1930 London Naval Conference

powers, five, united, governments, negotiations, president, cruiser and hoover

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These failures were a serious set-back to the movement for Naval limitation. Above all they led to strained relations between. the United States and Great Britain, when confidence and co operation between them, as being the two principal Naval Powers, were essential to the work. Their differences were still on the cruiser problem, and it was clearly of vital importance that the matter should be settled between them before there was any hope of tackling successfully the two other outstanding questions be tween the five Powers. That was the position when Mr. Hoover became President of the United States.

This sketch of the history of the problem is essential to an understanding of what the negotiations preceding and during the Naval Conference achieved.

The Yard Stick.

A way out of the Anglo-American difficulty was indicated in a speech made by Mr. Gibson, the representative of the new American administration, during the meetings of the Preparatory Commission at Geneva in April 1929. He proposed that in estimating equivalent naval strengths other factors than unit displacement tonnages should be considered. In the case of categories in which there were marked variations as to unit char acteristics, the age of ships and the calibres of their guns might also be taken into account. Here was a method—known as "the yard stick"—of calculating parity between the cruiser fleets of the United States and Great Britain even though they differed in the numbers, tonnages and gun calibres of their ships. The American fleet might contain a larger number of 8 inch gun cruisers whilst the British possessed a still greater preponderance of the smaller ships. The fruitless search after strict mathematical parity could be abandoned.

The two Governments lost no time in exploring the possibilities of this method, and their efforts ended successfully. In June con versations commenced between General Dawes, the new Ambas sador of the United States in London, and Mr. Ramsay Mac Donald, who had become Prime Minister ten days previously.

Their informal negotiations were continued for three months, at the end of which time the difference of opinion between their Gov ernments as to how their cruiser fleets might be limited so as to achieve parity whilst allowing variety, had been reduced to a minimum. But for a matter of 30,00o tons the two Governments were indeed agreed on programmes for the limitation of every category of ship in their two navies. But they never lost sight of the fact that the United States and Great Britain alone could not solve the Naval limitation problem. Their conversations were a

preliminary to a conference of the five Washington Treaty Powers, the summoning of which had been in the minds of President Hoover and Mr. MacDonald ever since they faced the Naval problem in the summer. Therefore their negotiations were not intended to reach an agreement which they would present as a fait accompli to be accepted or rejected in its entirety by the other three Powers. The understanding between them was a provisional one, to liquidate the Anglo-American cruiser difficulty and to form a basis for negotiations between all the five Powers together. The other interested Governments were at each stage informed of the progress of their negotiations.

The Conference Meets.

On October 7th invitations to a Naval Conference to meet in London in January 193o were sent with the authority of both Governments to the French, Italian.

and Japanese Governments, and not many days later were ac cepted. Meanwhile Mr. MacDonald had sailed for the United States, on a visit to the President which still further strengthened the confidence and friendliness between the two great English speaking peoples, a deplorable lack of which had previously threatened to destroy the work for Naval disarmament. On his return to London conversations with the three other Governments were commenced, with a view to disposing of any preliminary difficulties.

The London Naval Conference was opened by His Majesty King George V. on January 21st, 193o. Although it was called a Five Power Conference, there were actually twice that number of delegations attending it, for five British Dominion Governments sent delegates to co-operate with the United Kingdom Delegation in discussions of vital importance to the Navy which protects them as a whole. The Conference sat until April 22nd, when the London Naval Treaty was signed by all the delegates.

The Conference's work would have been comparatively simple had it been a meeting of only the three Geneva Conference Powers. Recognising the complications which would be introduced if it were a gathering of the five Washington Conference Powers, President Hoover and Mr. MacDonald had considered whether the easier task should not be finished first, but they came to the conclusion that the London Conference should be one of the five Powers. When it met, forebodings of difficulty proved correct.

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