The Federals had then assembled armies for the invasion of Virginia numbering 180,00o men, to which the Confederates could immediately oppose 8o,000, a number which might even tually be brought up to 100,000. McClellan, with the main Federal army, was preparing to disembark on the Yorktown peninsula and to advance on Richmond from the coast, while other Federal forces converged on Richmond from the north and west. How in these circumstances was Richmond to be defended? J. E. Johnston, who commanded the Confederate main army in Vir ginia, proposed to concentrate all available troops about Rich mond and to fight it out there. Lee saw that this was a counsel of despair, and that the one chance for the Confederates was to utilize their central position and to compensate by skilful manoeuvre for inferior numbers. He therefore persuaded the President to send Johnston, against the latter's wish, to oppose McClellan in the Yorktown peninsula, so that time might be gained. He turned to "Stonewall Jackson" (see JACKSON, THOMAS JONATHAN), whom he asked to unite some of the remaining de tachments of the Confederates in Virginia, in order to attack the Federals in the Shenandoah valley, and so create alarm for the safety of Washington. This task Jackson brilliantly accomplished in his famous Valley campaign. The Federal forces intended to aid McClellan in his attack on Richmond were diverted or dispersed. In the meantime Johnston had fallen back on lines prepared around Richmond, and in the battle of Seven Pines attacked McClellan. The result was indecisive and Johnston fell wounded, Lee succeeding to the command of the army of northern Virginia.
Lee now proceeded to consummate his plan. McClellan, expect ing reinforcements to his right flank, had advanced on Richmond with his forces divided by the Chickahominy. Jackson had pre vented the arrival of these reinforcements and kept them in expectation of attack. Lee thereupon brought Jackson by rail and road towards Richmond, and on his arrival had 87,00o men opposed to McClellan's 109,000. Further he skilfully utilized the defences of Richmond to outbalance McClellan's superior numbers, leaving in them 28,00o men to hold 75,000 of McClellan's army south of the Chickahominy, while with 59,000 he attacked at the beginning of the battles of the "Seven Days" the 34,000 Federals on the north of the river, With his right over whelmed McClellan was forced to retreat and fell back to the James river, eventually embarking his troops and returning to the Potomac. Generalship had neutralized superior numbers and the danger to Richmond was removed.
When McClellan's retreat was ended, Lee sent Jackson to the Rapidan to check the Federal force which, recovering from the latter's blows, was uniting under the command of Pope. As soon as McClellan's intention to evacuate the Yorktown peninsula was clear Lee joined Jackson with the main body of the army of northern Virginia. Before them Pope fell back behind the Rap
pahannock, and Lee, whose intention was to manoeuvre Pope out of Virginia, divided his forces, sending Jackson with half his force by a flank march to come down on Pope's rear, while he himself followed with the remainder under Longstreet. Jackson reached Manassas Junction and destroyed Pope's depots, and then fell back a short distance so as to cover the passes of the Blue Ridge and be in a position to unite with Longstreet. While so placed a Federal column, ignorant of his presence, marched across his front. Jackson, unable to resist the temptation, attacked and so brought on the second battle of Bull Run (Aug. 29-30), in which, Longstreet arriving in the nick of time on the field, Pope was completely defeated. Lee then decided to cross the Potomac and invade Maryland, not with the object of conquering any portion of Northern territory, but to keep the Federal forces out of Virginia by forcing them to defend Washington, and to strengthen the peace party in the North.
After crossing the Potomac Lee detached Jackson with half his force to reduce Harper's Ferry, which, held by a garrison of 11,00o Federals, interrupted his communications with Virginia. Jackson speedily accomplished his task, but while he was engaged in it, an order by Lee which disclosed the division of his forces fell into the hands of McClellan, who advanced and attacked the Confederates in position behind the Antietam (Sept. 17). Jackson arrived on the field in time to enable Lee to repulse McClellan's attacks, but this done the Confederates were com pelled to retire into Virginia. It is more than doubtful whether Lee was justified in accepting this battle. He could have avoided it and returned to Virginia with the defeat of Pope and the surrender of Harper's Ferry to his credit and have avoided the heavy losses which the Confederates could ill afford. It would appear that at this time he was disposed to underrate unduly the fighting power of the Northern troops.
A long pause followed the battle of the Antietam, and it was not until Dec. 1862 that Burnside, who had displaced McClellan in command of the Army of the Potomac, attempted to meet Lee in the field. Lee's army was then disposed along the Rap pahannock, and his service of information being admirable, he was able to concentrate in time to meet Burnside's attack upon his position at Fredericksburg. This attack, which was purely frontal against a strong position, was repulsed with great ease on Dec. 13. Lee had been criticized for not undertaking an imme diate pursuit, but his justification is that he expected the Federals to renew the attack, and did not wish to expose his infantry to the fire of the superior Federal artillery on the opposite heights.