During the latter period of his life, Dr Beattie ex perienced a new train of domestic calamities, which, added to the unfortunate situation of Mrs Beattie, Beattie. gradually undermined his health, and impaired his intellectual powers. The first and severest of these trials was the loss of his eldest son, James Hay Beat tie, who died in 1790; in whose society he had found one of his greatest enjoyments, and who had already been associated with him in the Professorship of Moral Philosophy, at the early age of ig.* Some years after, his only remaining son, Montague Beat tie, likewise died, after a short illness. This event he intimated to one of his friends, by a letter written on the same day, in the terms of calm and unaffect ed resignation. But his mind had been violently shaken, even before this blow ; and, when he look ed on the dead body of his son for the last time, he gave way to the scene, and exclaimed, " Now I have done with this world." Its first effect was the loss of memory respecting his deceased son. Yet it was found, that, by the mention of what the latter had suffered during his sickness, his recol lection could usually be recalled. He continued to discharge his duty as Professor; but, notwith standing some returns of a more vigorous intellect and fancy, he did not from this time resume his studies, and seldom answered the letters which he received. He was attacked with palsy in 1799, and afterwards sustained repeated shocks, the last in 1802. He lingered till the 18th of August 1803, when be expired at the age of 68. A particu lar Account of his Life and Writings, by Sir Wil liam Forbes of Pitsligo, who had long been his friend and confident, was published in 1806, in which are to be found some interesting selections from his private correspondence.
The character of Dr Beattie is delineated in his writings; of which the most prominent features are purity of sentiment, and warm attachment to the principles of religion and morality. His disposi tions were gentle and modest, and he possessed great tenderness of heart. He was laborious in his lite rary pursuits, vet fond at all times of conversation and society. towards the latter period of his life he was subject to an irritability of nerves, by which his temper was sensibly affected ; and ihmigh, to appearance, his bodily frame was robust, he had im paired his strength by excess in study. He pos sessed considerable talents both for music and draw ing.
His abilities as a writer may be said to have al ready undergone that ultimate test which is to be found in public opinion; and it has ranked him high as a moralist, a critic, and a poet. His Essay on Truth became a very popular book, particularly in England, and has gone through many editions. It must be confessed, that this work is not without con • siderable faults as a philosophical composition. Its leading doctrine has been thus stated by himself: "As we know nothing of the eternal relations of things, that to us is, and must be truth, which we feel that we must believe; and that to us is falsehood which we feel that we must disbelieve. I have shown that all genuine reasoning does ultimately terminate in cer tain principles which it is impossible to disbelieve, and as impossible to prove ; that, therefore, the ul timate standard of truth to us is common sense, or that instinctive conviction into which all true reason ing does resolve itself." It is now generally admitted that, in the illustration of this doctrine, which is con formable In substance to that of Reid, Dr Beattie has fallen into some errors, or at least ambiguities, which the former has been enabled in a greater degree to avoid. What constitutes the chief defect of the
Essay is a want of that strictness and precision, which a discussion of the metaphysical parts of the subject necessarily requires. He has used the term common sense with more latitude, and in a greater variety of significations, than is consistent with ex act or conclusive reasoning ; and he has stated some propositions too generally, and without the limita tions which they seem to require. Notwithstanding this imperfection of the work, when considered strict ly as a logical treatise, it is certain that many of the fundamental doctrines delivered in it carry with them an irresistible weight, which subsequent in quiry and discussion have tended, not to diminish, but increase. It may justly be considered as an ex ample, in probable reasoning, of that indirect but conclusive mode of proof, which, in mathematical science, is usually termed reductio ad absurdum ; a form which has been frequently and successfully em. ployed by Dr Reid, for similar purposes. A refer ence to the sources of knowledge possessed by man kind in general, and to their common or universal sentiments, is an appeal regarding certain acknow ledged facts, as an ingredient and groundwork of science. Nor is it to be supposed that, in these cases, philosophy surenders her judgment to the po pular opinion ; but only, that the conclusions of the soundest and the most improved reason are conforms. ble to the dictates of our faculties, as they are exercis ed by the majorityof mankind. The materials of know ledge possessed by the philosopher and the vulgar are the same ; it is in the extent of the inferences which are drawn from them, in their combination, and in the uses to which they are applied, that the disproportion is to be found. In their reasoning on mixed subjects, and in the power of remote calcula tion, men differ infinitely; in their •immediate judg ments they differ very little.
It is undeniable also, with respect to the style of this work, that Dr Beattie has fallen into an error, by using, on various occasions, a greater keenness of expression than is at all suited to the argumenta tive parts of his subject. An author may, indeed, be moved by a commendable feeling of indignation, to commence the task of writing, whatever be the subject of discussion. But he who attempts to con duct a train of reasoning, while under the immedi ate influence even of ajust passion, engages in too difficult a matter, and foregoes. many advantages. The truth is, that the metaphysical speculations of 170 B E A BraitiP. Berkeley and Hume bad proceeded se far- in con tradicting the ordinary apprehensions and feelings of mankind, as to prove, in the clearest manner, eves to men of science, .the impossibility of obtaining certain kaowledge, by any exercise of the hu man intellect, altogether abstracted from the in formation of matter, and the employment of our ether. faculties ; and those consequences with regard to and the social state, which ap peared to flow as a necessary result from the spe culative principles, particularly of Mr Hume, roused in- a large class, both of the learned and_ unlearned, a. sense of repugnance and opposition proportionally strong. Dr Beattie was among the first who endea .