It is only by his writings on the history of Philo. sophy that Brucker is now known in the literature of Europe. In this study, his great work forms an import. ant sera, and even at the present day it is the moat 'extensive and elaborate upon the subject. It is, however, a work of which the defects are great, and its errors have been important in their consequences, in proportion to the authority it has acquired. We shall, therefore, hazard a few general observations on the defects which chiefly detract from the perfec tion and utility of the Critical History of Philo f°IAY• If Brucker had carried into this study a penetra tion equal to his diligence ; and had his general cam prehension of the scope and nature of the subject been correspondent to the elaborate minuteness of his details : be would have left us a work which might have had some pretensions to be considered .as a rational history. of human opinion. He lived, however, at a period when these different qualities were only beginning to be conjoined ; and when as yet the history of Philosophy had been written merely as a chronicle of the .passing theories of in dividuals and sects. To give to the science of his.
•tory a regular and connected form, and to arrange the narrative of successive events, and still more of successive opinions, according to the relation they hear to principles of established influence, was an at tempt of which few in that age had any conception, and of which Brucker certainly had none. In civil history, it was then believed, that the historian had -fulfilled all the duties of his office, if he strung to g ether the events which were known, or believed to have occurred, in good language, and garnished them occasionally by a few general reflections on the ab solute motives of human action. A very different notion is now held of the functions of the historian. He who at present attempts to write the history of any country, must reflect before he begin, what were the chief occurrences in that history, and what were the revolutions which the manners and consti tution of that particular nation hive undergone. He must bear with him, from the commencement to the conclusion of his labours, a constant impression that every occurrence should be more or less considered, not only as it took place, and as it bore an influence on contemporary affairs, but as it may remotely have contributed to the events, and the opinions, end the character of succeeding times. But if this be true in regard to the histories of particular nations, it is evident, that by how much the traces of opinions are more light and evanescent- than those of events,—by how much the speculations of philosophers, whose writings have either perished or come down to us mutilated and obscure; are more difficult to be appre ciated in their causes, and connections, and conse quences, than the actions of warriors and statesmen; by so much the more is it necessary in philosophi cal than in civil history, to combine reasoning with erudition, and to substitute the researches of the philosopher for the details of the chronicler. History and philosophy are two different things ; and he who 11 . would write the history of philosophy must excel in both. Bacon had long ago required this union, •and had pointed out the manner in which the historian of literature should endeavour to establish those principles of connection, which constitute the soul and charm of such a history ; how by detecting the union of effects and causes, he might be enabled to determine the circumstances favourable or adverse to the sciences; and how, in short, by a species of enchantment, he might evoke the literary genius of each different age.• The fulfilment of this plan was,
however, far beyond the capacity of Brucker ; and was an undertaking of which he had even no con ception. Better qualified by nature and education for amassing than arranging materials, he devoted his principal attention to a confused compilation of facts, leaving to others their application, the dis covery of their mutual connections, and the forma tion of the scattered fragments into a whole.
The merit of his great work consists entirely in the ample collection of materials. The•reader who would extract any rational view of the progress of opinion, must peruse it with a perpetual comthenta ry of his own thoughts. He will find no assistance from•his author, in forming any general views, or in tracing the mutual dependencies of the different parts of the subject. Brucker has discovered the fountains of history ; but he has made us drink of them without purifying the draught. Even in this respect, his merit has been greatly overrated. Vast as is the body of materials which he has collect ed, we are always missing those very things which we might reasonably have expected would have been the first objects of a rational inquirer, and are continually disappointed of the information we are most anxious to acquire. The idle and attention which he has bestowed on- previous com pilers, has frequently diverted him from the study of the original" authors themselves. Quoting the pas sages of the ancients from others, or trusting, per haps, to the reference of an index, he has frequently overlooked those very testimonies which could have given us the most authentic knowledge of the opinions or characters of ages and individuals. He has often presented the authorities he has adduced, mutilated or misapplied ; and this either from not having sufficiently studied these passage. in general connection with the system they illustrate, or from having been unable to withdraw them from the obscurity• in which they were involved. He has shown no critical sagacity in distinguishing the spurious from the authentic, or in balancing the comparative weight of his authorities. He has fre quently transcribed, where he ought to have explain ed, the words of the original authors ; and, without taking into account the different value of the same term in different nations and ages, he has left us to apply a doubtful or erroneous meaning to words which might have been easily rendered by other ex pressions, and to suppose a distinction in the sense, where there only existed a difference in the lan guage. The glaring errors, even, which occasionally occur in his expositions of the Grecian philosophy, while they are inconsistent with any critical know ledge of the tongue, would make us suspect that he was in the habit of relying on the treacherous aid of translations. In short, if we kneW nothing more of the'ancient philosophers than what 'we acquire from Brucker, we should be often• obliged to attribute to them opinions, so obscure or so absurd, that we must either believe ourselves wrong in the interpretation; or be unable to comprehend the cause of all the ad miration and reverence they have received.