Battle of Zama

ZAMA, BATTLE OF, 202 B.C. One of the most decisive battles in military history in its military result, Zama ranks above any, save perhaps Waterloo, for its decisive effect on the course of world history. For the defeat of Hannibal, the first and only true defeat in his career, left Carthage naked, and her surrender put an end to the long struggle between Rome and Carthage (see PUNIC WARS) for the mastery of the Mediterranean World.

The prologue to Zama had been the invasion of Africa by Scipio (q.v.), almost in defiance of the Roman senate which wished him instead to attack Hannibal, who still stood unconquer able in Southern Italy. In Africa Scipio's brilliant series of vic tories over less formidable generals had forced Carthage to sue for peace before Hannibal could answer the summons of recall. But while the peace negotiations were being conducted in Rome, Hannibal landed at Leptis, whereupon the Carthaginians broke the truce, and Scipio's military position was gravely compromised— isolated on hostile soil and with part of his force detached to assist his ally Masinissa in securing his new kingdom of Numidia. Instead of awaiting Hannibal near Carthage, Scipio cut himself off from his base and marched on a divergent path into the interior. Security lies often in calculated audacity, and an analysis of the military problems makes it highly probable that his march inland up the Bagradas valley was aimed, by its menace to the rich in terior on which Carthage depended for supplies, to force Hannibal to push west to meet him instead of north to Carthage. By this clever move he threatened the economic base of Carthage and protected his own, also luring Hannibal away from his military base—Carthage. A complementary purpose was that this line of movement brought him progressively nearer to Numidia, shorten ing the distance which Masinissa would have to traverse with his expected reinforcement of strength.

It had the intended effect, for the Carthaginians sent urgent appeals to Hannibal to advance towards Scipio and bring him to battle, and within a few days he marched west, and arrived by forced marches at Zama. He then sent out scouts to discover the Roman camp and its dispositions for defence—it lay some miles farther west. Almost coincidently Masinissa arrived with 6,000

horse and 4,00o foot, and Scipio then broke up his camp and moved to a fresh site near the town of Narragara, his position being well chosen tactically, and having water "within a javelin's throw." Hannibal also moved his camp forward to meet him. A parley between the two commanders led to no result, and both thereupon prepared to decide the issue by arms. The dispo sitions made by the rival leaders have several features of note. Scipio placed his heavy Roman foot—he had probably two legions —in the centre ; Laelius with the Italian cavalry on the left wing; and on the right wing Masinissa with the whole of the Numidians, horse and foot. The heavy infantry were drawn up in the normal three lines : first, the liastati; then the principes; and finally, the triarii. But instead of adopting the usual chequer formation, with the maniples of the second line opposite to and covering the inter vals between the maniples of the first line, he ranged the maniples forming the rear lines directly behind the respective maniples of the first line—thus forming wide lanes between each two cohorts. The Carthaginian had eighty elephants, more than in any pre vious battle, and in order to terrify the enemy he placed them in front of his line. Supporting them, in the first line, were the Ligurian and Gallic mercenaries, intermixed with Balearic and Moorish light troops. In the second line were the Carthaginian and African levies, their combined strength probably exceeding that of the first line. Finally, Hannibal's own troops from Italy formed the third line, held back more than 200 yards distant from the others, in order evidently to keep it as an intact reserve. On the wings Hannibal disposed his cavalry, the Numidian allies on the left and the Carthaginian horse on the right. His total force was probably in excess of 50,00o, perhaps 55,00o. The Roman strength is less certain, but if we assume that each of Scipio's two legions was duplicated by an equal body of Italian allies, and add Masin issa's 10,000, the complete strength would be about 36,000.