This note transmitting the final draft of the treaty contained the following statements which were also made in an address delivered before the American Society of International Law on April 28, 1928, by the American Secretary of State, and which referred to the six major considerations emphasized by France in its draft of April 20 and prior diplomatic correspondence with the United States: "(I) Self-defense. There is nothing in the American draft of an anti-war treaty which restricts or impairs in any way the right of self defense. That right is inherent in every sovereign state and is implicit in every treaty. Every nation is free at all times and regardless of treaty provisions to defend its territory from attack or invasion and it alone is competent to decide whether circumstances require recourse to war in self-defense. If it has a good case, the world will applaud and not condemn its action. Express recognition by treaty of this inalienable right, however, gives rise to the same difficulty encountered in any effort to define aggression. It is the identical question ap proached from the other side. Inasmuch as no treaty provision can add to the natural right of self-defense, it is not in the interest of peace that a treaty should stipulate a juristic conception of self defense since it is far too easy for the unscrupulous to mold events to accord with an agreed definition.
"(2) The League Covenant. The Covenant imposes no affirmative primary obligation to go to war. The obligation, if any, is secondary and attaches only when deliberately accepted by a state. Article ten of the Covenant has, for example, been interpreted by a resolution submitted to the Fourth Assembly but not formally adopted owing to one adverse vote to mean that 'it is for the constitutional authorities of each member to decide, in reference to the obligation of preserving the independence and the integrity of the territory of members, in what degree the member is bound to assure the execution of this obligation by employment of its military forces.' There is, in my opinion, no necessary inconsistency between the Covenant and the idea of an unqualified renunciation of war. The Covenant can, it is true, be construed as authorizing war in certain circumstances but it is an authorization and not a positive requirement.
"(3) The Treaties of Locarno. If the parties to the treaties of Locarno are under any positive obligation to go to war, such obliga tion certainly would not attach until one of the parties has resorted to war in violation of its solemn pledges thereunder. It is therefore obvious that if all the parties to the Locarno treaties become parties to the multilateral anti-war treaty proposed by the United States, there would be a double assurance that the Locarno treaties would not be violated by recourse to arms. In such event it would follow that resort to war by any state in violation of the Locarno treaties would also be a breach of the multilateral anti-war treaty and the other parties to the anti-war treaty would thus as a matter of law be automatically released from their obligations thereunder and free to fulfill their Locarno commitments. The United States is entirely willing that all parties to the Locarno treaties should become parties to its proposed anti-war treaty either through signature in the first instance or by immediate accession to the treaty as soon as it comes into force in the manner provided in Article III. of the American draft, and it will offer no objection when and if such a suggestion is made.
"(4) Treaties of Neutrality. The United States is not informed as to the precise treaties which France has in mind and cannot therefore discuss their provisions. It is not unreasonable to suppose, however, that the relations between France and the states whose neutrality she has guaranteed are sufficiently close and intimate to make it possible for France to persuade such states to adhere reasonably to the anti-war treaty proposed by the United States. If this were done no party to the anti-war treaty could attack the neutralized states without violating the treaty and thereby automatically freeing France and the other Powers in respect of the treaty-breaking state from the obligations of the anti-war treaty. If the neutralized states were attacked by a state not a party to the anti-war treaty, the latter treaty would of course have no bearing and France would be as free to act under the treaties guaranteeing neutrality as if she were not a party to the anti-war treaty. It is difficult to perceive, therefore, how treaties guaranteeing neutrality can be regarded as necessarily preventing the conclusion by France or any other power of a multilateral treaty for the renunciation of war.
"(5) Relations with a State. As I have already pointed out there can be no question as a matter of law that violation of a multilateral anti-war treaty through resort to war by one party thereto would automatically release the other parties from their obligations to the treaty-breaking state. Any express recognition of
this principle of law is wholly unnecessary.
"(6) Universality. From the beginning it has been the hope of the United States that its proposed multilateral anti-war treaty should be world-wide in its application, and appropriate provision therefore was made in the draft submitted to the other Governments on April 13. From a practical standpoint it is clearly preferable, however, not to postpone the coming into force of an anti-war treaty until all the nations of the world Can agree upon the text of such a treaty and cause it to be ratified. For one reason or another a state so situated as to be no menace to the peace of the world might obstruct agreement or delay ratification in such manner as to render abortive the efforts of all the other Powers. It is highly improbable, moreover, that a form of treaty acceptable to the British, French, German, Italian and Japanese Governments as well as to the United States would not be equally acceptable to most, if not all, of the other Powers of the world. Even were this not the case, however, the coming into force among the above-named six Powers of an effective anti-war treaty and their observance thereof would be a practical guaranty against a second world war. This in itself would be a tremendous service to humanity and the United States is not willing to jeopardize the practical success of the proposal which it has made by conditioning the coming into force of the treaty upon prior universal or almost universal acceptance." The draft multilateral anti-war treaty proposed by the United States on June 23, 1928, was promptly accepted by the other 14 Governments thus addressed, and the definitive instrument was, as stated above, signed at Paris on Aug. 27, 1928. As soon as it had been signed all the other Powers of the world were f or mally notified of the fact and furnished with a copy of the treaty text. They were also informed that the United States would be happy to receive from them at any time appropriate notices of adherence to the treaty from those Governments wishing to con tribute to the success of the new movement for world peace by participating therein. The English text of the treaty, the first two articles of which it will be observed are practically identical with the corresponding articles of the bilateral treaty originally proposed by M. Briand, is as follows :— "Deeply sensible of their solemn duty to promote the welfare of mankind; "Persuaded that the time has come when a frank renunciation of war as an instrument of national policy should be made to the end that the peaceful and friendly relations now existing between their peoples may be perpetuated; "Convinced that all changes in their relations with one another should be sought only by pacific means and be the result of a peaceful and orderly process, and that any signatory Power which shall here after seek to promote its national interests by resort to war should be denied the benefits furnished by this Treaty ; "Hopeful that, encouraged by their example, all the other nations of the world will join in this humane endeavor and by adhering to the present Treaty as soon as it comes into force bring their peoples within "The High Contracting Parties solemnly declare in the names of their respective peoples that they condemn recourse to war for the solution of international controversies, and renounce it as an instrument of national policy in their relations with one another.
"The High Contracting Parties agree that the settlement or solution of all disputes or conflicts of whatever nature or of whatever origin they may be, which may arise among them, shall never be sought except by pacific means.
"The present Treaty shall be ratified by the High Contracting Parties named in the Preamble in accordance with their respective constitu tional requirements, and shall take effect as between them as soon as all their several instruments of ratification shall have been deposited at Washington.
"This Treaty shall, when it has come into effect as prescribed in the preceding paragraph, remain open as long as may be necessary for adherence by all the other Powers of the world. Every instrument evi dencing the adherence of a Power shall be deposited at Washington and the Treaty shall immediately upon such deposit become effective as between the Power thus adhering and the other Powers parties hereto.
"It shall be the duty of the Government of the United States to fur nish each Government named in the Preamble and every Government subsequently adhering to this Treaty with a certified copy of the Treaty and of every instrument of ratification or adherence. It shall also be the duty of the Government of the United States telegraphically to notify such Governments immediately upon the deposit with it of each instrument of ratification or adherence.