This omnipotence of the sultan in deciding the policy of the Government was in striking contrast with his impotence in enforc ing his views on his subjects and in his relations with foreign powers. Mahmud, in spite of—or rather because of—his well meant efforts at reform, was hated by his Mussulman subjects and stigmatized as an "infidel" and a traitor to Islam. Mahmud's policy was the converse of that recommended by Machiavelli, viz., in making a revolution to change the substance while pre serving the semblance of the old order. Metternich's advice to Mahmud to "remain a Turk" was sound enough. His failure to do so—in externals—left him isolated in his empire: rayahs and true believers alike distrusted and hated him. Of this hatred he was fully conscious; he knew that his subjects, even many of his own ministers, regarded Mehemet Ali as the champion of Islam against the "infidel sultan"; he suspected the pasha, already master of the sacred cities, of an intention to proclaim himself caliph in his stead. This, together with the weakness due to military reforms but recently begun, drove him to rely on the aid of Russia. The long tradition of French friendship for Turkey had been broken, in 183o, by the conquest of Algiers. Austria was, for the time, but the faithful ally of the tsar.
On Aug. 9, 1832, Mahmud made, through Stratford Canning, a formal proposal for an alliance with Great Britain, which Palmerston refused to consider for fear of offending France. Mahmud bitterly contrasted the fair professions of England with the offers of effective help from Russia. His old ally having deserted him, he accepted the aid of his hereditary foe. The Russian expedition to the Bosporus, the convention of Kutaiah, and the Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi (July 8, 1833) fol lowed. Mahmud was under no illusion as to the position in which the latter placed him towards Russia; but his fear of Mehemet Ali and his desire to be revenged upon him out-weighed all other considerations. With his single aim in view he busied himself with the creation of a national militia, with the aid of Moltke and other German officers. In 1834 the revolt of Syria against Ibrahim seemed to give him his opportunity. He pleaded the duty of a sultan to go to the aid of his subjects when oppressed by one of his servants; but the Powers were obdurate, even Russia, much occupied in affairs nearer home, leaving him in the lurch.
Mahmud was astute enough to take advantage of the offence given to the Powers by Mehemet Ali's system of monopolies, and in 1838 signed with Great Britain, and afterwards with others, a commercial treaty which cut at the root of the pasha's system. A few months later his passionate impatience overcame his policy and his fears. The hand of death was upon him, and he felt that he must strike now or never. In vain the Powers, now united in their views, warned him of the probable con sequences of any aggressive action on his part. On his sole initia tive he sent instructions to Hafiz Pasha, commanding the Ottoman troops concentrated at Bir on the Euphrates, to advance into Syria. The fatal outcome of the campaign that followed he did not live to hear. When the news of Ibrahim's overwhelming vic tory at Nessib (June 24, 1839) reached Constantinople, Mahmud lay unconscious. He died early in the morning of July 1.
Mahmud II. cannot be reckoned among the great sultans, neither had he any of the calculating statecraft which character ized Abd-ul-Hamid II. ; but his qualities of mind and heart, none the less, raised him far above the mass of his predecessors and successors. He was well versed in State affairs and loyal to those who advised and served him, personally brave, humane and kindly when not maddened by passion, active and energetic, and always a man of his word. Unhappily, however, the taint of the immemorial corruption of Byzantium had fallen upon him too, and the avenue to his favour and to political power lay too often through unspeakable paths. When he came to the throne the empire was breaking up from within; one by one he freed the provinces from the tyrannical rulers who, like Ali of Jannina, were carving out independent, or quasi-independent, empires within the empire. If he failed in his wider schemes of reform, it was because it is impossible to impose any system, however admirable, from above on a people whose deepest con victions and prejudices it offends.
There is a great deal of valuable material for the history of Mahmud and his policy in the unpublished Foreign Office records (1832-39), volumes of correspondence marked Turkey.—From Sir Stratford Canning.—From Mr. Mandeville.—From Lord Ponsonby. See further works mentioned under TURKEY: History; and MEHEMET ALI.