PROBLEMS Since this English-speaking situation in the world would be inconceivable if it did not actually exist, can we speculate usefully upon the prospects and problems of the future? In spite of the American Immigration Laws of 1921 reducing in a drastic way the influx from southern and eastern Europe, it is generally assumed that the population of the United States alone will be about 15o, 000,000 by 195o and over 200,000,000 by the end of the century. The British islands seem likely before very long to become stationary at a limit of about 5o.000.000. Though nothing like the rate of multiplication of English-speakers in the 19th century seems likely to occur in the future, it is reasonable to assume that their aggregate will reach over 300,000,00o by the end of the 20th century. It would seem that of white races only the Russian speakers have some chance—by no means necessarily a sure chance—of ultimately attaining equal numbers.
A main question, therefore, for the world, and perhaps its principal ques tion, is whether the English-speaking communities will prove cap able of pursuing in the greatest matters concerning them and all mankind a common world-policy. Will settled friendship pre vail or will friction increase? Concord or discord? Upon the answer everything may depend for the better or worse course of general civilization. In the last few years relations have not been satisfactory nor can it ever be easy to make them perfect. To distinguish between speech and race—Hindu orators for instance, like orators before them, have an unapproachable fluency in the English language for agitation against English rule—is as we saw at the outset, an elementary business of the modern historian. The common language of the English-speaking world expresses many profound diversities of race, temperament and thought ; of historic imagination and present political sympathy. In face of these facts the old "Anglo-Saxon" theory has been for many years not only obsolete but prejudicial. A much broader basis of in telligence and appreciation is required. In America or Australia an ordinary citizen of Irish-Celtic descent may cease in reason to cherish the former bitterness of the old feud but cannot be expected to feel a positive pro-British instinct. It is natural for an American of German blood to think of Germany with senti ments of affection and romance. And so with other millions of Italian or Slav blood in the American Union. They have like those of British origin, but usually more so, their own cults of ancestor worship, and the mother-island plays no part in their dream. Yet all these necessarily are English-speakers.
These variations of feeling are apt to accentuate any political disagreement or misunderstanding that may arise from time to time between Britain and America. There has been no war between them for well over a century, and this again—considering how obstinate are apt to be the quarrels of kinsmen—is one of the more significant and encouraging facts of modern history. For, controversies have been recurrent, sharp and sometimes dangerous. Under past conditions of contact phases of friction were inevitable; but we are all prone to forget how much they have diminished in frequency and severity. The chief matter of practical difference has been that of naval power and maritime law—as we might well expect since the seas are the common path way for the traffic and trade and personal voyages of all English speakers; and this question, owing to the epochal events and changes of recent years, has become all-important for their present and future relations.
From its beginning the American Union has urged the largest rights of neutrals to trade freely upon the high seas in time of war. The island depended for its life upon the utmost use of sea-power as against land-power. This controversy led to the last armed quarrel in 1812. During the American Civil War the maritime controversy in another form became threatening again, but was settled for the time by a memorable arbitration heralding the best hopes of to-day. After the outbreak of the World War the British blockade. the only means of preventing the triumph of the Central Empires, made the maritime tension so acute that if German policy had been more judicious, the United States, possibly, might have declared against the Allies. Even when President Wilson was their Associate he demanded amongst his Fourteen Points, the Freedom of the Seas and made it plain that America otherwise must proceed to create a fleet strong enough to assert in all circumstances her own freedom. The Brit ish preferred the latter alternative formidable as it was, for the sound reason—peace being still insecure—that the former might have left them at a deadly disadvantage against military possi bilities in Europe and Asia. Accordingly, the American fleet was developed with the purpose of making it second to none.
The Washington Con ference of 1921 thus became the most momentous deliberation that had ever affected simultaneously all the English-speaking peoples. Britain ceded her majestic tradition of separate sea supremacy and accepted the principle of naval equality with America—the United States, in the new international spirit, re nouncing the power they possessed of creating a naval dominance of their own. None the less, dispute gradually arose as to the technical arrangements required to realize in fact, without in justice to either side, the accepted theoretical parity. It became active in 1927 at the abortive Geneva Conference on the subject— acutely touching certain types of cruisers—and remained more or less unpleasant down to the end of 1928. Then American opinion having rejected larger propositions of naval increase favoured Mr. Coolidge's recommendation to build 15 large cruisers for parity. British opinion was equally resolved not to enter upon any competition in naval armaments with the United States.
In any case American parity will exist in strength and practice. This, as a result of the late War, is the largest world-change of its kind since Cromwell. It means two very different things. On the one hand, the British navy alone cannot determine future sea-law. Britain cannot have more right to interfere with American com merce than America with British commerce ; and thus the way is open and wide towards such a revision of sea-law as shall remove the old cause of difficulty and the last remaining danger to the future of English-speaking relations. Happily this course seems pretty sure to be taken. For on the other hand, their joint sea power while they remain in amity is far greater than ever and more deeply secured. The British islands can accept the "freedom of the seas" now that the rise of the American navy places a double-guarantee behind it. Far more than ever, for the old land with its industrial democracy under universal suffrage, "peace is the greatest of British interests"; and apart from that, nowhere is the idealism of peace more earnest and profound. But if the hope of world-peace were frustrated, then under the new sea-law which naval parity implies and demands, America even as a neutral would be the sure source of the sea-supplies that are Britain's life.
