The funds, it is said, of Benefit Societies, are of ten confided to improper hands, and by consequence lost. This, too, is an evil, which, so far from be ing necessary, has a sure tendency to correct itself. People learn by a little experience where their money may be safely lodged. It is, indeed, a lesson which probably they have already learnt. We per ceive it is a rule in most of the London Societies, that whenever the fund exceeds what is necessary for the current expenditure, it is invested in Govern ment securities. Another thing should be observed, that it is a great advantage of Benefit Clubs not to require much in the way of fund. if the calcula tions are correct, the outgoings within an average period will balance the incomings ; and all that is requisite in the way of fund, is a small sum to meet accidental inequalities. When this fund is lost, it is not much that is lost. If a small additional sum is subscribed by each member ; or, instead of this, if the allowances are for a short time suspended, or only reduced, the society is placed in its former situation. The case is wofully different with a bank. There, if the funds are lost, the whole is lost.
2. thus stands the comparison between Savings Banks and Benefit Societies, in regard to the mem bers or contributors. How stands it in regard to the community as a whole ? In the first place, it is evident, that the classes, of whom such members and contributors are composed, being the whole population, with the deduction of a number comparatively small, it is not easy for any thing which is good for them, one by one, not to be good for the whole conjointly.
Further, if Benefit Societies afford, as appears to be ascertained, a better security for the maintenance of the people, free from public aid, than Savings Banks, the public is benefited to the amount of all the support which otherwise it would have been ob liged to afford.
If the moral and intellectual qualities of the peo ple are more favoured by the societies than the banks, the public is benefited in respect to a cause of good, the effects of which are incalculable.
Thus far on the side of good. On the side of evil, a great fear has been expressed, that out of any joint proceedings of the people would arise mischief to the government; The operation of fears of this description has been one grand cause of the evils which human beings have brought upon one another. It is a circumstance full of suspicion, when govern ments count upon the hatred of their people. It seldom happens, and seldom can happen, unless when they know well that the people have reason to hate them. it is not natural for the people to hate their government, unless oppressed by it. The people, in. stead of being disposed to hate a good government, are far too much disposed to be pleased with a bad. one ; as the history of the whole earth so abundantly and wofully testifies. If a government takes care of the interests of the people, and gives them in. struction sufficient to know their own interests, that is to say, takes no measures to prevent their instruc tion (for that, in such a state of society as ours, in cludes all that is necessary), it will have nothing to fear from the little societies which the people may form, to insure one another against some of the ca lamities to which they are most commonly exposed.
Besides, if ever the people are stimulated to combine against the government, they will find better me diums of combination than the Benefit Societies, which appear to have an unnecessary and improper jealousy of one another.
A fear has been also expressed, that Benefit So cieties may be rendered subservient to conspiracies for the raising of wages. Upon this it may be suf ficient to observe, that many instances of what the workmen call striking for wages have taken place, since Benefit Clubs were frequent; in these instances, other means of combination have always been found; and Benefit Clubs are by their nature ill adapted to the purpose.
For a long time, the unhappy state of the English' law rendered the Benefit Societies a mere object of prey. Any person whatsoever, who found it agree-1 able to cheat them, might do so with perfect impu nity. They had no means of' redress. This was ovriug to one of the fopperies or quaint conceits of the English law, bred in times of ignorance and im.
posture, and hugged with ecstasy by the lawyers, in spite of the wisdom of an enlightened age. In con sequence of the conceit to which we allude, no as , semblage of men could be regarded as one body, or entitled to sue for property possessed in common, unless they had certain ceremonies performed- in re gard to them,—ceremonies exquisitely useless; after the performance of which, the lawyers would give them a nickname (that of a corporation), and would then permit them to sue as one party, for any cause of action common to them all. The ceremonies, the performance of which gave an assemblage of persons this potent name, depending upon the will of great men, were not easy to be got ; nor was the getting • of them without an expence fatal to such institutions as Benefit Clubs. " They remained, therefore, de prived of the benefit of law till the year 1793, when an act was passed which had two objects in view. One was to take securities against certain dangers at that time intensely associated with the idea of any thing called an assemblage of the people. Another was, to give to Benefit Societies, though without the name corporation, which performs legerdemain if not magic, in the kingdom of the lawyers, something. of the protection of law. The treasurers and trus tees, as vested with the property of the society, were enabled to bring or defend any action, suit, or pro secution, relative to the property of the society. But to obtain this advantage, it was rendered incum bent upon the society to make known all its rules to the justices of the peace, and obtain their approba tion.