Imagery.—Just as knowledge of the present physical environ ment and response to its demands involves the mental events named "sensations," so knowledge of the past or use of knowl edge acquired in the past is bound up with events termed "im ages." For every variety of sensation, sight, sound, etc., there is a corresponding variety of imagery. When to-day we recall the sight of the fishing boats returning to harbour, we have visual imagery of what we saw last evening; similarly we may recall the cry of the gulls by auditory imagery. We may recall in verbal imagery the comments made when the scene was presented. The difference between sensation and imagery is not one which can be well expressed in words. Everyone knows it from his own expe rience. We call images "dead" as compared with actual sense data. They not only lack "liveliness" but seem fragmentary and fluctuating; now this is present. now that, and as we attempt to fixate them they are apt to die out. Imagery, again, does not stand in as close relation to movement as sense experience. A sensation produces a motor response. There is adjustment of sense organ and impulsive action. With imagery there may be some adjustment of sense organ as in the fixed look when trying to see a visual image clearly, but there is no attempt to stretch out a hand to take the imaged object nor to step aside to avoid it. Imagery is not normally accompanied by the wealth of or ganic sensations which form a background to sense experience of the special senses.
and the present, a continuity of interest, direct or indirect. There is an association between the suggesting present and the suggested past experience or acquirement. The conditions of suggestion are known as the "laws of association" (see ASSOCIATION OF IDEAS). If depth of impression and strength of association ensure mem ory, feebleness of impression and failure of association entail obliviscence or forgetting. If association links fail there can be no suggestion, and where there is no suggestion there can be no recall of past experience by the present. The breaking down of association links gives rise to a condition known as "dissociation." This may occur for a given group of ideas or for incidents con nected with a given period in a man's life (see AMNESIA). Some psychologists attribute all failure of association to "repression." They assert that all experiences which are painful or in conflict with accepted standards of life are repressed into the uncon scious and thereby cut off from the associations of conscious memory. They regard repression as the explanation of all for getting. But this view is unwarrantably narrow. It not only overlooks natural decay which is the complement of growth in all living processes, but it confuses conditions which ought to be distinguished: the repression of an associated idea by reason of its pain value and the temporary inhibition of one line of associa tion through interest in another. It is, surely, perverted pedantry to seek some painful association in a forgotten engagement when such obliviscence is due to the inhibition of all ideas unconnected with an absorbing occupation.