BREAKWATER IN PLYMOUTH SOUND, iS a work of a similar nature to that of Cherbourg, but constructed on sounder principles, with less machinery, and fewer people. Compared in extent and dimensions with that of Cherbourg, it is only in the ratio of 'about one to four.
There is no port and harbour on the south-west coast of England possessing so many advantages as Plymouth,—none so well situated for assembling and equipping a fleet to watch the movements of the ene my in the harbour of Brest. Its dock-yard may be • considered as the second in the kingdom in point of size, convenience, and effective strength; the margin, of which stretches along the magnificent harbour of Hanioaze, a noble expanse of water, nearly land-lock ed, of a capacity sufficient for mooring safely a hun dred sail of the line in excellent anchoring-ground, and in water that carries its depth to the very quays of the yard. On the opposite or eastern side of the Sound, and at the distaire of about three miles from Hamoaze and the dock-yard, is another sheet of wa ter, called Catwater, not quite so deep, nor so-well sheltered as Hamoaze ; but, since the progress made in the Breakwater, forming a safe and commodious harbour for merchant vessels of ev;ry description. These two harbours open into Plymouth Sound and Cawsand Bay, in which ships employed in the block ade of Brest, or those refitted in Hamoaze, have been accustomed to assemble and • prepare for putting to sea. But the very exposed situation of Plymouth Sound, and the heavy swell that almost constantly rolled in, especially when the wind blew fresh from the south-west to the south-east, made it so inconve nient and so unsafe an anchorage for ships of the line, that, of late years, the fleet employed in block ading Brest, has been in the practice of bearing up, when driven from its station, for the more distant an chorage of Torbay, though little better with regard to security, and worse in every other respect, than Plymouth Sound. It is, for instance, a more ineli gible rendezvous for the western squadron, in the chance of the fleet being caught there by an easter ly wind, and unable to get out, when it is the most favourable wind for the enemy to put to sea ; in the danger to which the ships are liable when so caught at an anchorage, so open and exposed ; in the incon venience, the delay, and the expence of obtaining the necessary supply of stores ancl provisions from the other ports, there being none at Torbay short, this open and exposed bay bore so bad a character among naval officers, that Lord Howe used to say, it would one.day be the grave of the British fleet.
It is, besides, an object of the first importance to the efficiency of every naval arsenal, to have a safe and commodious roadstead in its neighbourhood, like that of Spitbead to the harbour and dock-yard of Portsmouth. Here those ships which may have gone through a course of repair or refitment, or those new from the stocks, may assemble and complete their final equipment for sea; and here, also, ships return ing from sea may safely lie at their anchors till the wind and tide may serve them to $o into harbour. But, in Plymouth Sound, ships coming out of Hamoaze, or ships going into that harbour, had no such secu rity : by the rolling sea that set in, they were exposed to the double danger of parting their cables, or strik ing against the bard and rocky bottom, either of which would be almost certain destruction.
It was most important, therefore, to render Ply mouth Sound, if possible, by any means, and almost at any expence, a safe roadstead for ships ;:of war. To as certain the practicabilitylof this measure, Mr Rennie, the Civil Engineer, and Mr Whidby, the Master At tendant of Woolwich Dock-yard, were sent down by Lord Howick, at the suggestion, we believe, of Lord St Vincent (Earl Grey), in the year 1806, with direc tions to examine and report, whether by any, and what means, a sufficient shelter might be given to in sure a safe anchorage for a fleet of ships of the line. The report was favourable ; and several plans were of fered for sheltering this sound, so as to render it ca pable of containing in safety at their anchors, above 50 sail of the line. Nothing, however, was done or at tempted, notwithstanding all the increased and mighty preparations of the enemy, till Mr Yorke-presided at the Board of Admiralty; when one of his first mea sures was to carry into execution this grand and im portant national object,—the most important that, perhaps, was ever undertaken for the glory and the safety of the British navy. The that took place can only be explained by the frequent changes of the Board of Admiralty, which, we believe, have been fatal to many important measures for the bene fit and advantage of this great bulwark of the nation.