When philosophy takes all its principles from a few facts, he calls it empirical,—such as was that of Gilbert, and of the chemists.
It should be observed, that Bacon does not charge the physics of antiquity with being absolutely regardless of experiment. No system, indeed, however fantastical, has ever existed, to which that reproach could be applied in its full extent ; because, without some regard to fact, no theory can ever become in the least degree plausible. The fault lies not, therefore, in the absolute rejection of experience, but in the unskilful use of it ; in taking up principles lightly from an inaccurate and careless observation of many things ; or, if the observations have been more accurate, from those made on a few facts, unwar rantably generalized.
Bacon proceeds .to point ont,the circumstances, in the history of the world, which had hitherto favoured these perverse modes of philosophizing. He observes, that the periods during which science had been cultivated were not many, nor of long duration. They might be reduced to three ; the first with the Greeks ; the second with the Romans ; and the third with the western nations, after the revival of letters. In none .of all these periods had much attention been paid to natural philosophy, the great parent of tha sciences.
With the Greeks, the time was very short during which physical science flourished in any degree. The seven Sages, with the exception of 'Males, applied themselves entirely to morals and politics ; and in later times, after Socrates had brought down philosophy from the heavens to the earth, the study of nature was generally abandoned. In the Roman. republic, the knowledge most cultivated, as might be expected among a martial and ambi, tious people, was such as had a direct reference to war and politics.. During the empire, the introduction and establishment of the Christian religion drew the attention of men to theological studies, and the important interests which were then at stake left but a small share of talent and ability to be occupied in inferior pursuits. The corruptions which follow ed, and the vast hierarchy which assumed the command both of the sword and the sceptre, while it occupied and enslaved the minds of men, looked with suspicion on sciences which could not easily be subjected to its control.
At the time, therefore, .when Bacon wrote, it might truly be said, that a small portion.
even of the learned ages, and of the abilities of learned men, had been dedicated to the study of Natural Philosophy. This served, in his opinion, to account for the 'imperfect state in which he found human knowledge in general ; for he thought it certain, that no part of knowledge could attain much excellence without having its foundation laid in phy sical science.
He goes on to observe, that the end and object of knowledge had been very generally mistaken ; that many, instead of seeking through it to improve the condition of human life, by new inventions and new resources, had aimed only at popular applause, and had sa tisfied themselves with the knowledge of words more than of things : while others, who were exceptions to this rule, had gone still farther wrong, by directing their pursuits to objects imaginary and unattainable. The alchemists, for example, alternately the dupes of their own credulity and of their own imposture, had amazed and tormented the world with hopes which were never to be realised. Others, if possible more visionary, had promised to prolong life, to extinguish disease and infirmity, and to give man a command over the world of spirits, by means of mystic incantations. " All this," says he, " is the mere boast ing of ignorance ; for, when the knowledge of nature shall be rightly pursued, it will lead to discoveries that will as far excel the pretended powers of magic, as the real exploits or Cesar and Alexander exceed the fabulous adventures of Arthur of Britain, or Amadis of Gaul." I Again, the reverence for antiquity, and the authority of great names, have contributed. much to retard the progress of science. Indeed, the notion of antiquity which men have taken up seems to be erroneous and inconsistent. It is the duration of the world, or of the human race, as reckoned from the extremity that is past, and not from the point of time which is present, that constitutes the true antiquity to which the advancement of science may be conceived to bear some proportion ; and just as we expect more wisdom and experience in an old than in a young man, we may expect more knowledge of nature from the present than from any of the ages that are past.