Hence, the direct bearing of the Treaty of Versailles on the naval problems of the Pacific. Under that treaty, the former German islands north of the Equator passed into the custody of Japan, while those south of the Equator were transferred to the British empire. As an element in naval strategy, these islands possess an immense potential importance. Since 1919 Japan has exercised mandatory powers over several island groups situated far out in the Pacific. Strategically, her most important acquisi tions are the Peleliu islands (Soo m. east of the Philippines) ; the Carolines ; the Marianas islands, excepting Guam, which is Ameri can territory; and the Marshall group, these latter being some 1,700 m. to the southwest of Hawaii. Light naval vessels, air craft and submarines, judiciously distributed among the islands named, would represent a serious menace to a hostile force ad vancing towards Japan from the east.
It is thus essential to note that under the mandate of the League of Nations, the use of these islands for warlike purposes and their fortification are forbidden. Of equal significance have been the results of the Washington Conference (q.v.). The covenants there arrived at in 1922 not only reduced the battle-fleets of the leading naval Powers according to a definite schedule, but they deal also with naval bases and have in some degree nullified the effect of the territorial changes in the Pacific for which the Ver sailles Treaty was responsible. Under the Washington Treaty the British empire, the United States and Japan agreed to main tain the status quo as to fortifications and naval bases in a series of highly important strategic positions in the Pacific. The United States, for example, is pledged not to improve in any way the shore defences or naval works in the Philippines, Guam or the Aleutian islands ; Japan accepts the like obligation in regard to the Bonin islands, Formosa and other insular possessions; while the British empire is debarred from adding to the naval resources of Hongkong.
The Hawaiian islands are also exempted, though they are more than 2,000 m. from the American mainland. Their position makes them invaluable as the pivoting centre of a fleet charged with the task of defending not only the western seaboard of the United States but the outlying territories of Alaska and Samoa.
The zone of agreement demarcated at the Washington Confer ence begins east of the meridian of io° E. long. Singapore lies just outside this limit and is thus not subject to the pledges against fortification. First utilised as a naval harbour in 1882, Singapore has been for many years the southern base of the British China Squadron. • Over the development of Singapore as the naval base of a battle-fleet, there has been serious controversy in Great Britain, successive Governments, Conservative and Labour, taking different views. The new dockyard was begun in
1924-25, and was advocated on grounds mainly, if not entirely, defensive. The contention is that Singapore is regarded by Aus tralia and New Zealand as the United States regards Hawaii. A naval station at Singapore would be an indirect but none the less effectual deterrent to plans, if they should ever be considered, for the invasion of Australia or New Zealand. The susceptibili ties of these Dominions have been aroused somewhat by the non renewal of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance.
Since the Washington Conference, competition in battleships has been abated. But additional attention has been directed to cruisers, of which Japan has constructed a powerful contingent. The range of action of cruisers has become a factor on which experts lay great emphasis. By Great Britain, with her numerous coaling stations and her interest in confined waters like the Medi terranean, small cruisers are held to be most useful. But the United States, surveying an ocean like the Pacific, which extends from the Arctic to the Antarctic regions, and has a breadth as great as io,000 m., and covers nearly one-half of the surface of the earth, is anxious for cruisers of the largest size; that is Io,000 tons. The Panama canal has enabled the United States to operate her fleet in two oceans, the Atlantic and the Pacific, and it is to the Pacific ocean in particular that she has devoted her naval developments. The fleets of the United States and Japan in the Pacific have become, therefore, the major determinants of the strategic situation. But, in the main, these imposing forces are dependent on shore communications, which shores are separ ated by thousands of miles. Even Hawaii and Singapore are outside of a fighting radius that would include Japan. No single Power or group of Powers, therefore, has achieved an absolute control of this vast area of sea. Up to the present, the Latin American Republics, bordering on the Pacific, for instance Chile and Peru, have not organized naval forces that seriously affect the situation. (See SINGAPORE; WASHINGTON CONFERENCE, etc.) BIBLIOGRAPHY.-World Peace Foundation, "Japan, America and the Great War," in A League of Nations, vol. i., No. 8 (1918) ; and "China, the United States and the War. Chino-Japanese Negotiations, 1915-18. Shantung and Its States," vol. ii., special number (1919) ; G. H. Scholefield, The Pacific Past and Future (1919) ; A. Bullard, A. B. C.'s of Disarmament and Pacific Problems (1921) ; H. C. Bywater, Sea-Power in the Pacific (1921) ; N. Golovin, Problems of the Pacific in the Twentieth Century (translated 1922) ; A. J. Toynbee, Survey of International 192o-23, PP. (1925) ; H. G. Miller, The Isthmian Highway (1929).