Conference of Paris

The debate in the plenary session—the one important discus sion in that body throughout the period of the conference— resulted in approval of the principle of the Covenant and brought forward various suggestions for amendment. President Wilson left on the following day for the United States.

The Covenant was revised by the commission and finally ap proved by the fifth plenary session of the conference on April 28, without change of a single word. It is to be doubted whether there were many sitting at that historic table who realized that with the acceptance of the Covenant a new phase of civilization had begun and that the League of Nations was its keystone. The Covenant specifically provided for safeguarding the Monroe Doctrine against actions by the League ; it contained a clause to permit any state to withdraw upon giving notice of its intention two years in advance. The chief objection to the Covenant raised in America was passed over. With the full support of President Wilson, Article X. was retained in the Covenant. See also LEAGUE OF NATIONS.

Council of Four.

Four days after President Wilson left for the United States, Clemenceau was shot by a fanatic. Although not dangerously wounded, he was confined to his home. Col. House, who had been delegated to take Wilson's place, came to meet him there and, with the return of Lloyd George from England, the same group was reformed which had worked with celerity and success during the Armistice proceedings. Thus the Council of Four took form. The Japanese plenipotentiary, Saionji, held to the policy of standing off when Japanese in terests were not concerned, especially when the matters under discussion pertained purely to a European problem.

Upon Wilson's return to Paris (March 14) he replaced House in these informal conferences. The four heads of states aban doned the Council of Ten. It was reduced to the five foreign ministers. Whenever they desired, the Four assumed the authority of the Ten as the Supreme Council of the Peace Conference and drew apart to confer in private. The ministers of foreign affairs continued to sit as a Council of Five, although they were con cerned chiefly with minor executive duties and other matters of routine. But, while the Four were still engrossed in negotiation with the recalcitrant German delegation, the Five went ahead with discussion of the terms to be given to Austria. The power

of the Peace Conference had been drawn into the hands of four men, and the Italian, Orlando, found that final decision belonged really to the Three—Clemenceau, Lloyd George and Wilson.

No one listened to the arguments of the Four except their in terpreter, Capt. Paul Mantoux, and later their secretary, Sir Maurice Hankey, who rendered invaluable service by keeping the minutes of their discussions and by drafting the resolutions upon which they agreed. On occasion, experts were summoned to give data and technical advice. Inter-Allied commissions were formed directly by the Four and ordered to report to them.

National Claims.

When Wilson returned to Paris (March 14) the problem of meeting the claims of France, Italy, Belgium and Japan immediately became acute. The French asked for continued occupation by the Allies of the Rhineland and the bridgeheads of Cologne, Coblenz and Mainz. Unauthorized de mands were made for the permanent separation from the Reich of German territory on the left bank of the Rhine. France asked further for complete sovereignty over the Saar Valley, as com pensation for its own mines which had been deliberately ruined by the German forces. The French representatives pressed vehemently for "integral reparation," assessment of actual damages done by the enemy and exaction of the total amount in reparation. France supported Poland's claim to complete sover eignty over Danzig and the approaches to that city.

Although at one time (April 7) President Wilson threatened to break off negotiations over these questions and return to the United States without finishing the task of peace-making, com promises that he could accept were found one after another. The scheme for a republic on the Rhine was repudiated, but agree ment was reached that the left bank of the Rhine, and a wide strip on the right bank, should be demilitarized and all fortifica tions razed, and that the Allies should maintain their joint military occupation for 15 years. It was to be continued if France, in the opinion of the Allies, was not then sufficiently secured against an unprovoked attack. The decision to prohibit union of Germany with Austria, described by Tardieu as one of Clemenceau's fun damentals, was inserted in the first draft of the German Treaty in May and remained there in the definite text of June 28.