inheritance or in other ways independent of the individ ual services of the recipient, there is no denying; but the comparison will yield as much reason for accepting as for rejecting the principle recommended. One family which has furnished to the republic a remarkable number of dis tinguished citizens has seen in the same and immediately following generation one after another of its most promising young men utterly ruined from having received liberal sums of money by legacy or bequest. At the other end of the social scale, an instance has come to the writer's attention of a woman of middle age who had supported herself as a domestic until she received an unexpected legacy of a few hundred dollars, as the result of which she immediately became an inmate of the alcoholic ward, and on her discharge found that her capacity for self-support had vanished. No statistics of the effect of legacies on rich and poor are available, and it is doubtless true that they may be of benefit as well as of injury. In other words, those to whom is presented the choice between a life of comparative idleness and a continuance of those habits of industry which have previously been acquired, may resist the temptation to choose wrongly. Since, however, char itable resources have not been shown to be greater than are required for real needs, the community is clearly jus tified in refusing to present this choice, either through public or through private beneficence.
It is equally true that those who find themselves unable to maintain the standard of living which is accepted by the community as normal should have assistance, and that such assistance should always, if possible, be of a kind that will eventually remove the disability. The best occupa tion for a sick person, says a shrewd and sensible physician, is to get well. The best occupation for any family whose income is below the minimum which permits a normal standard of living is to raise it, and one of the wisest occupations for their neighbors, from either a selfish or an altruistic point of view, is to encourage this process.' The third deduction to be made from the recognition of the standard of living is that there is such a thing as a I In this connection one may profitably study the cases of Friedrich, Sheehan, Caspar, Sidney, Bowles, and many others described in Part II.
criminal failure, justifying correctional, disciplinary, and protective measures. The man who, from an appetite for strong drink or from the survival of migratory instincts, or from any other unsocial and antisocial motives and im pulses, fails to provide for his own support and that of others who are naturally dependent upon him, may require segre gation or punishment before relief methods are applicable. The faults of the head of a family should not become a reason for refusing relief to its other members, but his faults may require attention before relief is advisable. Such punishment or segregation may not always be prac ticable. The one who is responsible for the neglect, mal treatment, or desertion of the family may have escaped beyond the jurisdiction of the state, or it may be that there is an absence of legal evidence, even when the facts are notorious. These practical difficulties, however, point to modification in the penal code or in the practice of the courts, and in no way affect the governing The fourth and final consideration to which attention may be called is the necessity for an accurate knowledge of the facts, the elimination of fraud, an investigation suffi ciently thorough to leave no doubt whatever of the amount of income, of the expenditure necessary to maintain the proposed standard of living, of the personal and special resources of the family, and of all other facts essential to a sound judgment as to the extent to which charitable relief is required. Absolute privacy in regard to one's
personal and domestic affairs is inconsistent with a sound policy of relief. Publicity, however, in regard to such affairs, such as is sometimes given by the sensational public press, or by irresponsible almoners, who undertake to col lect funds, is entirely unnecessary. The requisite knowl edge of the circumstances need not be shared by many, but the few upon whom the responsibility rests should have full and reliable information.
1 Ample demonstration of the necessity for discipline and reformation will be found in illustrative cases set forth in the present volume. Atten tion may be asked especially to the cases of Dolan, p. 224, Campbell, p. 208, Bonner, p. 227, and Jones, p. 227. In some instances recourse is necessary to the criminal law, but in others, notwithstanding grave moral short comings, a complete reformation and improvement have been brought about entirely by personal influence.
If these four conditions are observed : I. discrimina tion based upon full knowledge; IL disciplinary treatment of those who are criminally responsible for dependence ; III. relief with intelligent oversight for those who cannot maintain a normal standard of living; IV. the refusal of all charitable support to those who can — there may be practically unlimited increase in the funds available for relief, without either danger of pauperization or danger of exceeding the need.
When the actual earning capacity of the family is below the point of physical or moral well-being, the deficiency may ordinarily be made up by outside aid. Whenever possible, assistance should be of such a kind as to increase the earning capacity and so make further aid unnecessary. When the deficiency is, however, inevitable and perma nent, the aid must be likewise permanent. This is the fundamental and comprehensive principle of relief. It is subject to certain limitations, to which attention will be called in due time ; but the principle itself should not be lost in the consideration of exceptions and limitations. The principle that relief may properly be supplied to make good a temporary or permanent deficiency in the wage earning capacity of the family, is not to be confused with the practice of the old English poor law in providing relief in aid of wages. We are not to supply relief in order that employers may get the benefit of underpaid labor ; we are not to encourage, directly or indirectly, the payment of wages below the normal and self-sup porting standard, in the expectation that a part of the income of wage-earners will be supplied from charitable sources. Charitable relief is not an efficient lever with which to raise the standard of living among those who have normal wage-earning capacity ; it is only when from some definite reason the family is below the level of normal wage-earning power, that relief is justified. Relief is not a substitute for wages in whole or in part, but is a substitute for income necessary for the supply of the necessities and the ordinary comforts of life, when such income cannot be earned.