It remained now only to expel our troops from Portugal, a task committed to Massena, at the head of a veteran army, which crossed the frontier in Sep tember, and penetrated into the heart of the king dom, but soon received a proof of the firmness of our battalions at Busaco. Superiority of force en abled the French to march forward, but the lesson they had received deterred their general from an at tack on our lines at Torres Vedras ; and Europe saw with surprise month after month passed in inaction by bands hitherto only accustomed to advance and conquer. At last, in the beginning of March (1811), the want of provisions compelled them to retreat to the Spanish frontier ; and though the subsequent events of the campaign on the side of Badajoz, Al buera, Cadiz, and Ciudad Rodrigo, were of varied success, our troops maintained a high reputation, and the French made little progress in the subjuga tion of the peninsula.
The attention of the public was now attracted to a growing rupture between France and Russia ; and Bonaparte appears to have been deterred only by the lapse of the summer months, from attempting, in 1811, that plan which was put into execution, with so preponderating a force, and such proba bilities of success, in 1812. Secure of Austria by alliance, and master of Italy, Prussia, Saxony, Bava ria, and Wirtemberg, he directed against Russia a host which appeared irresistible, and which, in fact, could be opposed only by one course,—that of eva cuating province after province, removing or destroy ing the magazines, and obliging the enemy to con tend with all the physical disadvantages of a thinly peopled country. Such, accordingly, was the po licy of the Russians. The battle of Borodino, hazarded without much advantage of position, seem ed a momentary departure from their cautious course ; but it was soon resumed, their army re tiring to the south of Moscow, avoiding farther fighting, and annoying their opponents chiefly by the destruction of supplies. Bonaparte, always san guine, delayed commencing his until the 20th October, and had not proceeded above a fortnight on his march, when the inclemency of the season, and deficiency of provisions, begun to prove fatal, first to his horses and soon after to his soldiers. Such was the situation of the French, with a march of more than 400 miles before them. The Russians and Cossacks, without venturing on close action, found means to annoy th2m exceedingly ; and, by a rare coincidence, a Russian army advancing north ward from Turkey, was enabled to reach the line of retreat of the French. The latter, reinforced by fresh troops, were still able to force their way, but the intensity of the cold, and the continued deficien cy of provisions, led to an increasing and rapid re duction of their numbers. Their total loss, from the beginning to the end of this campaign, amounted to 300,000 men ; a calamity which encouraged Prussia at once to throw off the yoke, and Austria to pre pare the means of taking a less eagertut more de cisive part in the contest.
In France the extent of the catastrophe was concealed ; but even had it been known, the power of Bonaparte was too firmly fixed to be shaken by popular murmurs. The whole frame of admi nistration, from the senate to the municipal coun cils, was devoted to him, and a levy of 350,000 men was forthwith ordered. With part of these, and with a part also of his remaining veterans, he again took the field in Germany, met the ad vancing Russians and Prussians, and gained, at Lut zen on the 2d, and at Bautzen on 21st May, suc cesses, which, without equalling the victories of his better days, taught his opponents the neces sity of caution, and disposed them to a more cor dial co-operation. After an armistice from June to August, passed, however, in the most active pre parations, operations recommenced, and the French were evidently overmatched in force. On one oc casion they foiled at Dresden, by a prompt concentra tion, a bold attempt of the allies; but in every other di rection, whether in Silesia, inLusatia, or, subsequent ly, in the heart of Saxony, they felt their inferiority to their more numerous opponents. Finally, the battle of Leipsic decided the independence of Germany, and the retreat of the French to the Rhine. On the side of Spain similar disasters had been experienced ; the force hostile to France was then under the direction of a single leader, and triumphed in repeated actions, first at Vittoria, on 21st June, and afterwards near Pampeluna, in the end of July ; advancing, in the end of the campaign, to the frontier of France. Such was the situation of affairs in the beginning of 1814. Bonaparte seemed at last to lower his tone, sending back Ferdinand to Spain, making a pacific overture to the allies, and attempting to a waken the sympathy of his French subjects. New taxes and new levies were ordered by his subser vient senate ; but the time to discipline the latter was not given him by his opponents. The campaign opened with the invasion of France, in the south west, by the British, and a far more extensive inva sion on the north-east by the Russians, Austrians, and Prussians. Our troops, acting in concert, and on a matured plan, met with no reverse of fortune. Our allies, less cautious, obtained, at first, some suc cesses, but were taught at Montmiril and Montereau that Bonaparte, if reduced in means, was still for midable in the resources of his genius. At last, his too adventurous project of throwing himself in their rear, enabled them to march to Paris, to enter that capital with little resistance, and to accomplish a complete change in the government of France.