In the first half of the 18th century the tactics of the British Navy were severely restricted by flag officers in command of fleets being commanded by the official Fighting Instructions to adhere strictly to the ordered line of battle. Moreover they were not permitted to attack an enemy until that line had been cor rectly formed and until they were in a position for each ship to bear down like one of a row of infantry soldiers charging in line on their opposite numbers of the enemy's fleet. To such an extent had this become a fetish that Admiral Mathews, after his encounter with the Franco-Spanish fleet in 1744, was relieved of his command and tried by Court Martial, one of the two counts being that he engaged without having ordered and dressed his line.
But already there were to be found flag officers who refused to be tied by these academical restrictions. Chief amongst these was Admiral Vernon, who initiated and put into effect a number of reforms which broke away from the rigidity enforced by the official restrictions. Nelson was nothing if not enterprising in his tactics, and he seldom failed to seize the golden opportunity because it called for unconventional action. Trafalgar, the cul mination of his great career and pinnacle of his fame, was fought in accordance with his intentions. The British fleet bore down in two lines on the approaching Franco-Spanish fleets, which were in a crescent formation. As an old naval authority puts it : "This novel mode of coming into action kept the enemy com pletely in suspense. It threatened every part of their line. If our two columns had turned the same way, they would have been able to do infinite damage in that quarter before the other wing of the enemy could come up to succour their overpowered fleets: if the two columns should cut through the centre, they must destroy it and effectively separate the two wings so as to leave them ignorant of each other's fate. Such was the fact: the enemy, though superior in numbers, lost no less than nineteen sail of the line." But the tactics of the sailing navies must not be taken as suitable for guidance in naval tactics of the present day. Many new influences have arisen in sea warfare which have not merely extended the range at which battles must be fought, but have altered their whole character and conduct. Chief amongst these influences has been the introduction of steam, whereby a fleet can now disregard the direction of the wind so far as the actual propulsion of the ships themselves is concerned.
Next in order of importance is the introduction of underwater weapons, notably the self-propelled torpedo (q.v.). The increased power of the gun and the danger of torpedo attack have com bined to rule out ramming and boarding as deliberate methods of attack. But the great tactical principle of seeking to concen trate the maximum available force on some part of the enemy's fleet in such a way that the rest of it cannot retaliate, or assist their hard-pressed companions, remains today just as much as in the past. But such an ideal tactical advantage can, generally speaking, only be secured by a fleet with greatly superior speed. Nevertheless it was achieved by masterly manoeuvring aided by conditions of low visibility when Admiral Jellicoe deployed the Grand Fleet across the head of the German High Sea Fleet in the opening stage of the main action at Jutland (q.v.). Even
so, a skilful enemy may be able to extricate himself from what would otherwise be a disastrous position, and this the German Admiral, Scheer, succeeded in doing on two occasions during that battle. True, his method was merely to execute a precipi tate right-about-turn, and the result clearly showed that although, diagrammatically, he was, at one moment, somewhat in the posi tion of Nelson at Trafalgar, in that his fleet was heading for the centre of his opponents' battle line, yet both his subsequent manoeuvres and the results of the tactical situation, were as difficult as it is possible to conceive. Nelson deliberately de signed such an approach; he charged on, and thereby achieved a great victory; Scheer accidentally found himself in a position where he was threatened with annihilation by the concentrated fire of the British battle fleet. He withdrew just in time, but sorely damaged, under cover of a heavy smoke screen and torpedo attack by his destroyer flotillas.
The tactical requirements of a modern fleet necessitate vari ous types of warships. The battleship remains as the predominant surface fighting unit. The battle cruiser claims certain tactical qualities, due to her greatly superior speed and power armament. But the limitation of capital ship tonnage by the Washington Treaty (q.v.) will probably see this type merged into that of the battleship. It is very questionable whether the lightly armoured British type of battle cruiser justified its existence as a fleet unit, however useful they may have proved in the World War when on detached service. The fleet type cruiser or light cruiser, as it used to be called, must remain in order to provide the outposts of the battle fleet. Their duties are, essentially, to reconnoitre and to keep the commander-in-chief informed as to its position and formation until battle is joined, after which they would close in and, acting as semi-independent squadrons, seize every opportunity to counter attacks by enemy light craft and to harry his aircraft carriers. These latter are a new fleet unit which may produce a novel and powerful influence on fleet tactics of the future. In suitable weather conditions, aircraft can take over a great deal, if not all, of the reconnaissance work of cruis ers. Observation from the air may be the means of effecting a junction between rival fleets, or of enabling a weaker fleet to evade action altogether. It may be the means whereby an ad miral may attain an overwhelming tactical advantage over a less well-served adversary. It may assist him to waylay and bring to action an evasive enemy, like the German fleet at Jutland. It may enable gunfire to be directed efficiently at a range so great that it would be impossible accurately to observe the fall of shot from the control tops of the ships, themselves. In addition, air craft have enhanced the torpedo menace by introducing it in a new form. Flying from the deck of a carrier, out of sight of the hostile fleet, a torpedo-carrying squadron may appear out of the mist or from behind a smoke screen with but little warning, dive down and release their torpedoes at almost point blank range. This is a form of torpedo attack against which a sure means of defence is not very easily devised.