These, we confess, are rather explanations of the word than definitions of the thing it signifies ; and can be of no value, even as explanations of the word, except only to those who understand, without ex planation, all the other words they contain. For, if the curious inquirer should proceed to ask, " And what is the faculty or power of Taste ?" we do not see at present what other answer we could give, than that it was that of which Beauty was the object ; or by which we were enabled to discover and to relish what was Beautiful. It is material, however, to ob serve, that if it could be made out, as some have al . leged, that our perception of Beauty was a simple sen sation, like our perception of colour ; and that Taste was an original and distinct sense, like that of seeing or hearing; this would be truly the only definition that could be given, either of the sense or of its object— and all that we could do in investigating the nature of the latter, would be to digest and enumerate the circumstances under which it was found to pre sent itself to its appropriate organ. All that we can say of colour, if we consider it very strictly, is, that it is that property in objects by which they are re commended to the faculty of sight ; and the faculty of sight can scarcely be defined in any other way than as that by which we are enabled to discover the existence of colour. When we attempt to proceed farther, and say that Green is the colour of grass, and Red of roses or blood, it is plain that we do not in any respect explain the nature of those colours, but only give instances of their occurrence ; and that one who had never seen them could learn nothing whatever from these pretended definitions. Complex ideas, on the other hand, and compound emotions, may be always defined, and explained to a certain extent, by enumerating the parts of which they are made up, or resolving them into the elements of which they are composed :—and we may thus acquire, not only a substantial knowledge of their nature, but a practical power in their regulation or production.
It becomes of importance, therefore, in the very outset of this inquiry, to consider whether our sense of Beauty be really a simple sensation, like some of those we have enumerated, or a compound or deri vative feeling, the sources or elements of which may be investigated and ascertained. If it be the former, we have then only to refer it to the peculiar sense or faculty of which it is the object ; and to determine, by repeated observation, under what circumstances it occurs —But, if it be the lat ter, we have to proceed, by a joint process of Omer, vation and reflection, to ascertain what are the pri mary feelings to which it may be referred ; and by what peculiar modification of them it is and distinguished. We are not quite prepared, as yet, to exhaust the whole of this important discus sion, to .which we shall be obliged to return in the sequel of our inquiry ; but it is necessary, in order to explain and to set forth, in their natural order, the difficulties with which the subject is surrounded, to state here, in a very few words, one or two of the most obvious, and, as we think, decisive objections. against the notion of Beauty being a simple sensation, or the object of a sepatate and peculiar faculty.
3 The first, and perhaps the most considerable, is the want of agreement as to the presence and existence ' of Beauty in particular objects, among men whose organization is perfect, and who are plainly possess ed of the faculty, whatever it may be, by which Beauty is discerned. Now, no such thing happens, we imagine, or can be conceived to happen, in the case of any other simple sensation, or the exercise of any other distinct faculty. Where one man sees light, all men who have eyes, see light also.—All men al low grass to be green—and sugar to be sweet, and ice to be cold,—and the unavoidable inference from any apparent disagreement in such matters necessa rily is, that the party is insane, or entirely destitute of the sense or organ concerned in the perception. With regard to Beauty, however, it is obvious, at first sight, that the case is quite different. One man sees it perpetually, where to another it is quite invisible, —or even where its reverse seems to be conspicuous. Nor is this owing to the insensibility of either of the parties—for the same contrariety exists where both are keenly alive to the influences of the Beauty they respectively discern. A Chinese or African lover would probably see nothing at all attractive in a belle of London or Paris,—and undoubtedly, an elegansfor marum spectator, from either of these cities, would dis cover nothing but deformity in the Venus of the Hot tentots. A little distance in time produces the same effects as distance in place ;—the gardens, the furni ture, the dress, which appeared beautiful in the eyes of our grandfathers, are odious and ridiculous in ours. Nay, the difference of rank, education, or employments, give rise to the same diversity of sen sation. The little shopkeeper sees a Beauty in his roadside box, and in the staring tile roof, wooden lions, and clipped boxwood, which strike horror into the soul of the student of the picturesque,—while
