The Highest Good

THE HIGHEST GOOD The oldest, and in some ways the most important, ethical problem is that relating to the supreme good or ultimate end of human conduct. Many human activities are admit tedly directed to ends or purposes that are not regarded as possessing value in themselves, but as means to ulterior ends which confer on them a derivative value. One may do strenuous physical exercises or take long walks merely in order to keep physically fit; one may play chess or solve cross-word puzzles in order to exercise and improve one's intelligence, or in order to divert one's thoughts from cares and worries ; one may try hard to make money in order to provide for one's dependents, or in order to carry out some other philanthropic scheme. But even these ulterior aims may not be valued as final ends; one may be prepared to sacrifice them to some higher end. The individual may at a supreme crisis be willing to sacrifice himself and his family to some great cause such as honour, or justice, or patriot ism, or humanity. Yet some end or aim there must be (so it is commonly assumed) which is ultimate and not subordinate to anything else. Such an ultimate end, whatever it may be, is usually called the summum bonum, or highest good. It is an old ethical tradition that there is such a highest good; and that this highest good is happiness. (The view that happiness is the summum bonum is known as Eudaemonism.) There are, however, very different conceptions about the nature and claims of happiness as the ultimate end of human conduct. Moreover, other ultimate ends have been formulated, such as perfectionism, or duty for duty's sake, and, in intimate connection with this, the good will as the highest good. All these conceptions must be briefly con sidered.

Happiness As the Highest Good.

The popular moral max ims of all times and climes testify to the widespread belief that in the last resort what man really seeks is happiness, and that all his other pursuits are directed (though sometimes mistakenly) to this end. Popular moralizing for the most part either points out the right means to happiness or utters a warning against the wrong means. Hence the prudential character of popular ethics. Psychologically the assumption that happiness is what men always seek either directly or indirectly is open to serious criticism. Generally speaking, happiness is the consequence of the attainment of some desired end, the satisfaction of some felt need. It is not usually either the actual end or object desired, or even the conscious purpose for which something else is sought. For the most part it is only people devoid of interest in things, and so deprived of the satisfaction of realizing, or at least advanc ing some cause or other, who voice a longing for happiness, or their grievance against its elusiveness. But even if this objection be waived as something calling for a more careful reformulation of the eudaemonistic summum bonum rather than for its rejec tion, the question naturally arises as to whose happiness is to be sought. To this question three different answers are possible, and have actually been given. It may be held that each individual should seek his own happiness. This theory is known as Egoistic Eudaemonism. On the other hand it has been maintained that the end to be pursued is the happiness of mankind as a whole or at least of the community of which the individual concerned is a member. This theory is known as Utilitarianism. A third answer that has been suggested, though not very seriously, is that the individual should always pursue the happiness of others, not his own happiness. This theory is known as Altruism or Altruistic Eudaemonism. These views will now be considered in turn.

Egoistic Eudaemonism.—In its crudest form this theory identi fies happiness with physical pleasures. (A theory which identifies happiness with physical pleasure or sensuous enjoyment is called Hedonism.) In its maturer form egoistic eudaemonism (indeed every form of eudaemonism) attaches a higher value to pleas ures of the mind (that is, pleasures derived from the pursuit of knowledge, art, etc.) than to those of the body; and in its high est form, egoistic eudaemonism identifies individual happiness with that which results from the fullest development of a highly artistic or spiritual personality. By a curious paradox egoistic eudaemonism is apt to become ascetic in character when it takes on a religious complexion. The individual is then so bent on secur ing his salvation at all costs that he eschews all ordinary pleasures, and sacrifices worldly happiness on the altar of an other-worldly blessedness.

