley at Lake Albert had caused rumours, which quickly spread to Omdur man, of a great invading white pasha, with the result that in July the khalifa sent up the river three steamers and six barges, con taining 4,00o troops, to oppose this new-corner. In October the mandist commander took Rejaf and sent messengers to Dufile to summon Emin to surrender. The mutineers then released Emin and Jephson—who rejoined Stanley and reached Zanzibar safely —and turned to repulse the dervishes, eventually driving them back to Rejaf. They did not, however, follow up their victory. In 1893 Fadl-el-Maula Bey and many of his men took service with the Congo State expedition. The bey was killed fighting the dervishes and the remnant of his men were found by Capt. Thrus ton from Uganda in March 1894 at Mahagi, on the Albert Nyanza, whither they had drifted in search of supplies. They were enlisted by Thruston and brought back under the British flag to Uganda. In consequence of the Franco-Congolese Treaty of 1894, Maj. Cunningham and Lieut. Vandeleur were sent from Uganda to Dufile, where they planted the British flag on Jan. 15, 1895.