Battles of 1917 Ypres

YPRES, BATTLES OF 1917. Almost continuous fighting took place in the Ypres-Yser region during many weeks in the summer and autumn of 1917, but the operations as a whole may be said to have consisted of two distinct phases. First came the brilliantly successful combat, lasting a few hours, which has come to be known as the battle of Messines. Then, after a lull, there came to be launched immediately north of the scene of the Mes sines victory a series of attacks at short intervals which lasted four months. This was not a battle, but rather a campaign, with the fighting more defined than the purpose—of the nature familiar in the military annals of Flanders and the Low Countries generally. Like its German forerunners of 1914 and 1915, it achieved little except loss—in which, again, it repeated the earlier history of this theatre of war. So fruitless in its results, so depressing in its direction was this 1917 offensive, that "Passchendaele" has come to be, like Walcheren a century before, a name of ill-omen and a synonym for military barrenness.

An offensive in this sector had formed part of Haig's original contribution to the Allied plan for 1917. Its actual inauguration had been postponed by the unfortunate turn of events elsewhere. When the ill-success of the opening offensive in the spring at Arras (q.v.) and in Champagne (q.v.) was followed by the threat ened collapse of the French army as a fighting force, Haig's "first aid" treatment was to allow the British offensive at Arras by the III. Army to continue for some weeks longer, with the general object of keeping the Germans occupied, and with the local object of reaching a good defensive line. When successive thrusts, against an enemy now fully warned and strengthened, failed to reach this line, Haig decided to transfer the main weight of this effort northward to Flanders, as he had originally intended. His loyalty to his Allies and his acute sense of the common interest, inspired him to press on with an offensive policy.

It is right to emphasise that in May Haig's opinion of the policy to pursue was reinforced by the Prime Minister, Lloyd George, who, having committed himself to the Nivelle gamble for victory, was equally ardent to continue the offensive. It is true, however, that on cooler reflection he subsequently tried in vain to check the policy which he had countenanced.

British Objectives.

The aim was the occupation of the whole of the belt of high ground which extends from a point about three miles north of Armentieres, to near Dixmude. It rises some oo to 150 ft. above the great Flanders plain, and reaches a height of over 200 ft. at some points. In the spring of 1917 its southern portion enclosed to a great extent the Ypres salient, although the Allies' trenches gave them possession of the lower slopes of their side of the high ground. Farther to the north the enemy held the whole of the high ground. The general plan of operations was to begin at the southern end and to work thence northwards. The capture of the high ground was to be followed by an advance in the coast district. But the axis of the attack diverged from, instead of converging on, the German main communications, so that an advance could not vitally endanger the security of the enemy's position in France.

But, worse still, the Ypres offensive was doomed before it began—by its own destruction of the intricate drainage system in this part of Flanders. The High Command had persevered for over two years with the method of a prolonged preparatory bombardment, believing that quantity of shells was the key to success. The offensive at Ypres, which was finally submerged in the swamps of Passchendaele in October, threw into stronger relief than ever before the fact that such a bombardment blocked the advance for which it was intended to pave the way—because it made the ground impassable.