Universalistic Eudaemonism or Utilitarianism formulates as the highest good the happiness of the community, not merely that of the agent himself. According to egoistic eudaemonism the agent is only interested in others in so far as they are of service to him in some way or other. According to utilitarianism, on the other hand, the agent should not claim any privileges for him self—no individual must count as more than one, and the happi ness to be aimed at is the greatest happiness of the greatest num ber. There are obvious difficulties in such a theory. Even if it were true, as Bentham believed, that pleasures differ only quanti tatively, not qualitatively, that pushpin and poetry afford the same kind of pleasure, even so it would be difficult to choose, on the utilitarian principle, when the same quantity of happiness might be afforded to alternative groups of people. Why prefer the happiness of A, B, C to that of X, Y, Z? But, as J. S. Mill admitted, pleas ures are not of the same kind. Moreover they cannot be reduced to a common denominator. This difficulty is inherent in every form of eudaemonism. But in so far as it is real, it is impossible to construct a calculus of pleasures such as is indispensable to utili tarianism. Still the practical difficulties of the doctrine must not be exaggerated. The problems of life and conduct are vastly more complicated than the problems of arithmetic, whatever ideal one may set himself. And utilitarianism. whatever its shortcom ings may be, proved itself an effective instrument in the march of social democracy—and that was the main point with its founders.

Altruistic Eudaemonism or Altruism, when the term is not used as synonymous with utilitarianism, demands the pursuit of the happiness of others at the expense of one's own. It is a more positive formulation of the familiar doctrine'of self-sacri fice. Every ideal of life involves an element of self-repression, and self-denial is one of the conditions of self-fulfilment. But the pure altruism with which we are here concerned can hardly be considered seriously. If the happiness of the agent himself has no value, how can the happiness of others be of value? If it be urged that self-devotion to others, in so far as it is reciprocal, is a sure way of securing the happiness of everybody, then it is only utilitarianism in a disguised form, and expressed in a manner which recalls the famous island, the inhabitants of which main tained themselves by doing each other's washing. The doctrine of altruism and self -saci ifice is only too intimately associated with incompetent state-craft. Those who lack sufficient wisdom and insight so to work the social and political machine as to enrich the life of the citizens usually head for the kind of dis aster which necessitates the sacrifice of the lives of the citizens in order to save the machine and the mechanics.

Perfection As the Highest Good.

Perfectionism is the the ory which maintains that the highest good of human conduct is the fullest development of all the capacities of man in so far as these can co-exist in an harmonious whole. This may be expressed in yet another way. Man, like everything else, has certain latent potentialities. Different things have different kinds of potential ities, according to which we array them in a certain order of merit. Living plants have more potentialities than inert matter, animals are superior to plants, and man to animals. The precise limits of human potentialities cannot, of course, be determined in advance. But the high attainments of gifted individuals serve as milestones on the path of human progress, and encourage the imaginative construction of ideals of human life and character. Such ideals become standards of perfection, and the attainment of such perfection, or at least the earnest endeavour to attain it as far as in us lies, is what the theory of perfectionism regards as the highest good of human conduct.

Egoistic, Universalistic and Altruistic Perfectionism.—The question as to whose perfection is to be aimed at by the moral agent is clearly answerable, at least theoretically, in the same three ways as the corresponding question relating to eudaemonism or happiness. The perfection sought might be that of the indi vidual agent, or of mankind (or at least the community) as a whole, or of people other than the agent himself. We should thus get egoistic, universalistic and altruistic perfectionism cor responding to the three forms of eudaemonism. But the uni versalistic form is the only one worth serious consideration. Even in the case of eudaemonism it may be urged that the uni versalistic form is the only tenable one, inasmuch as ideal happi ness on the part of any individual is inconceivable in a milieu of unhappiness. But the contention is much stronger in relation to perfectionism. An individual may grow towards perfection in virtue of his struggle against imperfection and evil. But it is more than doubtful whether the attainment, the realization of perfection, is conceivable except in a perfect society. That is why the upholders of perfectionism sometimes postulate, as the metaphysical basis of their moral philosophy, the existence of a society of spirits as an essential part of the cosmic order. Ac tually, it is true, one may meet with a supreme egoist, such as Goethe is alleged to have been, who is so absorbed in his own development as to "pass by" all else. It is also not unusual to find very imperfect people trying to exercise a "moral influence" on others without attempting to heal themselves. Ethically, how ever, such cases are of little or no significance.

