Iii Intensive Traffic on the Roads

The existence of regulating commissions in charge of zones of movement, and masters of the traffic, considerably eased the French problem. But the regulating commissions must have con trol not only of automobile traffic, but of all traffic; in their zones no movements must occur without their having received notice and taken the necessary measures .to facilitate the execution of the movements in question. They must be able to arrest all false movements in good time. And they must be in close touch, so as to form a complete network, covering the whole area over which it may be necessary to move any column. It was by the function ing of an organization of this nature that the French Army was able to make its concentrations of considerable numbers of troops at very short notice in March, May and July 1918.

Strategic Transport by Road.

As the automobile has brought on the road again the tourist who had deserted it since the middle of the 19th century, so transport by motor lorry has brought into use again strategic movements by road. And, for the production of surprise effect, by adding the roads to the railways, it has been possible to put to full use all available means of com munication. The air alone has not been utilized ; but in the future it may be employed for the quick transport of combatants.

Combined Use of Railway and Motors.

In the majority of cases, use is made of railways and roads in combination. The end to be attained is always a rapid move of powerful forces ; the staff should therefore make use simultaneously, and as efficiently as possible, of every means of transport which it possesses. One must never lose sight of the fact that the efficiency of the railway is much superior to that of the road; a train of 5o wagons is equivalent to 15o lorries. At a speed of 3okilo. an hour, and with four departures an hour, one has four trains in a length of 3okilo., or the equivalent of 600 lorries. We have seen that 600 lorries form on the road a length of 20 to 2 5 kilometres. Railway and road have, therefore, very nearly the same output. But the lorries, going 15kilo. an hour are only half as quick. Further, at the end of 1 ookilo. it is necessary for the lorries to stop in order to rest the drivers, for, save in exceptional cases, relief crews are out of the question. The weak point in transport by rail really lies in the necessity of having stations for embarking and for dis embarking. Save in quite exceptional cases it is an absolute tech nical necessity to load and unload in stations, and, even so, only in those where there are sidings sufficient to take the military trains so as to leave free the main line during the times of embarking and disembarking. Without this precaution all the traffic will be blocked. Further, when it is a question of loading materiel it is necessary to place it on the platforms. While special platforms or docks are indispensable on the railway, it is always easy, on the road, to find or organize quickly loading-places for lorries.

Big movements by railway can be made only from a zone A to a zone B, if the two zones A and B are equally rich in loading places. But—apart from those points which come into the initial concentration scheme, and on which, therefore, work can be done in peace—it is impossible to ensure, in the large movements which military operations may necessitate at any given moment, that the beginning and the end of rail transport shall take place in zones that are rich in loading-places. On the other hand, it is generally

possible to find, within a radius of 5o to iookilo. in the zones A and B under consideration, one or more regions rich in loading places. The normal combination consists, therefore, in utilizing motor transport to prolong railway transport, and to carry the troops or materiel (I) from their stationary zone to the places of embarkation, and (2) from their places of disembarkation to the zone of operations. The relatively short movements (5o to me kilo.) it requires are those in which the efficiency of the lorry is at its greatest. And between the two zones of loading thus actually used, the efficiency of the railway will equally be a maximum.

Naturally, other combinations are also practicable ; for example, that by which, on Nov. 1917, three French divisions were to be carried from Meaux and Chateau-Thierry to Peronne ; the infantry, with their machine-guns and cooking-carts, being con veyed in motor lorries, and the artillery by train. The object of these movements, very quickly ordered on Nov. 19, was to re inforce the successful British attack in front of Cambrai with the first use of tanks in mass. While the embarkation of the artillery was proceeding at railway stations in proximity to the divisional billetS on the Marne, the C.R.A. of Meaux and Chateau-Thierry loaded up on 3,000 lorries the infantry, etc., of the three divisions.

There are many details which complicate considerably the task of the transport officials; such as the question of food supply for the troops during their transportation and at their disembarka tion, and the question of moving troops simultaneously with the building-up of the munitions dumps which they will require. One last remark should be made : transportation by automobile and by railway, which, we have seen, supplement one another happily in regard to distance, is equally satisfactory in regard to time. Large movements by railway require concentration of materiel, often difficult to achieve; and, in the case of moves decided on in a hurry, the possibility of motor transport on a large scale assumes very great importance, since it takes four or five days for the railway to show its full powers.

Conclusion.

The experience of the War shows the role which transport by motors is called upon to sustain becoming more and more important. The Allied Armies, together, placed on the French front about 20,000 motor vehicles in October 1914; four years later the number exceeded 200,000. At the time of the Armi stice the inter-Allied transport reserve, the creation of which had just been decided on, was of a size to transport simultaneously divisions of infantry complete, with all their means of fighting, machine-guns and artillery included. This was a fighting mass of more than f oo,000 men, which the Higher Command was able to pick up at short notice and carry at the speed of f ookilo. a day to any point where it was required. As regards the transport of materiel at the end of the War, it had become possible—independ ently of resources just mentioned—to keep supplied with food and munitions 4o divisions at a distance of I ookilo. from the railways.