.he is transported in surveying the fragments of an cient sculpture, which are nothing but ugly masses of mouldering stone, in the judgment of the admirer of neatness. It is needless, however, to multiply in stances, since the fact admits of no contradiction. But how can we believe, that Beauty is the object of a peculiar sense or faculty, when persons un doubtedly possessed of the faculty, and even in an eminent degree, can discover nothing of it in objects where it is distinctly felt and perceived by others with the same use of the faculty'? This one consideration, we confess, appears to us conclusive against the supposition of Beauty being a real property of objects, addressing itself, to the power of Taste as a separate sense or faculty,—and seems to point irresistibly to the conclusion, that our sense of it is the result of other more elementa ry feelings, into which it may be analyzed or resolv ed. A second objection, however, if possible of still greater force, is suggested, by considering the pro digious and almost infinite variety of things tn which this property of Beauty is ascribed, and the impos sibility of imagining any one inherent quality which can belong to them all, and yet, at the same time, possess so much unity as to be the peculiar object of a separate sense or faculty. All simple qualities that are perceived in any one object, are immediately recognised to be the same, when they are again per ceived in another ; and the objects in which they are thus perceived, are at once felt so far to resem ble each other, and to partake of the same nature. Thus snow is seen to be white, and chalk is seen to be white ; but this is no sooner seen, than the two sub stances, however unlike in other respects, are felt at once to have this quality in common, and to resemble each other in all that relates to the quality of colour, and the sense of seeing. Now, is this felt, or could it even be intelligibly asserted, with regard to the quality of Beauty ? Take even a limited and specific sort of Beauty,—for instance the Beauty of Form. The form of a fine tree is beautiful—and the form of a fine woman,—and the form of a column, and a vase, and a chandelier. Yet how can it be said that the form of a woman has anything in common with that of a tree or a temple ? or to _which of the senses by which forms are distinguished, does it sp. pear they have any resemblance or affinity ? The matter, however, becomes still mere inex tricable when we recollect that Beauty does not be long merely to forms or colours, but to sounds, and perhaps to the objects of other senses ; nay, that in all languages and in all nations, it is not supposed to. reside exclusively in material objects, material to belong also to sentiments and ideas, and intellectual and moral existences. Not only is a tree Beautiful, as well as a palace or a waterfall ; but a poem is Beau tiful, and a theorem in mathematics, and a contrivance in mechanics. But if things intellectual and totally segregated from matter may thus possess Beauty, how can it possibly be a quality of material objects ? Or what sense or faculty can that be, whose proper office it is to intimate to us the existence of some property which is common to a flower and a demonstration, a valley and an eloquent discourse The only answer which occurs to this, is plainly enough a bad one; but the statement of it, and elite insufficiency, will serve better, perhaps, than anything else, to develope the actual difficulties of the subject, and the true state of the question with regard to them. it may be said, then, in answer to the questions we have suggested above, that all these objects, however various and dissimilar, agree at least in being Agree able, and that this Agreeableness, which is the only quality they possess' in common, may probably be the Beauty which is ascribed to them all. Now, to those who are accustomed to such discussions, it would be quite enough to reply, that though the Agreeableness of such objects depend plainly enough upon their Beauty, it by no means follows, but quite the contrary, that their Beauty depends upon their Agreeableness ; the latter being the more compre hensive or generic term, under which Beauty must rank as one of the species. Its nature, therefore, is no more explained, nor is less absurdity substantially committed, by saying that things are Beautiful, be cause they are Agreeable, than if we were to give the same explanation of the sweetness of sugar ; for no one, we suppose, will dispute,' that though it be very true that sugar is agreeable because it is sweet, it would be manifestly preposterous to say that it was sweet because. it was agreeable. For the fit, however, of those who wish or require to be mere regularly initiated in these mysteries, we beg leave to add a few observations.