The French Protectorate and the Franco-Spanish Agree ment.—As soon as the treaty had been ratified by the two parlia ments, M. Regnault was sent to Fez, and the Franco-Moroccan treaty of March 3o, 1912, was signed, by which Mulai Hafid agreed to a certain number of reforms, equivalent to a Protec torate, which was accepted by the Powers. Negotiations with Spain ensued, for the putting into force of the secret treaty of 1904. The new Convention was signed on Nov. 27 and contained a few modifications as to the frontier of the Spanish zone, which follows the Muluya from its mouth to near Meshra (Klila. Thence turning west, it runs north of a line reaching to Jebel Mulai bu Shota (the Riff) and thence, striking toward the north-west, to the Atlantic, and containing El Qsar and Larache. A Khalifa (Deputy) represents the sultan at Tetuan, where the Spanish Commissioner-General resides. The Spanish Protectorate extends over a zone of about 18,30o sq.m., with an estimated population of 460,000 (1923). The question of the Ifni enclave in the south was also settled. Tangier (q.v.) and its neighbourhood (about oo sq.m.) constitute a special internationalized zone.
The Protectorate was followed by a revolt at Fez (April 7. 1912), in which 13 French officers, 4o soldiers and 13 civilians were killed. General Lyautey was appointed resident-general and took up his post on April 27, 1912. Mulai Hafid, whose collabora tion could not be counted upon, retired on Aug. 12, and was suc ceeded by his brother, Mulai Yusef. The history of General (now Marshal) Lyautey's administration is a remarkable example of France's colonial policy. Internal difficulties were not wanting. The tribes around Fez remained unsettled, especially in the Taza "corridor" leading to Algeria. In the south, the revolt of El Hiba necessitated the occupation of Marrakesh (Sept. 1912) by Gen eral Mangin, who was to play such a conspicuous part in the World War. Fighting in Western Morocco continued for some months, but this district and that of Fez were occupied by the spring of 1913. The important strategic point of Taza was taken in May 1914, and Khenifra (centre of the unsubdued Zdian tribes of the Tadla district), in June.
On the outbreak of the World War, the French commander received telegraphic orders from the ministers of foreign affairs and of war (July
"to reduce the occupation to the principal points on the coast," as "the fate of Morocco would be settled in Lorraine," and asking him to send all available men and material to the French front. Lyautey immediately dispatched 37 battalions and other troops; but refused to evacuate the interior. The tribes round Taza and the Zayan in the west promptly rose once more, but the three great kaids of the Atlas and the bashas of Tarudant and Tiznit, in the south, near Agadir, remained friendly. The Spanish zone was used by the Germans as a basis of active propaganda and action against the French Protectorate. Throughout 1915 and 1916 chiefs in German pay conducted a campaign along the Wad Wergha. But in May and June 1917 Abd el Malek was driven from Taza. In March 1917, El Hiba was severely defeated at Wijan, his force being dispersed in the following spring. The Tafilelt was definitely occupied at the end of 1917.
After the War the French continued their operations, taking the offensive now on one and now on another of their four fronts: the northern (Spanish zone, Djebala and Riff tribes) ; the Berber (Central Atlas) ; the front of the big kaids (round Marrakesh, the Glawi, M'tuggi, Gundafi) ; and the southern front (Kut Aissa, Tafilelt).
By the end of 1923, the French zone was completely pacified. Lyautey's constant aim all through was the conquest of what he called "useful Morocco" (le Maroc utile), the last French opera tions being largely dictated by the need of gaining control of the "Water Castle" of the Central Atlas.
But Lyautey's military difficulties were not at an end. The Riffis, who, during the World War, had lavishly received arms, ammunition and money from the Germans against the French, turned, from 1919 onward, against the Spaniards. In 1921, Abd el Krim, the son of a Beni Uryaghel (Ouriaghel) chief, some time in the Spanish service, settled at Ajdir, at some distance inland from Alhucemas, stirred up resistance between that point and Melilla, and inflicted a terri ble defeat on the army of General Silvestre. With the capture of an enormous amount of arms and ammunition, these Moroccan events led to a crisis in Spain, and, in Sept. 1923, the constitu tional Government was replaced by a Military Directorship under General Primo de Rivera, who decided upon a general withdrawal; a courageous but difficult manoeuvre which was not accomplished until the autumn of 1924. But the evacuation increased Abd el Krim's prestige, and on the other hand, the gradual occupation by France of the northern limits of her Protectorate caused some apprehension to the Riff chieftain.
In April 1925 Abd el Krim launched a furious attack on the Taza-Ujda roads; the tribes that remained faithful were massacred; Wazzan and Taza were threatened; but Lyautey, although his councillors were, it is said, in favour of a retreat, persistently refused to budge from Taza, just as he had refused to abandon the interior in 1914, thus saving Morocco for France a second time. A regular and severe campaign ensued. A rapid glance at a good map, enables one immediately to appreciate its difficulties. In July, Marshal Petain was sent on a mission to Morocco while General Naulin took supreme command of the troops, under the high direction of Marshal Lyautey. But, on Aug. 22, Marshal Petain returned to Morocco. A joint action of France and Spain was agreed upon, at a conference held in Madrid. On Sept. 8 a suc cessful disembarkation of Spanish troops took place in Alhucemas bay and a junction was effected at Syah between the columns of the two countries. Winter suspended the general operations, which really necessitated quite different methods and material from those employed in European warfare, a practical point that appears to have been too often lost sight of. So the Riff "coup de-main" continued. On May 3o, however, 40,000 additional native troops having been recruited, Abd el Krim surrendered unconditionally at Taza to General Boichut, the French com mander, and was sent in exile to Reunion. (See ABD EL KRIM.) The French losses during the campaign amounted to 2,162 ex clusive of casualties among native troops ; but the monetary expense was great, and will be supported principally by Morocco itself (about Fr. 26,000,00o).