Every trooper carried a complete set of tools, individual camp kettle, and iron ration, for his own maintenance and subsistence in the field. He had also a water-tight bag in which he carried a change of clothes, and which could be inflated for crossing rivers.
Tactics.—The tactics of the Mongol army were rigid in con ception, without the possibility of wide variation, but flexible in execution. They were built up on a definite framework of tactical moves, so that they resembled an applied battle drill. The analogy is further heightened by the fact that the different manoeuvres were directed by signals, so that the delays and upsets caused by orders and messages were obviated. The result of these battle drill tactics was seen in an amazing perfection and rapidity of execution. The Mongol force was a machine which worked like clockwork, and this very mobility made it irresistible to troops far more strongly armed and numerous.
The battle formation was comprised of five ranks, the squad rons being separated by wide intervals. The troops in the two front ranks wore complete armour, with sword and lance, and their horses also were armoured. The three rear ranks wore no armour, and their weapons were the bow and the javelin. From these latter were thrown out mounted skirmishers or light troops, who harassed the enemy as he advanced. Later, as the two forces drew near each other, the rear ranks advanced through the intervals in the front ranks, and poured a deadly hail of arrows and javelins on the enemy. Then, when they had disorganized the enemy ranks, they retired into the intervals, and the front ranks charged to deliver the decisive blow. It was a perfect combination of fire and shock tactics, the missile weapon troops firing and disorganizing the enemy ready for the shock troops to complete his overthrow.
Their continuous run of victories, usually over superior num bers, were achieved in defiance of most of the canons on which European armies, of the present equally with the past, have based their systems. Nor can these successes be discounted in the way that is common when discussing victories over Asiatic troops, who are regarded as lacking the staying power, discipline.
and equipment of European soldiers. Sabutai's warriors proved themselves more than a match for the men-at-arms of mediaeval Europe, who had superiority both of numbers and armour. The Mongol tactics were never to close with the adversary until he was weakened and disorganized by fire. If charged by the heavy European cavalry, they never let themselves be drawn into a clash, but dispersed on a signal, rallied by signal at a distance, and again assailed the enemy with fire, repeating the process until the enemy was "unhinged" and the way paved for a decisive charge. Thus they proved that mobility is the basis of tactics, as of strategy; that lightly armed troops can beat more heavily armed ones if their mobility is sufficiently superior Another canon that they violated was that mobile troops, such as cavalry, must needs rest on a stable infantry base. Although cavalry was the decisive arm alike of Alexander and Hannibal, it formed merely the mobile wings hinged on an essentially pro tective infantry centre, which was the pivot on which it man oeuvred. The prime feature of the Mongol military system was therefore its simplicity, due to the use of a single arm, in contrast to the inevitably complex organization of a combination of sev eral arms which has always characterized European armies. In this way the Mongols solved the ever-difficult problem of co operation between arms which had radically different qualities and limitations. The single arm they used was that which possessed the highest degree of mobility, and in this lay the secret of their unbroken run of victory. At such local points where greater "locomobility" was needed than mounted troops could achieve, a proportion of the troops were temporarily dismounted and fought on foot.