THE MOTIVE OF MORAL CONDUCT The problem of the sanction of morality is intimately connected with that of the motive of moral conduct ; in fact they are two aspects of one theme. Sanctions are chiefly of practical impor tance in so far as they furnish motives. The natural inclinations of man are not, as a rule, strictly moral. Hence the sense of con straint, of external pressure, so frequently associated with the performance of duty. The question thus arises inevitably as to how man comes to conform to moral dictates in spite of his natural inclinations. This is the problem of motives, meaning by motives whatever induces one to adopt a certain course of action. The answers to this problem are various, and are intimately con nected with differences in the views adopted in relation to some of the other ethical problems already considered. Egoistic eu daemonists naturally incline to say that the chief motives of moral conduct are the hope of obtaining some happiness and the fear of pain or misery. And to some extent this view is really im plicit also in all ethical theories that formulate external sanctions of morality. The religious sanction is apt to build upon the per sonal hope of heaven and the personal fear of hell ; though there is such a thing as a love of God that is entirely free from such considerations. The political sanction may easily be identified with the fear of the police and punishment on the one hand, and the hope of political advancement on the other. Similarly, the social sanction may of ten assume the form of a fear of social ostracism of one kind or another, and the hope of finding favour with one's fellows who may advance one's ambitions. Of course, this need not be so ; no doubt there are some who love their country or their community without any ulterior considerations. From the point of view of utilitarianism the political and social sanctions may provide the bases of quite satisfactory moral motives. Similarly, with universalistic perfectionism.
It is quite different with nomism, the theory of duty for duty's sake. In its rigorous form it approves no motive except that of respect for the moral law. Personal fear and hope it would con demn as selfish motives; and actions prompted by political or social motives it would characterize as "legal" but not as moral. This severe attitude of Kant was ridiculed by the poet, Schiller, who was otherwise a devoted admirer of the philosophy of Kant. And, most remarkable of all, Kant himself could not escape en tirely the natural desire of man for happiness, on which he actually based the postulates of the existence of God and of the immortality of man, so that those who do their duty for duty's sake may yet reap their reward, at least hereafter in a better world.
Note.—The preceding account of ethics only gives a sketch of the main ethical problems and their solutions. The article, ETHICS, HISTORY OF, gives the historical setting of the problems and their solutions, and discusses them more fully. The adequate study of these problems, however, requires also some insight into the whole philosophical system of each moral philosopher, such as will be found in the articles under the names of the leading moral philosophers.
Wilson and Fowler, Principles of Morals (i886) ; J. Dewey, Outlines of Ethics (1891) ; J. H. Muirhead, Elements of Ethics (1892, etc.) ; W. Wundt, Ethics (1897) ; F. Paulsen, System of Ethics (1899) ; J. S. Mackenzie, Manual of Ethics (1924) ; and H. Rashdall, Theory of Good and Evil (2nd ed., 1924). Other Books: T. H. Green, Prolegomena to Ethics (1882, etc.) ; L. Stephen, Science of Ethics (1882) ; W. R. Sorley, Ethics of Naturalism (1885) ; S. Alexander, Moral Order and Progress (1889) ; H. Sidgwick, Method of Ethics (189o, etc.) , and Ethics of Green, Spencer, Martineau (1902) ; J. Martineau, Types of Ethical Theory (1891) ; A. E. Taylor, Problems of Conduct (19o1) ; J. Seth, A Study of Ethical Principles (1902) ; G. E. Moore, Principia Ethica (19o3) ; and F. H. Bradley, Ethical Studies (2nd ed., 1927). See also ETHICS, HISTORY OF, and the bibliography given there. (A. Wo.)