Perfectionism and Eudaemonism are not entirely opposed to each other. In fact, they have certain features in common. In the first place, perfectionism may be said to embrace eudaemonism to some extent inasmuch as perfectionists usually maintain, and, from a psychological point of view, rightly maintain, that what ever contributes to human perfection is generally also conducive to human happiness, while that which retards human development also brings unhappiness. Again, eudaemonism and perfectionism tend to estimate moral conduct by its results. According to eudaemonism, conduct is good or right if it promotes happiness; it is bad or wrong if it leads to unhappiness. According to per fectionism, conduct is good or right if it promotes the develop ment of human potentialities ; it is bad or wrong if it hinders it. Apart from such results, it would appear that human conduct as such could not be described as good or bad, as right or wrong. Lastly, the highest good, which, of course, is also the standard of conduct, as conceived by both eudaemonists and perfectionists, is such that it would be pursued quite spontaneously without the sense of "obligation" or "duty" frequently associated with right conduct. Hence the tendency of both eudaemonist and perfec tionist ethics to become mainly descriptive. In the case of eu daemonist ethics this tendency is seen clearly in so-called psy chological hedonism, which takes its stand on the alleged fact that men actually do pursue pleasure as the ultimate good. In the case of perfectionist ethics this same tendency is clearly observ able in the ethics of Spinoza, which aimed "neither to revile nor to deride but to understand" human conduct. One consequence of this is what may be described as the predominantly intellectual character of eudaemonist and even more so of perfectionist ethics.

Duty As the Highest Good.

In contrast with both eu daemonism and perfectionism, which make the moral worth of conduct depend on its results, an attempt has been made, notably by Kant, to associate moral value with the immediate springs of conduct. This attempt is inspired to a great extent by what may be crudely described as a sense of constraint that is frequently associated with moral behaviour, and which is regarded by up holders of this view as of the very essence of right conduct. Right or good conduct, in other words, must be judged by the sense of duty which prompts it, not by the consequences which result from it. There is, according to this view, a "categorical imperative," an unconditional law of duty, which demands obedi ence, whatever the consequences may be, and implicit obedience to this categorical imperative is the highest and only ultimate good. "Nothing in the world," says Kant, "is good except the good will." In order to make his theory plausible, and save it from the chaos of the Babel of voices in which the categorical imperative finds utterance in different cases (when it finds utter ance at all), Kant had to postulate a metaphysical moral order, on the one hand, and to empty the categorical imperative of all definite content, on the other hand. All that the categorical im perative bids us, according to Kant, is this : "act only on that principle which thou canst at the same time will to become a universal law." Apparently the essence of evil consists in treat ing one's own case as exceptional. Nomism (as this theory might be called) savours perhaps too much of the Prussian drill sergeant's love of the uniform and of obedience to be greatly in favour with an age that has a touching faith in freedom and de mocracy. Moreover, there are certain psychological considerations which seem to shake the very basis of the nomistic theory of duty for duty's sake. There are some people who have never heard the categorical imperative even in the modest form of a still, small voice. Some of those who have heard it are prone to identify it with a familiar and usual form of constraint that heredity, education and social environment are apt to make habitual in most mortals. Lastly, sentiment itself has a way of powerfully prompting various kinds of action in relation to its objects; and most people, probably all, for one reason or another, or even for no reason at all, possess, or are possessed by, senti ments for various objects, whose impelling promptings may easily be mistaken for the commands of the categorical im perative. Of course, there is a stage in the education of every body when discipline and the inculcation of a sense of duty may be not only valuable but necessary. In moral philosophy, how ever, as distinguished from moral pedagogy, one is concerned with the mature, reflective person ; and the moral ideal is that of a race of people who are so mastered by high ideals that they do their duty and know it not, rather than of a race of well drilled creatures of habit.