LESSONS TO BE LEARNED FROM EMERGENCY RELIEF IN DISASTERS The story of emergency relief work succeeding the great disasters at Chicago and Johnstown, the three minor but serious disasters coming in quick succession upon a single city, the hard times of 1893-1894, as seen in two cities with somewhat contrasting conditions, of the successful handling of the situation after the Baltimore fire with a relief fund of moderate size, and the expenditure of what may be felt to be an unnecessarily large sum for the benefit of the survivors of the General Slocum disaster, have been told in detail because they are typical, and together present many varied aspects of the problem of emergency relief. It will not be necessary to extend this study to the numer ous disasters that have befallen other communities. Forest fires, as in Minnesota and other states ; inundations from the sea, as at Galveston and elsewhere ; earthquakes, as at Charleston ; cyclones, as at St. Louis ; lowland floods, as along the Ohio and the Mississippi, the Kansas and the Mis souri ; droughts, and consequent failure of crops in limited areas in the West, and the various industrial crises through which the country has passed, present a greater variety in causes of disasters and in their attending circumstances, than in the relief problem, the character of which is suffi ciently set forth by the examples which we have already studied.
The first lesson which is written large in the experience of those who have been called upon to deal with such disasters is the folly and wastefulness of relying upon inexperienced, untrained, or incompetent agents for the distribution of relief and for the constructive work with out which relief distribution may easily be productive of more harm than good. There are always at such times 457 novel problems to be solved, but the experience of other communities under similar or analogous conditions will aid in their solution if it can be brought to bear. It may be, as at Chicago after the great fire, that the problem is primarily one of relief pending the resumption of trade and industry. It may be, as at Johnstown and at Hepp
that the problem of sanitation and public safety is equally important; or, as at Martinique, that the destruc tion of life is so complete that little relief is required except for the transportation of the few survivors for whom no means of livelihood remain. It may be that, as in Paterson after the fire and flood of March, 1902, and the tornado of 1903, and as in Baltimore after the devas tating fire of 1904, the community as a whole remains self-supporting, even though one portion is severely taxed to supply the necessities of other portions that have espe cially suffered, and that as a consequence no outside relief is needed ; or, on the other hand, as at Galveston after the inundation in September, 1900, and at Kansas City in 1903, that all classes have been so universally stricken that outside relief is imperative ; it may be, as at East St. Louis after the inundations of May and June, 1903, that relief is provided in sufficient quantity from towns and cities in the immediate vicinity, although not in sufficient amount from the stricken town or city itself; it may be, as in Indianapolis, that there is a comparatively homogeneous and intelligent working population deprived of employment through a temporary paralysis of commerce and industry, and that, as in New York City, widespread unemploy ment is accompanied by unusual opportunities to perform public work which the local authorities are neglecting ; or it may be, as in the case of the General Slocum disaster, that a very liberal relief fund is immediately subscribed and the chief problem of the committee responsible for its disbursement becomes one of applying the fund in such a way as to do as little injury as possible to families that have heretofore been independent, and in an exceptional degree, self-reliant.