Where, then, are we to look for this realm of free self-conscious ness? Not in the sphere of cognition, where objects are mechani cally determined, but in that of will or of reason as practical. That reason is practical or prescribes ends for itself is sufficiently mani fest from the mere fact of the existence of the conception of morality or duty, a conception which can have no corresponding object within the sphere of intuition, and which is theoretically, or in accordance with the categories of understanding, incognizable. The presence of this conception is the datum upon which may be founded a special investigation of the conditions of reason as practical, a Kritik of pure practical reason, and the analysis of it yields the statement of the formal prescripts of morality.
The realization of duty is impossible for any being which is not thought as free, i.e., capable of self-determination. Freedom, it is true, is theoretically not an object of cognition, but its impossi bility is not thereby demonstrated. The theoretical proof rather serves as useful aid towards the more exact determination of the nature and province of self-determination, and of its relation to the whole concrete nature of humanity. For in man self-determination and mechanical determination by empirical motives coexist, and only in so far as he belongs and is conscious of belonging both to the sphere of sense and to the sphere of reason does moral obliga tion become possible for him. The supreme end prescribed by reason in its practical aspect, namely, the complete subordination of the empirical side of nature to the prescripts of morality, de mands, as conditions of its possible realization, the permanence of ethical progress in the moral agent, the certainty of freedom in self-determination, and the necessary harmonizing of the spheres of sense and reason through the intelligent author or ground of both. These conditions, the postulates of practical reason, are the concrete expressions of the three transcendental ideas, and in them we have the full significance of the ideas for reason. Immor tality of the soul, positive freedom of will, and the existence of an intelligent ground of things are speculative ideas practically warranted, though theoretically neither demonstrable nor compre hensible. (See ETHICS, HISTORY OF.) The Critique of reason as self-determining supplies notions of freedom ; reason as determined supplies cate gories of understanding. Union between the two spheres, which seem at first sight disparate, is found in the necessary postulate that reason shall be realized, for its realization is only possible in the sphere of sense. But such a union, when regarded in ab stracto, rests upon, or involves, a notion of quite a new order, that of the adaptation of nature to reason, or, as it may be expressed, that of end in nature. Understanding and reason thus coalesce in the faculty of judgment, which mediates between, or brings to gether, the universal and particular elements in conscious experi ence. Judgment is here merely reflective; that is to say, the particular element is given, so determined as to be possible material of knowledge, while the universal, not necessary for cognition, is supplied by reason itself. The empirical details of nature, which are not determined by the categories of understand ing, are judged as being arranged or ordered by intelligence, for in no other fashion could nature, in its particular, contingent aspect be thought as forming a complete, consistent, intelligible whole.
The investigation of the conditions under which adaptation of nature to intelligence is conceivable and possible makes up the subject of the third great Critique, the Critique of Judgment. The general principle of the adaptation of nature to our faculties of cognition has two specific applications, with the second of which it is more closely connected than with the first. In the first place, the adaptation may be merely subjective, when the empirical condition for the exercise of judgment is furnished by the feeling of pleasure or pain ; such adaptation is aesthetic. In the second place, the adaptation may be objective or logical, when empirical facts are given of such a kind that their possibility can be con ceived only through the notion of the end realized in them ; such adaptation is teleological, and the empirical facts in question are organisms.
Aesthetics, or the scientific consideration of the judgments rest ing on the feelings of pleasure and pain arising from the harmony or want of harmony between the particular of experience and the laws of understanding, is the special subject of the Critique of Judg ment, but the doctrine of teleology there unfolded is the more important for the complete view of the critical system. For the analysis of the teleological judgment and of the consequences flow ing from it leads to the final statement of the nature of experience as conceived by Kant. The phenomena of organic production fur nish data for a special kind of judgment, which, however, involves or rests upon a quite general principle, that of the contingency of the particular element in nature and its subjectively necessary adaptation to our faculty of cognition. The notion of contingency arises, according to Kant, from the fact that understanding and sense are distinct, that understanding does not determine the par ticular of sense, and, consequently, that the principle of the adap tation of the particular to our understanding is merely supplied by reason on account of the peculiarity or limited character of under standing. End in nature, therefore, is a subjective or problematic conception, implying the limits of understanding, and consequently resting upon the idea of an understanding constituted unlike ours— of an intuitive understanding in which particular and universal should be given together. The idea of such an understanding is, for cognition, transcendent, for no corresponding fact of intuition is furnished, but it is realized with practical certainty in relation to reason as practical. For we are, from practical grounds, com pelled with at least practical necessity to ascribe a certain aim or end to this supreme understanding. The moral law, or reason as practical, prescribes the realization of the highest good, and such realization implies a higher order than that of nature. We must, therefore, regard the supreme cause as a moral cause, and nature as so ordered that realization of the moral end is in it possible. The final conception of the Kantian philosophy is, therefore, that of ethical teleology.
BIBLIOGRAPHY.—For books up to 1887 see Erich Adickes in Philo sophical Review (Boston, 1892 foll.) ; for 1890-94 R. Reicke's Kant Bibliographie (1895). See also in general the latest edition of Ueber weg's Grundriss der Geschichte der Philosophie, and Kantstudien 1896 onwards.
EDITIONS.—Complete editions of Kant's works are as follows: (I) G. Hartenstein (Leipzig, 1838-39, 10 vols.) ; (2) K. Rosenkranz and F. W. Schubert (Leipzig, 1838-40, 12 vols., the 12th containing a history of the Kantian school) ; (3) G. Hartenstein, "in chrono logical order" (Leipzig, 1867-69, 8 vols.) ; (4) Kirchmann (in the "Philosophische Bibliothek," Berlin, 5868-73, 8 vols. and supplement) ; (5) E. Cassirer (io vols., 1912-22) ; (6) under the auspices of the Konigliche Preussische Akademie der Wissenschaften a new collected edition was begun in 1900 in charge of a number of editors. Seventeen of the 21 projected volumes had appeared in 1927. There are also useful editions of the three Kritiks by Kehrbach, and critical editions of the Prolegomena and Kritik der reinen Vernunft by B. Erdmann.
TRANSLATIONS.—There are translations in all the principal languages. The chief English translators are J. P. Mahaffy, W. Hastie, T. K. Abbott, J. H. Bernard, Belfort Bax, Meikeljohn and Max Muller.
BIOGRAPHICAL.—Schubert in the iith vol. of Rosenkranz's edition; Borowski, Darstellung des Lebens und Charakters Kants (Konigsberg, - 5804) ; Wasianski, Kant in seinen letzten Lebensjahren (Konigsberg, 1804) ; Stuckenberg, The Life of Immanuel Kant (1882) ; Rudolf Reicke, Kants Briefwechsel (190o). See also several of the critical works below. On Kant's portraits see D. Minden, Ueber Portraits und Abbildungen Imm. Kants (1868) and cf. frontispieces of Kantstudien (as above).