Battle of Jutland

Scheer was not yet out of the wood, however. About 1.45, just as a faint grey light was heralding the approaching dawn, Captain Stirling, in the "Faulkner" with his fine 34 knot 12th Flotilla, sighted large ships on his starboard bow, steering a southeasterly course. Even as he manoeuvred to attack he thought to send a wireless report to his commander-in-chief. The attack, carried out with the greatest dash and gallantry, resulted in the battleship "Pommern" being sunk without a trace. Again Captain Stirling made his wireless message, but neither of his reports reached the "Iron Duke." About 2.25 in the growing light, the "Champion" with three destroyers sighted the enemy. One of the latter, the "Moresby," broke off at once and made a plucky attack which sank the German destroyer "V4," but the "Champion" turned to the eastward and made no report.

At 2.39

A.M. Jellicoe turned north. He had been left with the impression that the enemy had been following him south and now, with daylight rapidly returning, he was anxious to get in touch with a view to renewing the engagement. It had been his intention to close Horn Reefs at dawn, but the night fighting had scattered his flotillas and he deemed it imprudent to thrust into enemy waters until he could collect a destroyer screen. A signal from the Admiralty, despatched at 1.48 A.M. but not received in the "Iron Duke" until 2.4o informed the commander-in-chief that enemy submarines were apparently coming out from Ger man ports. The battle fleet formed single line on the northerly course so as to be ready for emergency in the early morning haze, and so, retracing his path, Jellicoe expected momentarily to fall in with his destroyer flotillas and possibly the damaged "Liitzow." Tyrwhitt's Harwich Force had, at last, been ordered to sea, and by 3.5o A.M. he was under way, much too late to be of service. From 3.15 A.M. Zeppelins began to be sighted and at 3.42 A.M. the British battle fleet had turned expectantly towards the sound of guns, but found that it was only some of their own cruisers engaging one of the enemy airships. It was obvious, however, that by now the position of the British fleet must be known to the German command. The hope of meeting the enemy which had been growing fainter was finally shattered by an Admiralty message received at 4.15 A.M. saying that at 2.3o A.M. the High Seas Fleet was only 16 m. from Horn Reefs steering S.E.b.S. at 16 knots.

Beatty was still clinging to the idea that the enemy was to the south-westward, and asked permission to sweep in that direc tion; but at 4.3o A.M., having re-formed into cruising formation,

Jellicoe regretfully made the signal "Enemy fleet has returned to harbour." Scheer reached Horn Reefs Light Vessel about 3 A.M. There he lingered for a short space receiving reports from his airships and taking stock of the condition of his fleet. At 3.3o A.M. he was informed that the "Liitzow" had had to be sunk. The rest of the i st Scouting Group was in no condition for seri ous action, the battleships which had been in the van had also suffered considerably, and he had only three light cruisers service able ; moreover the visibility was such that he could not rely on airship reconnaissance. Indeed many of the reports which he received from this source have since been proved to be very inaccurate. A policy of discretion was obviously dictated, and he gave the order for the whole fleet to return to harbour. On the way in, the battleship "Ostfriesland" struck a mine laid in the channel by the British destroyer "Abdiel" but got home.

The losses may be summarised as follows:— On the face of them these figures would appear to leave the balance of Jutland in favour of Germany, so far as destruction of men and ships is concerned, but the value of the battle must be measured in its after effects and not in its momentary losses. Results.—The broad effects of Jutland are a matter of his tory, but they may be summarised as follows: I. The High Seas Fleet after "consistently refusing action and manoeuvring with the sole object of returning safely to its base," as Jellicoe has put it, left the Grand Fleet in undisputed possession of the arena.

2. Although the German High Command must have realised that the Grand Fleet as a "fleet in being," was the fulcrum of the whole Allied cause, the High Seas Fleet only once left the Heligo land Bight after Jutland; this was on Aug. 19 of the same year. On this occasion Scheer was warned by airship reconnaissance that the British Battle Fleet was advancing to meet him, where upon he returned to his base.

3. In Nov. 1918 Scheer ordered the High Seas Fleet to sea, "to break the blockade." It was to have been a final bid for vic tory, but inaction had only served to crystallise the memories of Jutland ; the crews refused to weigh anchor. This mutinous out break at Wilhelmshaven widened the fissure which shortly after wards engulfed the whole German cause.

4. The full fruits of Jellicoe's domination of the German Fleet at Jutland were yielded on Nov. 21, 1918, when Beatty received the surrender of the greater part of the High Seas Fleet.