These virtual increases in the protective power of the rates in force are not evident in the statistics of average ad valorem rates, because the higher rates in many cases were sufficient to exclude relatively more of the foreign products to which they The imports came, by a process of selection, to consist more largely of goods subject to lower rates. So the year 1868 showed the highest aver age rate on dutiable goods (48.6 per cent) of any year after the act of 1828 until that of 1890, and the rate fell somewhat each year until in the fiscal year 1872 it was 41.3 per cent.
7 Internal revenue receipts in 1868 had been $309,000,000; in 1872 they had fallen to $131,000,000, yet the government's surplus for the tea and coffee, were then transferred to the free list, as were also raw hides and paper stock and some other articles ; the rate on salt was reduced one half and that on coal almost as much. Many other specific rates were reduced and the ad valorem rates on a long list of articles were cut to "90 per cent of existing rates." The effects of these reductions were mingled with those of the severe financial panic occur ring in 1873 and of the depression following, which reduced especially the importation of luxuries bearing the higher rates. The average rate of the three (fiscal) years 1873 to 1871 was 39 per cent on dutiable (a fall of 9) and 28 on free and dutiable (a fall of 16). The ratio of imports enter ing free, which in 1872 was still only about 1 in 14, became the next year 1 in 4. But government revenues falling short in 1874, advantage was soon taken of the circumstances to repeal in 1875 with little discussion the horizontal cut of tariff rates made in 1872. The specific rates that had been reduced in 1872 were little changed, however. From 1876 to 1883 (8 fiscal years) nearly a third of the imports con sisted of goods on the free list. The average rate on dutiable was over 43 per cent, and on free and dutiable 30 per cent.
The tariff was a leading issue in the campaigns of 1876 and 1880. In 1876 the Democratic party's platform contained a plank for "a tariff for revenue only." It was a time of great industrial depression, and, as is usual in such cases, a large number of electors held the party in power responsible for business adversity (as in turn they credit it with any more or less fortuitous prosperity). The Republican candidate
Hayes, after a long contest in Congress, was declared elected by a margin of one electoral vote. His opponent, Tilden, had received a quarter of a million more votes in the country as a whole. In 1889, when business prosperity was rapidly three years 1870-1872 was little less than $100,000,000 a year. This was almost half of the total receipts from customs, which were $216,000.000.
returning, the party in power was successful by a goodly margin of votes in the electoral college, though having a bare plurality of the popular vote. Garfield, the Republican candidate, was known as one of the more moderate protec tionists, and his opponent, General Hancock, who was with out any political record, declared the tariff to be a "local issue," to be determined in the Congressional districts. The tariff issue was thus not very sharply drawn. The tragic death of President Garfield left no clear leadership. The tariff question from 1876 to 1884 was politically in the dol drums.
Yet there was undoubtedly a somewhat growing popular de mand for some moderation of the very high duties. To this demand the friends of protection who were in power felt compelled to concede something—or to appear to do so. Congress appointed a Tariff Commission of which the chair man was secretary of the wool manufacturers' association, and after a report the tariff act of 1883 was passed. The net results were almost nil. Some rates were lowered, while others were raised with a definite protectionist purpose. The average rates for the next seven years, 1884-1890, were 45 on dutiable (an increase of nearly 2 per cent) and 30 on free and dutiable (unchanged as compared with the period end ing 1883). In 1884 the Democratic party elected its presi dential condidate (Cleveland) and a majority of the House, but as it did not control the Senate it could not pass any of the various proposed measures for a "reform" of the tariff. In 1888 the protective principle was a leading issue in the campaign. Although Cleveland received a few ten thousands larger popular plurality than he had obtained four years be fore, and held the electoral votes of eighteen of the states, he lost New York and Indiana by very narrow margins, a result in which other issues played a large part. Harrison was elected, and the party favoring a high protective tariff came into power.