Applying these principles to a siege or to a block ade, it is evident, that the belligerent who had an ex pensive scheme of hostile operations of either kind in dependence, would be far more seriously injured by its interruption, than the neutral would be benefited by a free intercourse with the blockaded place. On this ground, therefore, a belligerent who has formed a siege or a blockade, has an indisputable right to debar the neutral from all intercourse with those who are included within his lines ; and any attempt to penetrate the blockade for the purposes of-trade, subjects those who attempt it to destruction, and their properties to confiscation. The very exist ence, indeed, of a siege or a blockade, as a lawful act of hbstility, implies the right of enforcing it by an indiscriminate exclusion of all who seek access to the besieged.
But though this view of the nature of a blockade, ' and of the rights attaching to it, is clearly laid down by all writers on the law of nations, and though it has been acknowledged, in practice, by all civilized states, a question has been agitated in the late wars of Europe, between the neutral and the belligerent powers, as to the degree of restraint necessary to constitute a blockade, and, of course, to entitle the blockading party to all the rights consequent upon this scheme of operations ; and it is this dispute which was, in a great measure, the occasion of a general war with the neutral powers.
The unexampled success which attended the na val operations of Great Britain, during her late wars with France, naturally suggested to her rulers the possibility of extending this species of annoyance, and of converting the all-powerful navy which they into an instrument of active hostility. view, in place of confining its efforts to the mere watching of the enemy's already ruined trade, it was resolved to give greater scope to such an immense engine of maritime power, by placing under blockade the enemy's ports,—the mouths of navigable rivers,—and even extensive tracts of his coast. Proclamations to this effect were, accord ingly, issued,—the neutral trader was duly warned off, and prohibited, under the peril of detention, from all intercourse with the interdicted coast. But the legality of these blockades by proclamation being disputed, both by the neutral powers and by the enemy, their execution was resisted by a counter decree, which, on the plea of retaliation, placed un der blockade the whole island of Great Britain, and subjected all neutral vessels to detention and cap ture, which should have been found touching at any of its ports. On the same plea of retaliation, seve ral decrees, or Orders in Council, were issued by Britain, ordaining, that no neutral vessel should have any intercourse with France. and her depend encies, except such vessel should first touch at a British port, where, in some cases, the cargo was to be landed, and was to pay certain duties to the Bri tish government. From this period the maxims of equity, and the rules of internationallaw, were set aside, and the ocean became a scene of proscrip tion and pillage. All this anarchy originating in a disagreement respecting the nature and extent of a blockade or siege, it becomes of importance to settle this important question.
The object of a blockade is to reduce the inhabi tants of the blockaded town to such straits, that they I shall be forced to surrender to the discretion of their enemies in order to preserve their lives ; and the le-, gality of every blockade, except with a view to cap ture, has been questioned. But without entering in to this question, it seems obvious, that, in order to constitute the blockade of a town, either with a view to capture, or to temporary annoyance, the line by which it is surrounded should be so com plete, as entirely to obstruct all access into the place. When a place is blockaded, with a view to capture, the task of maintaining a real blockade may be safely left to the blockading party. But when a port is blockaded, with a view to mere maritime an noyance, the case is widely different ; because, iir these circumstances, the belligerent will equally at tain his end by .maintaining the mere show of a blockade, while he is in possession of all its substan '.tial rights. He may, to save himself expence and trouble, relax the blockade of his enemy's ports, while he enforces the exclusion of all neutrals, he rigorously as if he were maintaining an effectual blockade: and, in this case, his proclamations, while they are issued ostensibly for the blockade of the enemies' ports, would, in reality, amount to edicts for the suppression of the neutral trade. The urgent, immediate and obvious interests of the neutral would here be sacrificed to the remote, and in many cases, imaginary, convenience of the belligerent. The edict might be issued for the blockade of the ene mies ports, or for extensive tracts of his, coast, round which no hostile line can ever be drawn so as to con stitute a real blockade, and the whole trade of the neutral, with those interdicted parts of the enemies territory, must be immediately given up at the arbi trary mandate of one of the belligerents. The neu tral trade,—in place of being carried on as a matter of right,—in place of being regarded as a common bene fit to the civilized world, and on this account to be cherished and encouraged, would, under such a sys tem be looked upon in the light of a tolerated evil, existing only by the sufferance of those who imagin ed they had an interest in obstructing and in crush , ing it. The law of nations is not a partial system, modelled to suit the convenience of one party. It is a system of general equity, and its edicts are founded on a comprehensive view of what is for the - common advantage of all. In this view, then, the consequences to the neutral of those extensive and nominal blockades are sufficient to constitute them illegal. The damage to the neutral is infinitely greater than the benefit to the belligerent. The rights of blockade, and the limitation of those rights, must stand upon the same principle of justice and of public law ; and their extension beyond this equitable principle, must terminate in universal confusion and anarchy.