Libel

A person who utters a slander or publishes a libel is not re sponsible for any mischief caused by its repetition or re-publica tion save in the following cases : (I) where he authorized or in tended the person to whom he published the words to repeat or re-publish them; (2) where the repetition or re-publication of the words was the natural and probable result of the original pub lication; (3) where the person to whom the words were published was under a legal or moral duty to repeat or re-publish them. (Speight v. Gosnay [1891] 6o L. J., Q.B. 231).

Where a libel is contained in a newspaper the author of the libel, and the proprietor, printer, publisher, editor and vendor of the newspaper are prima facie liable for the damage caused by it, and any or all of them can be made defendants in one action. The vendor, however, will escape liability if he can prove that he did not know that the newspaper—and the same rule applies in the case of a book—contained, or was of a character likely to contain, a libel, and that such ignorance was not due to any negligence on his part. But the burden of proving this fact lies strictly on him, and the question of publication or non-publication in such a case is one for the jury. In the case of a book the jury may rightly infer that the vendor was negligent in not knowing that the book contained libellous matter from the title or general nature of the book itself, or from the recognized propensity of the author or publisher to publish libellous matter. But in the absence of such evidence the mere fact that the vendor did not have the book read through before he offered it for sale is not in itself evidence of negligence. (Welldon v. Times Book Club Ltd. [19ii] 28 T.L.R. 115).

The plaintiff in an action for libel or slander need not prove that the words are false, for the law presumes this fact in his favour. Nor need he prove malice on the part of the defendant. When a man says or writes anything defamatory of another he is assumed to do so maliciously. The law presumes malice from the defamatory nature of the statement, unless the occasion on which it is made is what is termed a privileged occasion, in which case the plaintiff must, in order to succeed, prove that the de fendant was actuated by malice (see infra). Nor need the plain tiff prove that he has suffered any damage as the result of the words complained of—except in the case of slander not falling within one of the f our heads above-mentioned--for the law pre sumes such damage without proof.

There are several defences open to a defendant in an action for libel or slander. He may contend that there has been no pub lication of the words, or that the words published are not defama tory, or do not refer to the plaintiff. Where special damage is an essential element of the action—as in the case of slander not falling within one of the above four heads—he may contend that no such damage has been suffered by the plaintiff, or that such damage, if any, is too remote. He may also rely on one or other of the following defences.

Justification.

To succeed in this defence the defendant must prove that the words used are substantially true. A slight in accuracy as to some detail will not prevent his succeeding if such inaccuracy in no way alters the character of the imputation (Edwards v. Bell [1824] 1 Bing. 40,3). But if the words which the defendant cannot prove to be true materially aggravate the main imputation or insinuate some further charge in addition to it, the plaintiff will be entitled to a verdict (Morrison v. Harmer [1837]). The test always is : Would the words as published have a different effect on the mind of the reader from that which the actual truth would have produced? (Alexander v. North-Eastern Railway Co. [1865] 6 B. & S. 34o).

Fair Comment.

In order to establish this defence the de fendant must prove (I) that the words are the expression of an opinion (not the allegation of a fact) ; (2) that they are the fair and honest expression of an opinion based on true facts; and (3) that the subject commented on is one of public interest, e.g., the public conduct of a man who holds some public office, or a book issued to the general public, or a work of art publicly ex hibited, or a play publicly performed. It should be noted that the comment must be both fair and honest. (McQuire v. Western Morning News [1903] 2 K.B. ioo, rio). The word fair refers to the language employed. The word honest refers to the mind of the critic. The defendant will fail in his defence, even though the language used by him does not in itself exceed the limits of fair criticism, if it can be shown that he was not expressing his honest opinion but was writing from some indirect motive, e.g., in the case of a play, with the intention of injuring the author or the producer (Thomas v. Bradbury, Agnew & Co. [1906] 2 K.B. 627).