In July he was exchanged at Komarom for the French diplo matists, and was present with Emperor Francis at the battle of Wagram. On July 8, he succeeded to Stadion's place, and be came minister of State on Aug. 4. He was absent at the peace conference at Altenburg when the emperor signed the Treaty of Schonbrunn on Oct. 14, 1809, and thus had nothing to do with this document, although on Oct. 8 he had been appointed minister of foreign affairs, a post he held for 4o years.
The position of Austria, reduced as she was by the Treaty of Schonbrunn to the level of a second-rate power, was one of great difficulty and danger, and of this Metternich was fully conscious. Up to this time, his policy had not been wholly free from emo tional impulse; but henceforward it was nothing but calculation, caution and a mechanical balancing of chances. His first ambition was to gain time, and to separate Napoleon from the tsar. The power which seemed to him best worth courting was Austria's late enemy, although he was determined not to lose his freedom of action by any too great concessions. Napoleon's request for the hand of the Archduchess Marie Louise, whether due to Metter nich's initiative or not, fitted his plans admirably. He accom panied the archduchess to Paris on March 13, 181o. The definite concessions which he established for Austria were, indeed, small; Napoleon declared that anything further must depend on Austria's attitude in the Franco-Russian War which he now stated to be inevitable. Yet Metternich had restored Austria's freedom to move. He hurried back to Vienna on Oct. io, just in time to stop the strong pro-Russian party at the Austrian court from com promising this liberty by concluding an alliance with Russia, and to win over the emperor for his policy of armed abstention. With the approach of the Franco-Russian War, this policy became in creasingly difficult to maintain in its entirety; but although Metternich concluded an alliance with Napoleon on March 1813, promising him military assistance in return for considerable concessions which France was now obliged to offer, he at once informed Russia that Austria's troops would only act on the defensive, and held out a prospect of a renewal of the old alliance of the conservative powers. When Napoleon suffered by catas trophe in Russia, Metternich extricated Austria from her alliance, alleging that it had been abrogated by Napoleon's own act; re verted to neutrality; and had soon manoeuvred his country into the position of arbiter of Europe. Napoleon's signature of the armistice of Pleiswitz gave Austria time to complete her arma ments. When Metternich visited Napoleon at Dresden on June
26, he still posed as the impartial "mediator," assuring the em peror "on his honour as a German count" that Austria was still free of "engagements." Yet he already had in his pocket the draft of the second treaty of Reichenbach (which was not, indeed, signed till the following day), whereby Austria contracted with Russia and Prussia to put 150,000 men in the field, and not to make peace without the consent of her allies, should Napoleon reject the ultimatum which was to be put to him. Metternich's object was, in fact, only to gain an extension of the armistice, till Austria was ready to take the offensive. As for the terms offered to Napoleon, his acceptance of them need not hamper the plans of the allies, while his rejection of them would be a blow to his waning popularity in France.
In the war that followed, although Metternich signed a fresh treaty with Russia at Topaz (Sept. 9), committing Austria more closely to the policy of the allies, he was chiefly anxious to ensure that the balance did not swing too far, nor strengthen overmuch either Russia or Prussia. The course of events forced him, against his wishes, to agree to the restoration of the Bourbons, but in other respects the Treaty of Chaumont (March 1, 1814) was a real triumph for him, since it laid down that at the final settlement Germany was to be reconstituted as a confederation of sovereign States, and also did much to temper the fear of a Russian dictatorship by consecrating the principle of that con certed action of the Great Powers, in affairs of international interest, which after Napoleon's fall governed the European sys tem.
On April io, Metternich arrived at Paris, ten days after its occupation by the allies. He was now at the height of his repu tation; on Oct. 20, 1813, two days after Leipzig, he had been created an hereditary prince of the Austrian Empire ; he now received from the Emperor Francis a unique honour : the right to quarter the arms of the house of Austria-Lorraine with those of Metternich. At the same time (April 21) the countship of Daruvar was bestowed upon him. On May 30, Metternich set his signature to the Treaty of Paris, and immediately after wards accompanied the Emperor Alexander and King Frederick William on a visit to England. On July 18, he was back in Vienna, where the great congress was to meet in the autumn. The dignity of a Hungarian magnate was bestowed upon him.