There is a further provision in Article 15 to the effect that if such a report is agreed to by the Council unanimously, with the exception of the representatives of one or more of the parties to the dispute, the members of the League—including the parties— agree that they will not go to war with any party to the dispute who complies with the provisions of the report. This is a most important additional limitation of the right of members to resort to arms. Article i 5 also allows an appeal from the Council to the Assembly, provided it is made within 14 days after the submission of the dispute to the Council. If a dispute is so referred to the Assembly, the Assembly is to deal with the matter in the same way as the Council, and if its report is agreed to by all the members of the League represented on the Council, and by a majority of the other members of the League, exclusive in each case of the representatives of the parties to the dispute, it has the same force as a unanimous report agreed to by the Council, i.e., the members of the League must not go to war with any of the parties to the dispute which accept it.
These Articles, then, provide two, or rather three, methods by which disputes can be settled by peaceful means through the agency of the League. The first provides for legal verdicts by the Permanent Court, when such verdicts are possible and useful; the second for arbitration by some special tribunal agreed to by the parties to a dispute; and the third, for settlement by the political agency of the Council or the Assembly, in accordance with procedure based on the principles of full publicity and strict impartiality. The authors of the Covenant believed that publicity would of itself ensure impartiality; that it was not conceivable that a council, acting as the representative of the whole body of the League and in circumstances of utmost pub licity, should conduct its inquiries into a dispute in any way not consistent with the strictest fairness to all the parties concerned. Sanctions.—Articles 12 to 15 also make provision for the next essential of a league—united pressure by all the members against any of their number which disregards its undertakings. In pro viding for a public report by the Council on the merits of a dis pute and for the publication of its recommendations as to a settlement, the Covenant lays down a method which, in prat tice, must exert the strongest moral pressure on any State which in defiance of Article 12 is disposed to go to war.
But the Covenant goes beyond this, and provides in Article 16 that, if any member of the League in contravention of its agreements resorts to arms, such a member is ipso facto "deemed to have committed an act of war against all other members of the League," and the other members are obliged to prevent all financial, commercial or personal intercourse between the na tionals of the Covenant-breaking State and the nationals of any other State. It is difficult in the disturbed condition of the world after the World War to realise just what would be the effect of such a complete economic and financial boycott in times of normal peace. But it is not too much to say that no civilised State would, in 1914, have ventured to declare war had it been threatened by such a universal boycott as is stipulated by Article 16 of the Covenant.
war is envisaged under the Covenant as legitimate, and the obligations of Article 16 would not come into force. Indeed against a genuinely recalcitrant member of the League, the Covenant goes even further. Article 16 lays down that in addition to the block ade which is an automatic obligation of all the members of the League, the council shall consider and shall recommend to the several Governments concerned, what military, naval or air forces members of the League shall severally contribute to the armed forces to be used to protect the Covenant. In other words, while leaving again the greatest possible elasticity, the Covenant fore shadows united military action, if it is necessary, against a Cove nant-breaking State.
The provisions summarized above, relating to membership, machinery, arrangements for the peaceful settlement of disputes and sanctions, cover the essentials of any league designed to main tain peace.
How far, and in what respects, does the Covenant go beyond these essentials? Guarantees.—First, there are the much-discussed provisions of Article io. This Article has been very generally misunder stood. Its effect is to guarantee the members of the League against external aggression which would impair their territorial integrity or political independence ; but this guarantee is only to be enforced as the Council acting unanimously shall agree. In practice the protection against sudden and unjust attacks provided by Articles 12-56 will probably be much more useful, and, if executed, all that is required. Article lc) is really only a rather clumsy assertion that territorial or political changes shall not be made by aggressive war. Such changes, if required, must be made under Article 19, which enables the Assembly to recon sider treaties which have become obsolete or dangerous to peace. Armaments.—Secondly, it may perhaps be said that, by the provisions of Article 8 on the subject of armaments, the Cove nant introduces something which is extraneous to an agreement to preserve the peace. But the history of the 2oth century has demonstrated that if you prepare for war you will have war; that increase of armaments in one country provokes increase of armaments in other countries, and that if rivalry in preparation for war continues, within a certain time war will break out. The authors of the Covenant believed that unless rivalry in arma ments could be prevented, any league of nations, however it be constituted, would fail. They therefore thought an agreement not to engage in unlimited competition in armaments absolutely necessary to the peace of the world. The Covenant deals with the matter in a way which is pre-eminently practical and sane. It recognises that the maintenance of peace requires the reduc tion of national armaments to the lowest point consistent with national safety, and directs the Council to formulate plans for such reduction for the consideration of the several members of the League. In other words, the members agree to co-operate in working out a general international plan embodying scales in accordance with which their armaments shall be limited or reduced. (See DISARMAMENT.) Further, the members agree that they will, through the League, endeavour to take measures for abolishing the evil effects of the private manufacture of armaments and material of war, and they agree to exchange full information as to their armaments, their preparations for war and the condition of their industries which may be adapted to warlike purposes. Lastly, by Article 23 they agree that, subject to conventions to be arranged, the inter national traffic in arms, admittedly one of the minor contributing causes of war, shall be placed under the League's supervision.